"The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for participatory decentralization in Uruguay and Chile"

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Abstract

The aim of this research project is to study the ways in which territory—particularly its socio-cultural dimension—influences the participatory decentralization (PD) initiatives of the state from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. To achieve this objective, this project analyzed decentralization experiences at the municipal level within the national-level context of political decentralization processes in Uruguay and Chile. Uruguayan cases were compared with the Chilean ones based on Mill's method of difference, also known as "most-similar design," which is considered one of the most useful qualitative approaches in terms of studying democratization in Latin America (George & Bennett, 2005). However, I used Mill's method in two distinct ways, comparing similar municipalities between the two countries, which allowed me to vary the national-level political project while holding municipal characteristics relatively constant; and comparing municipal cases within each of the two countries, which allowed me to vary the socio-cultural dimension of territory within a single participatory decentralization model. Comparing the effect of the political project on PD outcomes to the effect of the socio-cultural dimension of territory allowed me to assess which factor proves more important to local outcomes.

Although there are significant differences between Uruguay and Chile in terms of their political projects of decentralization, rural and poor municipalities with a high percentage of minority ethnic communities—in this case, Afro-descendant populations in Uruguay and indigenous Mapuche peoples in Chile—, still face deep, structural obstacles to implementing participatory decentralization, differences which are explained by the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territory and by the effect of geographical residence on the PD outcomes over the last decade. This alternative approach to

participatory decentralization based on the socio-cultural dimension of territory highlights the structural obstacles to successful participatory decentralization, such as clientelism, caudillism, centralism and racism. It also implies that deepening participatory decentralization requires a strategy to improve civic engagement and horizontal governance of the local civil society. In also has the potential to foster accountability and to redistribute political power at the municipal level in both countries.

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Chapter 1: <u>Introduction</u>

This research project is based on the central concerns and questions that emerged from my experiences as a social worker at the Ministry of Social Development in Uruguay, such as the design and implementation of a territorial management model throughout the country in order to address poverty and inequalities. The project is also based on my academic interests, including the building of citizenship and the strengthening of democracy in Latin America. Social workers consider themselves to be professionals and intellectuals engaged with the tension between the reproduction of inequalities and the production of resistance. Therefore, they must be able to understand and analyze social inequalities in order to promote capacities for alternative resistance from a human rights perspective, among the most excluded and marginalized communities of our contemporary societies (Iamamoto, 2003:29-95).

This study is also based on and motivated by my previous involvement in decentralization and social cohesion projects, fostered by the national government in the context of a deepening decentralization process over the last decade, throughout the country and particularly in the rural areas of Uruguay. As we shall see, although a 2009 new legal framework for decentralization established the third level of government with the creation of 89 municipalities in Uruguay, many obstacles and contradictions still remain more an a decade after its initial implementation.

The implementation of decentralization policy and its consequences (outcomes) has been thoroughly studied and discussed by researchers in recent decades, especially in terms of its socio-political aspects as well as in terms of governability, governance and accountability in the context of state reform in Latin America. From comparative and macro-level explanations related to political economy and political reforms, to studies

focused on sub-national politics, decentralization policy has been deeply analyzed by scholars and included by national governments on the public agendas of Latin American countries for years (Eaton, 2004; Falleti, 2010; Goldfrank, 2011). Most of these studies have emphasized the impact of the political project or the ideological model of decentralization on the successful implementation of this policy; many studies have also focused on the outcomes of decentralization in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of public management, legal framework reforms or deepening participatory democracy (Coraggio, 2004; Goldfrank, 2011; Grindle, 2007; Veneziano, 1999). Even though some Latin American countries have established and implemented a participatory model of decentralization in the last decades, significant obstacles and difficulties still remain in these countries. In addition, despite the fact that a significant portion of the literature argues that decentralization always devolves power to governors and mayors, the effects of decentralization on sub-national politics and on territorial interests are varied (Falleti, 2010).

I argue that analyzing decentralization from the perspective of the socio-cultural dimension of territory permits one to understand these contradictions and obstacles to deepening participatory decentralization at the local level. Furthermore, although significant studies on sub-national politics have been conducted over recent years, there are few comparative approaches to decentralization from the perspective of the socio-cultural dimension of territory. The socio-cultural dimension of territory consists of socio-cultural characteristics of a specific territory which include the ways that a community organizes itself in order to face and manage their development problems; the types of relationships between political/social leaders and citizens that are built over years and which imply the construction of leaderships and the distribution of power within the

community; and the individual identification process which involves the internalization of agreed-upon values, customs, ideas and feelings about self and others.

Therefore, this socio-cultural dimension of territory is understood to consist of four sub-components: social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries. Thus, this research project considers territory as a crucial category to analyze participatory decentralization processes in order to transform sectoral and centralist public management in the Latin American region. I argue that participatory decentralization processes depend on territorial characteristics, particularly on their socio-cultural and political dimensions. In this regard, territory not only refers to the ideas of land, terrain, space, measures, boundaries, rights and authority that are frequently connected to the nation-state (Moore, 2015; Sassen, 2006) but also implies social relations, practices, power, meaning and identities (Delaney, 2009; Escobar, 2008). In fact, territory implies a socio-cultural construction in which social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries are crucial to determining the form, function and significance of a given territory. Therefore, territory becomes a constructed reality built by people through their political actions toward collective goals in order to improve their communities (Agnew, 2013; Antonsich, 2010).

In the current socio-historical and political context of Latin America, dealing with this theoretical issue is not only pertinent and opportune but also extremely necessary since what is at issue is how to create the best opportunity for building citizenship and strengthening democracy at the local level. Exploring the socio-cultural dimension as a methodological strategy to transform deeply rooted cultural patterns—both in state institutions and in civil society—is crucial, since Latin American states were built based on European cultural patterns that shaped imaginaries, mentalities and cultural identities well into the present. States did not grant full citizenship rights, either de jure or de facto,

to all groups; missing were groups such as indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, women, youth, peasants and other minorities in the nineteenth century (Escobar, 2008: 200-253). Thus, the aim of this study consists of analyzing the ways that territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) influences participatory decentralization outcomes. Specifically, this study attempts to understand the main factors that influence the success or failure of the participatory decentralization policy in Uruguay and Chile, from a comparative, qualitative and interdisciplinary perspective.

To achieve this aim, three cases including—two rural municipalities and one urban municipality in Uruguay,—were compared with corresponding cases in Chile; the comparison was performed based on Mill's method of difference, also known as "most-similar design" (George & Bennett, 2005). I used this method in two distinct ways: first by comparing similar municipalities between the two countries in order to vary the political project at the national level; and second by comparing municipal cases within each of the two countries, to permit variation in the socio-cultural dimension of territory within a single participatory decentralization model.

To understand the influence of the socio-cultural dimensions of territory on participatory decentralization outcomes, the municipal cases were selected to be relatively poor (exhibiting a low or middle socio-economic level, measured by the percentage of unsatisfied basic needs) but varying in other characteristics of interest to this study. Those independent variables are the presence of ethnic minorities (measured by a higher than average percentage of Afro-descendant population in Uruguay and Mapuche communities in Chile) to analyze the ethno-cultural dimension effect (ethnic/non-ethnic), and the geographical location of the municipality (rural/urban areas) to analyze the geographical residence effect. The municipal cases were selected to be relatively poor in order to analyze the impact of the participatory decentralization policy on human

development in each country. Henceforth, I will refer to the three cases in each country as rural/ethnic, rural/non-ethnic, and urban/non-ethnic. The socio-economic level (low or middle), the geographical residence (rural/urban) and the ethnicity are variables that characterize a specific territory. Indeed, they are variables of one of the sub-components (e.g. social relations, power relations, imaginaries) of the socio-cultural dimension of territory, namely identity.

The sub-components of the socio-cultural dimension of territory (i.e. social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries) impact participatory decentralization (PD) outcomes by affecting the capability of local government and civil society to successfully implement this policy. Social relations, for example, influence the existence of horizontal governance in a specific territory, since this type of governance requires a high level of communication between individuals and a high capacity for self-organization in civil society. In addition, social relations influence the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability as well as the skills required by civil society for decision-making processes. Power relations also have an effect on citizens' appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability. Power relations with a more of horizontal structure between political leaders and citizens can transform clientelism and dependence into autonomy and cooperation.

Traditional, conservative and disengaged identity, which implies the historical exclusion of and discrimination against ethnic groups (e.g. against Afro-descendants in Uruguay and against the Mapuche community in Chile), can contribute to the insufficiency or lack of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, to authoritarian leadership, to the lack of or difficulties for self-organization; and to weaker skill and development of decision-making processes in civil society. However, modern and cohesive identity, which integrates ethnic and cultural diversity, produces horizontal, transparent and qualified leadership of

political leaders, can contribute to necessary mechanisms for accountability and stronger capabilities for decision-making processes in local civil society. Finally, reliant imaginaries which imply a strong connection with the land, trust between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity related to social problems and needs, lead to greater engagement by civil society and more contribution to building horizontal governance through synergy and networks. Furthermore, these kinds of imaginaries increase the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability. This kind of interaction between the socio-cultural dimension and PD outcomes are explored in detail throughout the case studies.

The within-country comparison between rural/ethnic group and rural/non-ethnic group cases allowed me to focus on variation in the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality and its effects on participatory outcomes within one country. The within-country comparison between rural/non-ethnic group and urban/non-ethnic group permitted identification of the geographical residence effect within one country. If the three municipal cases in Uruguay evidenced national similarities, and the three municipal cases in Chile also revealed national similarities, but the Uruguayan cases were different from the Chilean ones, then we may infer that political project is the most important factor to explain the PD outcomes. Thus, in more nationally similar cases, one should observe the political project effect on participatory outcomes within one country. However, if the cross-country comparisons between the matched municipal cases exhibited more important similarities than the three cases do within each country, then we may infer that the socio-cultural dimension of territory is a more important factor in understanding PD outcomes than the political project. While not discounting the role of the national political project and other institutional and political factors, my analysis suggests that socio-

cultural dimension of territory is the most important to understanding variability in participatory decentralization outcomes.

The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Uruguay was observed through the comparison between these two case studies: the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (rural, low socio-economic level and high percentage of Afro-descendant population) and the Municipality of Santa Rosa (rural, low socio-economic level and no significant Afro-descendant population). The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in civil society in Uruguay was evidenced by deeper difficulties for building horizontal governance; by more challenging obstacles to the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and by the lower capacity and skills for decision-making processes and local development in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblia compared to Santa Rosa. Regarding local government, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality was observed in the greater insufficiency of spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by the municipality, and by the lower quality of representation in Isidoro Noblía than in Santa Rosa.

The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Chile was observed through the comparison between the Municipality of Perquenco (rural, low socio-economic level and high percentage of Mapuche communities) and the Municipality of Empedrado (rural, low socio-economic level and no significant Mapuche communities). The social and political exclusion of ethnic groups, like Mapuche communities in Perquenco influences PD outcomes in both actors: local civil society and government. When compared with the Municipality of Empedrado, the study observed that civil society in the Municipality of Perquenco faced greater challenges in building horizontal governance and in the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, as well as lower capabilities and skills for decision-making processes and

local development. In the arena of local government, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality was evidenced by fewer spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by the municipality and by the lower quality of representation in Perquenco than in Empedrado.

In relation to the cross-country comparison between the rural/ethnic group municipalities in Uruguay and in Chile, more similarities in terms of participatory decentralization outcomes were observed between than within each country. Indeed, although very different political projects of decentralization have been implemented in these countries in the last decade, many similarities between the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Uruguay) and the Municipality of Perquenco (Chile) have been observed during this study. Both municipalities have experienced very similar participatory decentralization outcomes in terms of the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and in terms of the quality of representation by the local government as well as in terms of horizontal governance, the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and capacity for decision-making processes by local civil society.

The effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes within one country was analyzed, taking into account the similarities and differences between municipalities regarding the geographical residence (urban or rural) in each country, by keeping some control variables such as the socio-economic level (low), and no significant ethnic group (Afro-descendant population or Mapuche communities), and the same intervening variable, such as the national political project of decentralization within one country (Uruguay or Chile), constant. Regarding the comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group case study and the rural/non-ethnic group case study in Uruguay, the selected cases were Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa respectively. The observed differences between Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa can be explained

by the effect of geographical residence (urban or rural municipality) on the PD outcomes in these case studies. Indeed, although there are some similar control variables—low socio-economic level and no significant ethnic group (Afro-descendent population)—and the same intervening variable—the current national political project of participatory decentralization, led by left-wing political party *Frente Amplio,* and the same political party in departmental and municipal government in both municipalities (*Frente Amplio-MPP*)—the PD outcomes in Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa present remarkable differences. These differences could be explained by the geographical residence effect on PD outcomes.

Regarding the comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group, and the rural/non-ethnic group in Chile, the selected cases were the Municipality of Recoleta and the Municipality of Empedrado respectively. The differences observed between the Municipality of Recoleta and the Municipality of Empedrado could be explained by the effect of geographical residence on the PD outcomes in these case studies. Although there are some similar control variables—low socio-economic level, no indigenous people (no high percentage of Mapuche population)—and the same intervening variable (the current national political project of decentralization led by the center-right wing political party *Renovación Nacional*)—the PD outcomes in the Municipality of Recoleta and the Municipality of Empedrado present significant differences. The Municipality of Recoleta is characterized by a tendency toward strong social relations, a tendency toward horizontal power relations, a modern and cohesive identity, and a committed and reliant imaginary. Although clientelism and paternalism are still observed in some political leaders, the increasingly horizontal relationship between political leaders and civil society leads to a higher quality of representation in terms of transparency, legitimacy and horizontal leadership of political and social leaders in Recoleta than in Empedrado.

Finally, a cross-country comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group case studies in Uruguay (Municipality A) and Chile (Municipality of Recoleta); and a cross-country comparison between the rural/non-ethnic group case studies in Uruguay (Municipality of Santa Rosa) and in Chile (Municipality of Empedrado) were discussed in order to analyze the cross-country geographical residence effect versus the influence of the national political project on the PD outcomes in these countries. More similarities in the cross-country comparison than within each country were observed regardless of which political project had been leading the process of decentralization. Moreover, as was expected, better PD outcomes in terms of building horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of civil society, as well as increasing promotion of spaces for accountability and quality of representation were found among urban municipalities with non-ethnic groups (low percentage of Afro-descendants or Mapuche communities) in both countries.

Therefore, effective implementation of a decentralization policy that truly fosters human development must takes into account territory, in all its complexity and diversity—particularly its socio-cultural dimension (which includes social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries)—to understand the subjectivity of individuals and their practices. This dimension may also help us understand possible collective actions to address development problems and propose the best solutions for residents' own communities. Furthermore, this research project attempted to apply the concept of territory in order to understand the main difficulties and challenges of implementing participatory decentralization in Southern Cone countries. Indeed, this investigation offers a new perspective on the failure and success of PD in Latin America by examining an alternative to mainstream explanations such as macro-level explanations related to political economy and political reforms, studies on sub-national politics and the relevance

of the political project, and institutional designs behind the decentralization process. This alternative approach to participatory decentralization analysis, focused on the socio-cultural dimension of territory, demonstrates that although very different political projects and institutional arrangements have been implemented in Uruguay (social and political decentralization) and those implemented in Chile (administrative decentralization) in the last decade, similar PD outcomes were observed in the two cross-country comparisons conducted by this research project: between rural/ethnic cases (ethno-cultural effect), and between rural/non-ethnic group and urban/non-ethnic group cases (geographical residence effect).

Chapter 2: <u>Theoretical framework</u>

2.1 <u>The decentralization process in Latin America</u>: *Debates about its origin, causes and consequences.*

This research project is based on three main bodies of theories: a post-developmental and post-colonial approach to define territory and culture (A. Escobar, S. Hall & P. Du Gay, J. Scott, E. Gudynas), institutionalism and comparative politics to define participatory democracy and decentralization (L. Avritzer, G. Baiochi, B. Goldfrank, K. Eaton, T. Falleti, M. Grindle, B. De Souza), and popular education and participatory methodology to conduct research activities and to analyze the main findings (P. Freire, R. Chambers). Indeed, the post-colonial and post-developmental approach was applied to define the concept of territory as a relational and socio-cultural construction space and its implications on participatory decentralization (PD), particularly one of its main components: identity. This theoretical approach was also applied to understand how territory may become an empowering space to foster collective action and overcome rooted caudillism and clientelism in municipal government which negatively affect participatory decentralization outcomes, especially regarding the most excluded ethnic groups like Afro-descendants and Mapuche communities. An institutionalism and comparative politics perspective were used to analyze the origin, implementation, outcomes, success and failures, and current challenges in terms of deepening democracy in the Latin American region. Popular education analysis and participatory methodology were applied during and after the fieldwork in order to understand how previous conditions of civil society in terms of learning processes happen and influence PD outcomes, such as the capacity for self-organization, the appropriation of spaces for accountability and skills for decision-making processes, in local communities and

neighbourhoods in Uruguay and Chile. Applying a classic comparative method, typical of more institutionalist approaches to participatory decentralization, to analyze a post-colonial concept —territory —constitutes a unique theoretical contribution of this thesis to this academic topic.

In recent decades, decentralization has been receiving increasing attention from politicians, scholars and citizens in Latin America. Most studies on the origin, causes and consequences of decentralization processes from a comparative perspective are based on a macro-level explanation related to political economy and political reforms. In addition, although there are many important studies on sub-national politics, there are few comparative approaches to decentralization from the perspective of the socio-cultural dimension of territory; this will be the main contribution of this research project.

Different contributions about the origin, causes and consequences of achieving successful decentralization experiences have been developed regarding single countries such as Mexico (Grindle, 2007) or to the South American sub-region based on a comparative and historical perspective (Eaton, 2004; Falleti, 2010; Goldfrank, 2011). In fact, for some scholars the origin of the decentralization process in Latin America is linked to state reform proposed by international agencies. Based on neo-liberal ideology, these reforms aimed at transforming the state in terms of its functioning, capacity, efficiency and effectiveness through the reduction of fiscal cost, privatization of services and the reduction of state functions in order to deal with the crisis of the welfare state in the mid-1970s and 1980s (Coraggio, 2004; Falleti, 2007; Grindle, 2007; Veneziano, 1999; Ziccardi & Cardozo, 2009).

The decentralization project in Latin America is also considered to be the natural consequence of the collapse of developmental states with centralized command and

planning structures. The earliest decentralization policies of the post-developmental era began in the late 1970s and the process continued throughout the following two decades. In fact, it was the region of the world that implemented the most radical changes, second only to Spain. In addition, after centuries of being governed by appointed officials at the local level almost all of South America's citizens elected their mayors, as a result of decentralization (Falleti, 2010: 1-15). However, dictatorships interrupted citizen elections in most Latin American countries during the decade of 1970. Indeed, municipal governments were elected before the dictatorship, but during the authoritarian regime they were appointed by the President in Chile. Municipal elections were re-established in 1992 once democracy was restored in this country. In Uruguay, the first municipal elections were held in 2010 when a new legal framework created municipalities in this country.

However, the phenomenon of decentralization itself is not unique to the contemporary period. Eaton (2004) questions the connection between decentralization and the contemporary macroeconomic and political processes, since the attempt to decentralize and re-centralize the state occurred earlier in some countries. One explanation emphasizes the causal role played by fundamental reorientations of economic policy (Eaton, 2004:1-24). Another macro-level explanation states that structural changes such as urbanization and economic development strengthen the tendency to decentralize. However, it was a political process that led the process of decentralization after the dictatorship in Brazil. In addition, the type of territorial interests (national or sub-national) is the main factor leading to the adoption of different types of decentralization policies (Falleti, 2005: 327-344).

Finally, according to Mardonez (2006), there are different interpretations of the character of decentralization policies in Latin America. One of them states that it was the result of

the democratization process promoted by political parties after the dictatorship (Eaton, 2004; Grindle, 2007). The second one argues that it was an electoral strategy developed by political parties in order to achieve more political power within municipalities, as in the case of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* in Brazil (O'Neill, 2003). The third interpretation proposes, that most of the reforms promoted within Andean countries were top-down processes, not bottom-up ones. In fact, when there are no pressures from the bottom, decentralization often occurs as a result of conflict of interests among higher-level actors, as occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (Eaton, 2004: 18).

2.2   Which factors influence successful decentralization in Latin America?

Although Latin American countries have implemented significant reforms in order to successfully decentralize the structure of the state, many obstacles during and beyond these reforms have been observed in the last decades. Some scholars analyze how decentralization intersects with democratization and good governance, emphasizing the role of sub-national institutions and local politics (Eaton, 2004; Falleti, 2010; Grindle, 2007). Others focus on how power is distributed between the central and local bureaucracies (Falleti, 2010; Baiochi & Silva, 2008). Additionally, scholars have shown that the effects of decentralization on the intergovernmental balance of power are dependent on the temporal sequencing of different types of decentralization policies: administrative, fiscal, or political (Falleti, 2010:15-20). The prevailing territorial interests (national or sub-national) in each decentralization coalition influence the type of decentralization reform adopted. Indeed, the politics and power relations between political actors within a particular territory affect not only the process but also the outcomes of decentralization (Falleti, 2010:15-20).

Despite a significant body of literature which argues that decentralization always devolves power to governors and mayors, the effects of decentralization on sub-national politics and on territorial interests are varied. Policies are not only the result of politics and politicians' preferences: "policies also create politics" (Falleti, 2010: 3). The study of decentralization in Latin America shows that the early policies had consequences on later reforms. Furthermore, the meaning and goals of decentralization policies vary across the type of nation-state they seek to reform. Thus, decentralization processes must be analyzed in the context of the particular type of nation-state in which they take place (Eaton, 2004: 15; Falleti, 2010: 13). Many important changes in the relationship between national and sub-national governments cannot be attributed to changes in development models (Eaton, 2004: 16-17). More recently, in the last two decades of market-oriented policies, it is possible to identify alternating moments of expansion and contraction in the powers assigned to sub-national actors. Both democratization and decentralization can be understood as changes that divide and fragment, rather than concentrate, power. While democratization redistributes power among executive, legislative, and judicial actors, decentralization redistributes power across levels of government (Eaton, 2004: 16-17).

Other scholars analyze how local governance is affected by the dynamics of political competition, the capacity of leaders to mobilize resources for change, the modernization of public administration and the participation of civil society (Grindle, 2007: 10). However, in some cases, clientelistic practices continued and affected the allocation of public resources. Clientelism, party connections and personal relationships show the importance of traditional political relationships in limiting the effectiveness of local leadership (Grindle, 2007: 1-18). Clientelism and caudillism are two similar types of relationship between powerful leaders and groups or individuals that emerged during Latin American revolutions in the 19th century. Caudillism appeared when central

government was incapable of imposing its will on the whole nation. Caudillo figures were linked to the *encomenderos* (the most powerful public position during colonialism) who managed encomienda and exercised control over indigenous people and peasants during the colonial time. The encomenderos then became the *hacendados,* landowners of large *haciendas* (farms) who exercised economic and religious power over indigenous, priests and peasants. Caudillos emerged as military leaders in wars of independence, nation-building and anarchy throughout the entire region in the decade of 1810. The precursors of caudillos were leaders (like gauchos) who reacted to changing conditions in the late colonial period. Before that time there was no space for the emergence of caudillos because Spanish America was the most bureaucratic empire in the world (Lynch, 1992: 402-424; Pizano, 2001: 74-82).

Caudillos responded to different kinds of pressure groups and represented regional interests. They became benefactors, a source of patronage, who attracted support (clientage) by promising their followers public offices and other rewards when they gained power. The reward most appreciated was land. Indeed, a caudillo's promise was preferred to the offer of a bureaucrat or legislator. The mutual needs of patron and client became one of the pillars of caudillism in the new republics (Lynch, 1992: 402-424). The relationship between the caudillo (patron) and individuals, groups and popular classes (clients) was exercised through protection and benefits so it was based on mutual interests, loyalty and reciprocity. This authoritarian relationship benefited the elites and was reproduced over centuries through the present in most Latin American countries (Lynch, 1992: 402-424; Pizano, 2001: 74-82).

 Finally, the system of government also affects the decentralization process, but it is not necessarily an obstacle. A unitary government system such as the Uruguayan one can achieve some degree of participatory decentralization, while formally decentralized

political systems, like federal Argentina, may be less successful (Falleti, 2010; Litvack, 1998; Mitchell, 2008).

2.3 <u>A fundamental factor?:</u> *The political project and its conception of decentralization*

Even though there are many factors that influence the decentralization process, one of the most important is the political project behind the policy, because it shapes both implementation and outcomes. The political project of decentralization in Latin America refers to the model of decentralization, which is influenced not only by the ideology of the national government and the political opposition, but also by the previous institutional arrangements, legal framework and the role of international agencies in the implementation of this policy. From a market-oriented perspective, promoted by international agencies, decentralization was conceived of as a technocratic fix, through privatization and deregulation that would transform states into more effective and efficient apparatuses. One of the most economically successful examples of the neoliberal project in the region was that implemented in Chile by General Augusto Pinochet in the context of the military dictatorship often described as "authoritarian capitalism" (Garretón, 1983: 109-119). In Chile, the dictatorship started in 1973, when the military carried out a military coup, deposed President Salvador Allende and established the *Junta Militar* (Military Board) led by Augusto Pinochet. This authoritarian regime lasted for seventeen years and ended in 1990 when President Patricio Aylwin was democratically elected by citizens, after a plebiscite denied a new period of administration to Pinochet in 1988.

Until 1973 the Chilean political process was distinguished by a "backbone" of three interrelated phenomena: import substitution industrialization; increasing social inclusion; and the existence of a democratic political regime. It was believed by the military forces

that these phenomena caused the "crisis" of socialism that preceded dictatorship in Chile, and therefore needed rectifying (Garretón, 1983: 23-35). Military regimes in the Southern Cone underwent two stages of development: an initial phase of reaction, characterized by the task of eliminating adversaries and a later phase of institutionalization in which the regime attempted to establish new rules and procedures to guide social and political actors (Garretón, 1983: 125-129). Indeed, the Chilean dictatorship was characterized by these two phases or "dimensions:" 1) A reactive dimension expressed through the brutal repression of popular organizations and social movements such as Unidad Popular, based on the national security ideology, violating individual and social rights, and destroying the "system of mediations" between state and civil society to restore the national "order." 2) The "foundational dimension" focused on stabilizing the economy through the national project of capitalism, based on a technocratic management led by the "Chicago Boys" (Garretón, 1983: 132, 135; Garretón, 1983: 131-143). This "capitalist revolution" implied deregulated markets, political indifference toward the economy, and competitive individuals (Moulian, 1997: 15-30).

In 1979, more than two thirds of Latin America was living under military regimes. Authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone of South America were distinguished by capitalist restructuring, anti-popular reaction, anti-communism, the physical elimination of enemies and the violent destruction of any popular organization, and inspired by the US-sponsored doctrine of national security (Garretón, 1983:89-105; Loveman, 1997; Moulian, 1997). All these regimes left deep structural transformations in their societies and economies. Their policies and practices resulted in the disintegration of the "backbone" of these societies, destroying the network of social organizations in most Latin American countries (Garretón, 1983: 21-35).

In Uruguay, the civil-military dictatorship was established when the constitutional president Juan María Bordaberry, along with the military elite, carried out a coup (*golpe de estado*), dissolving the Parliament in 1973. This authoritarian regime participated in the *Plan Condor* or Condor Operation—an agreement between Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and the United States to persecute leftist political parties in the Latin American region in the context of the Cold War. Dictatorship ended when President Julio María Sanguinetti was democratically elected in 1984. The transition to democracy started with a plebiscite promoted by military government in which citizens rejected the authoritarian regime and the proposed constitutional reform by military elites in 1980. In addition, an agreement between military elites and political parties—except the Partido Nacional—known as *Pacto del Club Naval* (Naval Club Pact) granted impunity for the crimes committed by the military during the dictatorship. The authoritarian period was also distinguished by the proscription of political parties and labour unions, media censorship, the persecution, kidnapping, forced disappearance and murder of opponents to the military regime, particularly against members of the Communist Party (Busquets & Delbono, 2016).

According to Loveman (1997):

> During the 1970s and the 1980s the transition from military to civilian rule in Latin America was usually accompanied by either a new constitution or significant reform of the existing constitution. In Chile, the 1980 Constitution imposed by the military and amended in 1989, provided a framework for transition. (p. 374)

In Uruguay, after citizens rejected the Constitution proposed by the military in a 1980 plebiscite, negotiations between military elites and civilian, electoral and constitutional reforms facilitated the transition from 1984 to 1986, without eliminating language that

authorized the president to "take necessary security measures" (Loveman, 1997, p. 374). In many countries such as Chile, the transitional constitutions not only recognized a legitimate political role for the military but also expanded it, justifying military participation at all levels of policymaking and administration. Much of this legislation remained operational after the transition to elected civilian governments in the 1980s. National security laws were often supplemented with "antiterrorism" laws (Loveman, 1997: 366-397).

National security legislation altered the meaning of democracy in Latin America by imposing severe constraints, both psychological and legal. This means that any public protests, disturbances or activity by political parties, social movements, or trade unions are viewed as legitimate security concerns, requiring surveillance by military intelligence. This has represented a significant barrier to broad public contestation, to free and fair elections, to the normal exercise of civil authority, to the ability of elected governments to initiate policy and to the effective enjoyment of civil rights (Loveman, 1997: 377-388). In Chile, after the military coup in 1973 and particularly during the 1980s, people timidly started to get involved again in some grass-roots (or popular) organizations. These organizations were intended to help their members address problems such as human rights abuses, inadequate housing, malnutrition, employment issues and health care requirements. Political parties, repressed and forbidden during the dictatorship, had to rebuild their ties with the Chilean society. They were semi-tolerated following the start of democratic protests in 1983.

Oxhorn (1994) states: "The divisions within the opposition made it impossible for political parties to create the consensus needed for initiating a genuine transition to democracy before 1988" (p.53). To succeed, with or without mobilizations, the opposition needed consensus on a concrete alternative (Oxhorn, 1994: 49-68; Roberts,

1998: 81-83). The mediation played by political parties, particularly the coalitions and alliances within the party system between left and center, in the form of the center-left coalition Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy[1]) was crucial for the emergence of a coherent political opposition to the Pinochet regime. However, "authoritarian enclaves" left behind by the Pinochet regime still remain and will require time to be eliminated (Garretón, 1983: 23-35; Moulian, 1997: 37-44; Navia, 2010: 298-328; Siavelis, 2009: 3-21).

Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, the Chilean state, led by the *Concertación por la Democracia,* has been concerned with the relationship between civil society and state, especially during Michelle Bachelet's first administration (2006-2010) known as "gobierno ciudadano" (the citizen government). Indeed, the arrival of Bachelet to the presidency in 2006 represented a political change, since she was the first woman to reach this position and she promised bottom-up mechanisms of participatory democracy (e.g. participatory budgeting in municipalities and civil society councils). However, her government did not actually implement institutional changes to achieve such a transformation (Navia, 2010; Weeks & Borzutzki, 2012: 105). In addition, although *Concertación* governments from 1990 to 2010 have promoted several reforms to increase social spending, to reduce poverty and to create a social safety net for the needy, this coalition continues to identify its economic model as neo-liberalism with a human face—which reflects the extent to which Pinochet's legacy remains a defining factor (Navia, 2010: 298-328). Participation has been transformed into an instrument for state efficiency and effectiveness, and the civil service remains a centralist bureaucratic apparatus with a top-down structure and a technocratic decision-making style; many internal

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[1] The Concertación was a Chilean coalition of center-left political parties founded in 1988.

contradictions and ambiguities can still be observed (Cleuren, 2007:3-18; Eaton, 2004: 218-244; Haughney, 2012: 201-217).

For instance, the *Concertación*, during its first administration period (1990-1994), proposed the protection of indigenous lands and respect for indigenous cultures, but also rejected the new demands for collective rights to territory and political autonomy advocated for Mapuche organizations. Throughout the four administrations between 1990 and 2010, the Concertación supported industrial and infrastructure projects over the demands of local communities and indigenous peoples (Haughney, 2012: 203-207). Indeed, such contradictions has been also observed during all democratically-elected governments after the dictatorship in Chile. Indeed, systematic violence and repression against Mapuche communities, particularly in the La Araucanía region, have been observed, as denounced by national and international organisms such as the National Institute of Human Rights of Chile, the United Nations committees, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Amnesty International. For instance, a Mapuche leader was murdered by national police (Carabineros), in the context of a historical conflictive situation between Mapuche communities and forestry companies in the La Araucanía region in November 2018 (DW, 2018; DW, 2021; United Nations, 2013).

Other members of Mapuche communities including Lonko like Norín Catriman as well as activists for indigenous human rights, have suffered from criminalization and imprisonment by the national authorities, based on the Anti-Terrorist Law N° 18.314, in the last decade. This case was denounced by the Human Rights Committee in 2007 and by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 2009 (INDH, 2013; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2014). Different international organizations have denounced violations of human rights against Mapuche communities, citing the lack of self-determination, the lack of security and liberty, the cruel, inhuman

and degrading treatment by the national authorities, the discrimination, the difficulties to participate in public affairs, and the lack of equality before the law and the court in Chile (UNPO, 2014). Finally, researchers observe that the Chilean political system is characterized by the heritage of "protected democracy" suggesting that Chilean democracy is more procedural than substantive, and functions to constrain collective action (Moulian, 1997: 75-76; Heiss, 2017: 470-472).

Despite the regional influence of a market-oriented model of decentralization, in some Latin American countries, leftist political parties conceived of decentralization as an opportunity to deepen democracy and participation, to promote social equality, and to transform the model of the state from an alternative perspective. In Uruguay this process was led by the *Frente Amplio*[2] (Broad Front) in the 1990s; in Brazil, it was led by the *Partido dos Trabalhadores*[3] (Worker's Party) from 1989 onward (Avritzer, 2010; Canel, 2010; De Souza Santos, 2005; Goldfrank, 2011; Veneziano, 1999; Ziccardi & Cardoso, 2009). Indeed, decentralization and participation are considered by some as deeply linked; their combination is proposed as the key to improving government performance, activating citizens and deepening a substantive democracy. Decentralization and participation are separate but complementary concepts though the former is considered a necessary step to achieving the latter (Goldfrank, 2002; Veneziano, 1999). Alternative projects and models of decentralization based on citizen participation, accountability and inclusive local development emerged in several Latin American contexts—notably the Participatory Budget (PB) in Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 1989, in the Municipality of

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[2] The Frente Amplio Party (FA) is a Uruguayan center-left coalition of political parties created in 1971.
[3] Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) is a Brazilian center-left political party launched by a heterogeneous group made up of militants opposed to Brazil's military government, trade unionists, left-wing intellectuals and Catholics linked to the liberation theology in 1980.

Montevideo (Uruguay) in 1990, and in the metropolitan area of Caracas (Venezuela) in 1993[4].

The Brazilian and the Uruguayan leftist political parties aimed to transform an elitist democracy into a deliberative one from the local level. The core of their reform focused on creating new institutions to give citizens influence over government infrastructure budgets. Porto Alegre's PB process met each of these goals, becoming a successful international reference. In Montevideo, the participation program was less capable of sustaining citizen participation and engagement in the decision-making process. However, government transparency and responsiveness improved, as did the delivery of public services. Participatory decentralization was conceived within a broader state reform process which pursued a transformation of bureaucracy from a sectorial-vertical logic to a horizontal territorial one (Veneziano, 1999: 2-28). This transformation supposes that territorial needs and problems are taken into account from a comprehensive perspective. This new logic implies coordination and synergy among different ministries and agencies as well as governance networks between the state and citizens, to improve the quality and effectiveness of public policies (Buquet & Piñeiro, 2016; Canel, 2010; Cardarello et al., 2011; Delamaza et al, 2012; De Souza Santos, 2005; Goldfrank, 2011; Golfrank, 2002; Veneziano, 1999; Wampler, 2004).

The key factor in the left's transformation was the change from seeing democracy as "bourgeois formalism" or as an instrument to achieve power, to the adoption of democracy as a fundamental value and a permanent goal (Roberts, 1998: 17-53). Porto Alegre and Montevideo had this capacity because their central state devolved sufficient jurisdiction and resources to the local level. Both political parties promoted procedural

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[4] In the case of Venezuela the experience on PD failed due to limited political project and restrictive participatory mechanisms and processes (Goldfrank, 2011).

and substantive changes, ranging from popular participation in the policymaking process to redistributive socioeconomic reforms. Each administration included measures to decentralize administrative functions as well (Goldfrank, 2011). In this context, a discussion about participatory or deliberative democracy versus representative, liberal or elitist democracy in Latin America has emerged in the last decades (Avritzer, 2002; Baiocchi & Silva, 2008; Canel, 2010; Coraggio, 2004; De Souza, 2005; Fung & Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2001; Nylen, 2003; Schönleitner, 2006). The fundamental idea behind this debate is that representative democracy should not be replaced with participatory democracy but that the latter must be conceived as a complementary corrective with the potential to transform the former. Thus, participatory democracy presupposes a well-functioning representative democracy; expanded participation can reinforce liberal democracy by empowering ordinary citizens (Nylen, 2003; Baiocchi & Silva, 2008; Shönleitner, 2006).

However, approaches that emphasize local participation are based on problematic assumptions, namely: that civil society actors are an inherently pro-democratic force, willing and capable of social control over the state; that participatory arrangements are autonomous from—rather than embedded in—political dynamics; and that citizens will transform their preferences and promote decision-making processes beyond power or clientelistic politics (Shönleitner, 2006: 35-63). Consequently, it is important to analyze the roles of participatory and liberal democratic institutions in order to deepen democracy, we must investigate how these institutions interact with each other, how they affect the various actors, what the tensions and dilemmas are, and what kinds of democracy left-of-centre governments focus on to promote democratic consolidation. Civil society may not be sufficiently capable of supporting democratic consolidation as long as the party system and political institutions have not been reformed, and deliberative participation may not

be well developed if representative democracy has not been strengthened (Shönleitner, 2006: 35-63).

As Goldfrank (2002) argues, the interrelation of decentralization and participation is a condition of deepening democracy and building citizenship. Throughout Latin America, the relationship between government and civil society organizations has been characterized by opposition, substitution, submission, and incipient cooperation (Goldfrank, 2002: 51-83). Participatory public policies make sense within a theory of democratic governance based on two principles: that participation of social actors will give rise to more efficient government action; and that citizen support will emerge from government action. Thus, the strategies of opposition to government have to be abandoned (Baqueiro, 2015: 86-104). International agencies emphasize participation and decentralization, which is seen as the key means of realizing participation. However, these ideas are sometimes used to veil the nature and the effects of power and conflicts, even though power and conflicts are essential for democracy. The realization of the potential of participative community depends on the establishment of a political context that secures the rights of the most marginalized people, the conditions for deliberative democracy (Harris, 2001: 14-28).

Most definitions, regardless of the theoretical perspective adopted, recognize that decentralization is a process which requires different stages: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. Their sequence determines the degree of power distribution from the central level to the local one and the success of the process (Falleti, 2005: 327-346). Deconcentration implies the transfer of functions without financial and political autonomy. Delegation refers to the transfer of responsibility for decision-making and administration of public funds that are not controlled by the central government. Devolution supposes the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and

management from the central government to quasi-autonomous units of local government (Ziccardi & Cardozo, 2009; Falleti, 2005; Litvack, 1998).

Finally, in Latin America, alternative models of decentralization, have fostered a genuine development process since they produced greater equity through the participation of civil society in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies. The redistributive efficiency of the PB in Porto Alegre is confirmed by a range of research. In fact, the poorest region of the city has had the same decisional weight as the wealthiest region. The importance of the distributive nature of the PB is considered the first stage of a redistributive democracy (Albuquerque, 2004; Avritzer, 2002; Borja, 1987; De Souza Santos, 2005; Hickley & Mohan, 2005; O' Rourke, 2002). The PB in Brazil has implied a redistributive efficiency, accountability and quality of representation in a participatory democracy as well as a transition from a techno-bureaucracy to techno-democracy (De Souza, 2005: 307-376). This transformation has supposed a true process of appropriation by citizens of the public spaces and mechanisms of participation to analyze, understand, decide and propose alternative projects to improve their lives as local communities. Political capital (understood as the capacity to influence political decisions) became more equitably redistributed, and was no longer an exclusive monopoly of politicians and professionals. Participatory democracy is particularly effective in the process of learning values, skills, and competencies for the effective exercise of citizenship (De Souza, 2005: 307-376; Schugurensky, 2006: 163-182).

Although political projects are crucial to understanding the different decentralization outcomes in Latin America, many contradictions and challenges remain that I argue require an innovative analysis from a territorial approach. Furthermore, even though the design of institutions such as participatory budget (PB) is very relevant to achieving successful participatory decentralization, it is not enough. In fact, PB has limited effects

on civil society since it moves civil society practices from clientelism to associationalism but does not contribute to the capacity of civil society to self-organize. Indeed, this democratizing effect on civil society practices and networks is conditioned by pre-existing state-civil society relations. Those civil societies that were the most successful in terms of the PB and maintaining their autonomy were civil societies that already enjoyed significant self-organization capacity (Baiochi & Silva, 2008: 1-26).

Even though various comparative analyses have been conducted on participatory decentralization—with such lenses as the importance of political projects and institutional designs and the potential impact of an increasing devolution of political power and transfer of jurisdictions and resources from the national/regional government to the local one in the Latin American region—they have not been able to explain why some failures and limits still persist within urban municipalities, or to understand structural obstacles that impede the implementation of participatory decentralization in rural communities, particularly in those where indigenous communities and Afro-descendants constitute a significant population. Indeed, ethnic groups as well as women have not been sufficiently taken into account by researchers and policy makers who study and work on decentralization. Moreover, Putnam's concept of social capital (1995)—stressing the importance of social networks and the flow of information, social trust and reciprocity between individuals and groups to explain civic engagement—cannot enlighten us on other relevant aspects. Those include vertical relationships, authoritarian or charismatic leadership, conservative behaviour, disengaged practices and distrust in politics—explained by power relations and identity that are addressed by the concept of territory. Therefore, the socio-cultural dimension of territory seems to be an alternative to better understanding these aspects and obstacles to successfully implement PD.

2.4 <u>Other factors</u>: *Territory and its implications for decentralization*

Participatory decentralization processes depend on territorial characteristics, particularly on socio-cultural and political dimensions. As explained earlier, the political project, the institutional design, the sequence and process (political, fiscal and administrative) and the legal framework are fundamental factors for achieving participatory decentralization. However, there are some pre-conditions or learning processes related to both actors involved: the state and the civil society. In terms of the state, the political culture of clientelism and centralism must be transformed into a transparent, participative, coordinated and horizontal-territorial logic and cultural pattern. And in terms of civil society, an informal learning about democracy during everyday life is essential to achieve a participatory decentralization based on new power relations and a new cultural pattern (Buquet & Piñeiro, 2016; García-Guadilla, 2002; Khan, 2011; Schugurensky, 2006; Veneziano, 1999; Villalba et al, 2014).

Regarding the state, participatory decentralization experiences which truly promote citizen engagement and decision-making processes should take into account the different socio-economic, cultural and demographic characteristics of each territory (districts, neighbourhoods, zones) where the policy is implemented. In addition, social networks and local capabilities are considered to be crucial for a sustainable process of citizen participation as well as for a true process of empowerment (Canel, 2010: 1-44; Putnam, 1995: 65-78, Veneziano, 1999: 2-28; Woolcock & Naranyan, 2000: 225-249). In order to direct decision-making successfully, governmental top-down frameworks and goals need to be challenged and transformed with local geographies and bottom-up local desires and aspirations (Moir, 2013). States must promote that both women and men equally participate in politics and decision making processes (Khan, 2011; Villalba et al, 2014). Regarding civil society, the successful realization of the potential of participative,

community-level action involves networks between actors at different levels and in different sites, including local organizations, political parties and state agencies as well as NGOs and social movement organizations (Harris, 2001).

The participatory decentralization experience is the result of informal learning processes during everyday life. According to Paulo Freire's approach, education is not a schooling process, but rather an experiential learning process that takes place in daily life. Self-directed learning, incidental learning and socialization can occur throughout lifetimes (Freire, 1970: 71-86). Freire was a Brazilian educator who developed critical theories about education and oppression based on his own experiences as a teacher, working in the middle of the poorest communities of his country. From Marxist perspective, he analyzes the problem of the fear of freedom or fear of changing the world by oppressed communities. Oppressive leaders use techniques to control people, such as conquest (colonization), division, manipulation and cultural invasion. Freire also proposes revolutionary techniques such as cooperation, unity for liberation, organization and cultural synthesis in order to transform oppressive situations and also liberate oppressors from their own actions. Dialogue is conceived as an act of love, humility and faith that can help people to understand their own situation, to identify oppressors, to liberate oppressors from themselves and to humanize our world through collective actions (Freire, 1970: 87-185).

Socialization refers to the internalization of values, attitudes, behaviour and skills. Informal learning includes a variety of learning, such as internalizing patterns of authority and the dynamics of discrimination, especially when it comes to women and racialized groups and communities. One of those experiences is participatory democracy through mechanisms of consultation and decision-making processes. The educative effect of participation in the development of political efficacy is especially relevant for those

groups which are underrepresented in participatory democracy and have less experience with these processes. This process implies a new idea of citizenship that transforms clients into citizens and leads to the consolidation of participatory democracy (García-Guadilla, 2002; Hickley & Mohan, 2005; Schugurensky, 2006). Those informal learning processes are crucial pre-conditions for achieving participatory decentralization. They are also embedded in territory. Territories, which refer not only to ideas frequently connected to the analysis of the nation-state like land, terrain, space, measures, boundaries, rights and authority (Moore, 2017; Sassen, 2006) but also implies social relations, practices, power, meaning and identities (Delaney, 2009; Escobar, 2008), are a space of power relations which influence the strategies that people use to deconstruct their subaltern subjectivity and excluded position—through practices such as participating in social and political movements and advocating for their rights (Alvarez et al., 2017; Delaney, 2009; Escobar, 2008; Firsch, 2012; Hall & du Gay, 1996; Haesbaert, 2013; Sandoval et al., 2017).

Therefore, territory implies a socio-cultural construction in which social relations, power relations, traditions, beliefs, imaginaries, sense of belonging and practices are crucial to determine its form, function and significance. As Weber (2002: 3-47) analyzes, social relations are the base of social organizations and social systems. They imply interaction, exchange, communication, values, subjective meanings and specific objectives based on ethical principles. Therefore, territory becomes a constructed reality built by people through their political actions toward collective goals in order to improve their communities (Agnew, 2013: 1-4; Antonsich, 2011: 422-425). It is a flexible and changing process related to the notion of territoriality and identities, embedded in geography, meaning that communities are also shaped by the physical characteristics of the territory they inhabit (Berdegué et al. 2015; da Silva, 2017; Delaney, 2009; Escobar, 2008; Hoffman, 2016; Knight, 1982).

Social relations and empowerment of people in a territory are made possible by networks, when they enable a redistribution of power. Networks are old forms of social organization, but now they are empowered by new information/communication technologies (Castel, 2000; Martín-Barbero, 2006; Painter, 2010; Pellini & Ayres, 2007). Consequently, in the context of a hierarchical and centralist model of the state, they are viewed as an alternative tool to implement policy, to form the institutional architecture and promote both individual and collective agency. There are different types of networks depending on relational strengths, integration mechanisms and strategies: cooperative, coordinative and collaborative networks (Keast & Mandell, 2013).

People have invented or imagined territories to achieve their projects of administering public goods, so that there are intersections between territory, politics and governance (Agnew, 2013). Territory is not a socially disempowering technical device, but the socio-spatial context where living together is achieved, organized and negotiated through the continuous interplay between top-down discourses and bottom-up practices (Antonsich, 2010). There are different forms that coordinated action might take, but three are especially important: social mobilization, coalitions and policy networks. Social coalitions are characterized by a diversity of social actors; the existence of common objectives; sustained action over a long period of time; and power derived from different types of assets and capabilities. Consequently, decentralization is demanded not only for political reasons but also for economic ones (Berdegué et al. 2015; Boisier, 1999; Pellini & Ayres, 2007). Furthermore, some scholars (Delamaza et al, 2012) highlight the importance of the territory for achieving new governance. This new model of government supposes that social regulations operate not by impositions from the state nor from market but from negotiations between interrelated actors which are communicated by networks.

Networked governmentality implies intersectionality that challenges state actors and their hierarchical model of governance (Cunill, 2005 in Delamaza et al, 2012).

In the context of the current economistic model of development, another perspective on territory and nature is required to avoid the over exploitation of resources (Frisch, 2012; Gudynas, 2011). This alternative supposes a synergy between state and civil society to improve local communities. A different project of development cannot be based on the primacy of Western values but rather in a new paradigm of Nature: the "bio-centric" project. This approach implies a new concept of Nature which is not exclusively related to human beings (anthropocentric) but rather the intrinsic values of Nature (Gudynas, 2011).

Territory is a relational and empowerment space. As Agnew (2013) argues, "territory is an important type of spatial arrangement through which power is deployed and experienced but is not limited to the state" (p. 1). It is a place for recognition of differences and construction of identities—but also a space for resistance, empowerment and politics. That supposes the possibility of strengthening nations (or sub-national identity communities), their rights-based advocacy and their proposals for alternative development (Castel, 2000; da Silva, 2017; Escobar, 2001; Gudynas, 2011; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997; Hall & du Gay, 1996; Knight, 1982; Poirier & Dussart, 2017). Furthermore, territory is a space with a socially constructed identity. This identity can be the result of different factors, including a distinctive history, ethnicity, culture, economic structure, biophysical conditions, infrastructure, large private investments, social conflicts, and the influence of political-administrative boundaries. People in a territory share a social identity but the territory is not a homogenous unit (Berdegué et al, 2015).

Considering the idea that territory is a constructed reality and not a "natural" one, it is important to distinguish it from the concept of "territoriality" (Delaney, 2009; Sack, 1983). If 'territory' refers to a bounded space, 'territoriality' refers to behaviours related to the establishment and defense of territories. Territoriality in this sense often implies specific projects and practices such as to 'territorialize', 'de-territorialize' and 're-territorialize'. Territoriality is defined as "the attempt by an individual or group (x) to influence, affect, or control objects, people, and relationships (y) by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (Sack, 1983: 55). It is also a strategy based on interaction for establishing differential access to resources and people.

As such, territory reveals historical processes of exclusion, discrimination and exploitation exercised by modern nation-states and reinforced by the contemporary neo-liberal arrangements between states and transnational companies (Gudynas, 2011; Vandergeest & Pelusso, 1995). However, territory can also be a space for resistance against the historical consequences of this violent process of the creation of the nation-states based on Western values (e.g. 'whitening', the primacy of men over women, cultural homogenization) and the role played by the conservative wing of the Catholic Church in Latin America. In fact, it is possible to find experiences of resistance rooted in "territories of difference" such as the "Black consciousness" of Afro-descendants in the *quilombolas* and in the *favelas* in Brazil; the "ethnic settlement" of black and indigenous communities in the Pacific area that follows "the logic of the river" (Escobar, 2008: 1-25), in rural communities in Colombia (da Silva, 2017: 144-146). The territorially-based resistance strategies used by these ethnic groups, who are considered "subaltern subjects", reflect the powerful relationships between territory and identity. Other imaginations and beliefs enable these communities to resist, re-create and re-signify their lives within a historical (colonial or neo-colonial) heritage and contemporary context of domination,

exploitation, homogenization and exclusion in the Latin American region (da Silva, 2017; Escobar, 2008; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997; Hall & du Gay, 1996; Haesbaert, 2013; Hoffman, 2016; Passi, 2011; Poirier & Dussart, 2017).

The approach to culture from this investigation is principally based on authors who define culture as a social construction and a dynamic process which requires understanding the meaning of people's social practices and discourses, which are immersed in power relations at a micro level such as local communities. Studying culture implies the recognition of differences in our society and their importance for implementing development programs and policies (Escobar, 2008: 200-216; Sen, 2001: 1-27). Culture is important because human beings do not inhabit a world that is objective and natural, rather it is a world that is simulataneously counstructed and subjective (Clifford Geertz, 1973: 3-30). The study of culture consists of analyzing people's practices and social discourses and understanding their significance and symbols at a micro level. Culture is also determined by power relations; "cultural forms are always produced or enacted in particular social historical circumstances, by specific individuals drawing on certain resources and endowed with varying degrees of power and authority" (Thompson 1990: 135). Cultural phenomena are immersed in relations of power. This is clearly demonstrated in the nation-state, since although a nation seeks to be a community of people, it is also characterized by hierarchy and domination, and the perpetration of exploitation and exclusions. Indeed, there is a double movement in the domain of culture. While dominant actors seek to control and subordinate communities or groups, the latter are not passive actors; they are seeking to resist these attempts despite the contest is unequal because of the power possessed by the dominant actors (Hall 2018: 347-361).

Cultural practices and objects come with inherent meanings, and those meanings are created in the process of struggles and contestation. Culture is a process rather than a

finished form. Despite the lack of material means to challenge the dominance of powerful groups, the powerless resort to symbolic struggles in innovative and anonymous ways (Scott, 1985: 304-350). Culture is also conceived as a particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour. A key word is pattern and the relationship between these patterns can be observed in a specific way of thinking and living (Williams, 1961: 41-45). Furthermore, culture and development are intrinsically interrelated. Cultural factors influence the process of development, conceived of not just as growth of the GNP but as an enhancement of freedom and the well-being of people. Indeed, culture plays an important role as means of development because symbolic understanding can govern behaviour, including people's economic behaviour. Thus, cultural traditions, norms, values and social practices can impact economic success. However, these values are not immutable; they are dynamic. The contribution of values to development depends on the different factors and characteristics of a specific community. Variability, contingency and particularity characterize cultural identities (Sen, 2001:1-27). An alternative development project should include not only cultural decolonization but also a material transformation that would eliminate all kinds of exploitation perpetrated within the Global South.

Identities are the product of discourses and practices that are historical and reside within an economy of power. They are constructed through everyday practices. Indeed, identities have a processual and dynamic character in which local contentious and historical struggles play an important role. Identities are dialogic and relational and can be seen as a modern invention (Escobar, 2008: 200-253). Although identities are dynamic, these practices could be based more on customs and the belief in routines as norms (traditional or conservative) than on rational actions and the belief in bureaucratic rules (modern) and legal authorities (Larraín, 1989: 85-110; Weber, 2002). Identities are also considered as

resources of knowledge for social change, particularly for oppressed groups. All identities are relational and determined by others; they become political constructions through the logic of articulation. When relations of subordination are seen as oppression, they become collective action, such as in the case of the *proceso de comunidades negras* (black community process) in the Colombian Pacific. Identities are a particular articulation of difference, and the politics of identity is an instance of politics of difference (Escobar, 2008: 206-208).

Ethnic identity (e.g. blackness in the Colombian Pacific) is constructed by communities based on their specific territoriality (place-based, characterized by the aquatic environment) and their relationship with the state. Therefore, the ethnicization of identity is a political process which requires conscientiousness, a particular narrative, a discourse and social practices which become collective action. Identities become outcomes of participation in communities or are formed in the process of participating in activities organized in communities. They are the product of interaction with other people and objects as well as of a historical background. The key factors of identity are territory, autonomy and development (Escobar, 2008: 209-226). Consequently, cultural identity consists of the production of responses and values as an heir or as assignee, as actor or author of culture. These constructs are built in a given historical context, as a consequence of the psychosocial principle of identification-differentiation in relation to other culturally defined groups (García & Baeza, 1996).

In the process of identification-differentiation, imaginaries play a crucial role, since they include values, institutions, laws, symbols and myths which are shared within a social group, a community, and society. The concept of imaginary emerged from French philosophers like J. Paul Sartre. A cultural and political approach to imaginaries was developed by Benedict Anderson, who studied nationalism and nations in Europe and in

the colonies as cultural artefacts. All imaginaries imply a tension between reason and emotion, real world, practice and desires. In our daily lives we interact with different communities, such as neighbourhoods, workplaces and educational institutions. Imagination is a process of expanding oneself by transcending our time and space, creating new images of the world and ourselves. Nations are imagined as sovereign and as a community. What we think of as nations are imagined communities "because the member of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 2006: 6).

In imagining ourselves we can feel a sense of community with people we have not yet met. Society is understood as a political institution and social imaginaries are entwined with political imaginaries. Imaginaries are a mélange of past impressions and recent knowledge. We tend to ascribe emotions, traits, and beliefs to unreal objects as if they were real. Imaginary is a synthesis of our knowledge and our intention. Because we can imagine, we are ontologically free. All of our engagements with the world have the potential to activate the imaginary process. Because the imaginary process relies on intentionality, the world is constituted not from the outside into our consciousness, but we constitute the world based on our intentions toward it (Sartre, 2006: 4-16). These territorially-based concepts of culture, identity and ethnicity are particularly significant regarding the high socio-cultural and political exclusion of ethnic groups like Afro-descendants in Uruguay and Mapuche community in Chile and its impact on PD outcomes in these countries.

2.4. a Afro-descendants in Uruguay

As stated earlier, territory reveals processes of exclusion, discrimination and exploitation exercised by modern nation-states based on Western values and the role played by the conservative wing of the Catholic Church in Latin America (Escobar, 2008: 1-25). One of the most oppressive processes of exploitation, discrimination and exclusion was the one deployed against Africans through the slavery and human trafficking that occurred in the Latin American and Caribbean region, starting in the colonial period and continuing until after Independence. Africans and Afro-descendants, mostly located in the north of the country and in Montevideo, have been historically excluded from socio-economic, cultural and political life for centuries in Uruguay. This unfair situation still persists in the present through the systematic and structural discrimination and racism against Afro-descendants in this country. The socio-economic, cultural and political exclusion of Africans and Afro-descendants from society in Uruguay has existed for centuries and continues in the present. In fact, although according to the 2011 Census they represent 8.1% of the total population, they have been invisible to the state and to Uruguayan society; particularly the Afro-descendant people who live on the border with Brazil, such as in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía in Cerro Largo Department.

This historical discrimination against Afro-descendant people—which has implied the internalization of some values, attitudes, behaviours, and patterns of authority—has negatively influenced social relations of local civil society in this rural area. Consequently, these communities have been and still are characterized by weak interaction and trust between neighbours and groups, which hinders their abilities to self-organize and face their development problems. In addition, even though these rural Afro-descendant communities have believed that politics is an activity very far from their social problems and needs, they have developed a strong dependence on local leaders (*caudillos*)

over decades. The social and power relations, identities and imaginaries that characterize this territory negatively impact civil society engagement as well as political participation in rural areas like the north of Uruguay.

The first enslaved Africans were brought to the Americas in order to replace the indigenous workforce according to the accounts of the Dominican friair Bartolomé de las Casas in the sixteenth century. Slavery and the transatlantic traffic of Africans were spread over the world due to economic reasons. However, the main arguments of slavery were related to racism. These arguments influenced the belief that slavery and *negritud* (blackness) were synonymous. Racism, promoted by absolute monarchies in the fifteenth century, emerged as a European intellectual tradition based on biological theories that claimed the superiority of Europeans over Africans (Martínez, 2019: 81). Between 1514 and 1866, more than 12.5 million Africans were forced to cross the Atlantic Ocean to the Caribbean, Cartagena de Indias and Brazil. The traffic of Africans from West Africa to the North Atlantic was led by the English, while the traffic of Africans from Angola, the Southeast of Africa and the Bay of Benin to the South Atlantic was led by the Portuguese. The first enslaved Africans who arrived in the *Banda Oriental* (Eastern Province) of Uruguay were brought by Hernandarias in 1608. Most enslaved Africans who arrived in the *Río de la Plata* (Uruguay) were brought from *Río de Janeiro* and *Salvador de Bahía* (Brazil) to the port of Montevideo and through the border with Brazil (Río Grande do Sur) to the north of Uruguay. The slave trade was implemented by the Portuguese in *Colonia do Sacramento* from 1680 to 1777. For almost 250 years the slave trade was practiced in the Río de la Plata area and the sale of enslaved Africans occurred in the *Caserío de Negros* in Capurro neighbourhood, close to the port of Montevideo (Martínez, 2019: 81-96).

The traffic of slaves was introduced in the *Estado Oriental* in three ways: a) the arrival of *colonos* (settlers); b) clandestine human trafficking and c) the arrival of enslaved peoples through the border with Brazil (Borucki et al, 2004: 22). The arrival of enslaved Africans was demographically significant for Uruguay: about 4,540 people arrived between 1835 and 1842. A majority of enslaved people were young (no more than 16 years old) and had to serve their owners for 12 years. After Independence, one in every four farmers had enslaved people working in rural activities in the countryside in places such as Minas, Casupá and Santa Lucía. Slave trafficking was established in the *Río de la Plata* area due to the expansion of international commerce with Europe, particularly the exports of leather and tallow. The spread of large farms and *saladeros* (meat salting establishments) in South America caused the growth of forced labour to increase the profits of the local bourgeoisie through the nineteenth century (Borucki et al, 2004: 161-171).

The economic activity that required the highest number of enslaved people (about 5,000 people) was the *charqueada*[5] in Pelotas, Brazil, in 1830. This slave labour was established on the largest farms to grow wheat and to work in the *saladeros* in rural areas, as well as in bakeries, in tallow factories, and in the port of Montevideo during the colonial period. Slave trafficking allowed the expansion of the local economy and the increase of profits for local capitalists (Borucki et al, 2004: 11-22). Afrodescendants were also recruited into the national army by the government of the *Banda Oriental* (Eastern Province) during the colonial time and this situation continued over decades. The poorest immigrants from Spain and from the Canary Islands; the indigenous people (*Charrúas*) persecuted by President Rivera; enslaved Africans and Afro-descendants, and *libertos* (freedmen) were the servants of the richest families in Montevideo during the decade of 1830. Enslaved

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[5] *Charqueada* was an economic activity consisted of salting the meat (the *charque*) to improve exports during the colonia time in the Latin American region, particularly in the city of Pelotas (Brazil).

African women were the *amas de leche* (wet nurses) of white babies in the richest families in Montevideo (Borucki et al, 2004: 161-171).

Africans and Afro-descendants also settled along the border with Brazil. This territory used to be a site of conflicts between two empires, Spain and Portugal, during the colonial period. Brazilian farmers occupied the north and the north west of the *Estado Oriental* (Eastern State of Uruguay). Most Brazilian and Portuguese farmers who settled in the territory of Cerro Largo Department (*Aceguá*) avoided being registered by the new Estado Oriental in the decade of 1850. Although it was difficult to register the population in that time, according to some research, most enslaved Africans were located in the departments of Cerro Largo, Tacuarembó and Rocha in 1836. In Cerro Largo Department, about 25% of the population (598 people) was enslaved Africans. Some families had between one and five enslaved people while others had more than five. This area was characterized by legal and illegal flow of goods and people. The economic development of the north of the *Río Negro* (Black River) area was based on the expansion of the *charqueada* and cattle farming, made possible by slave labour (Borucki et al, 2004: 161-171).

The process of abolishing slavery started with the approval of a new legal framework known as *Libertad de Vientres* (the Law of Bellies) and the ban of the slave trade in 1841, and ended in 1862. This process began in the context of the creation of the *Estado Oriental del Uruguay* (Eastern State of Uruguay) in 1830. Despite the fact that abolitionism was established by political authorities, illegal and clandestine slavery continued for many decades for economic reasons (Borucki et al, 2004: 161-171). The oppressive situation of the enslaved Africans and Afro-descendants did not change once they achieved their freedom in the rural areas of the country. Most of them remained as low-wage rural labourers at local farms once they achieved their "freedom". They were not only included as workers in the domestic economy of farmers but also as small owners

or tenants on the white farmers' land. Slavery and cattle farming were two essential activities for the creation of wealth in rural communities during the nineteenth century in the Estado Oriental del Uruguay (Borucki et al, 2004: 174-198).

National censuses had not registered the Afro-descendant population in Uruguay since 1852 but they started to do it again in the 2011 Census, to fulfill the recommendations of the Durban Conference (2001). In addition, continuous household surveys included some questions about ethnicity in the decade of 1990 in response to the Afro-Uruguayan movement and the demands of NGOs, but they were still insufficient to research the situation of the Afro-descendant population in Uruguay. In the continuous household surveys as well as in the 2011 Census the questions on ethnicity were based on people's self-perception (Cabella et al, 2013: 9-13). According to the 2011 Census, the departments with a high or medium percentage of Afro-descendant population are located in the north of the country: Artigas (17.1%), Rivera (17.3%), Cerro Largo (10.9%), Salto and Tacurembó (9.9%); and in the capital of Uruguay, Montevideo (9.9%). Tracking with their socio-economic and cultural exclusion, the Afro-descendant population exhibits lower life expectancy than the non-Afro-descendant population; 39.6% live in poverty, and of that group 55% are children; 47% of young adults (20-24 years old) have been able to access only basic education (primary school) while only 7.7% have been able to access university-level education (Cabella et al, 2013: 25-71).

Access to primary school is more similar between Afro-descendants and non-Afro-descendants than access to high school, to university education and to any other professional education. Furthermore, illiteracy among young people (15 years and above) is higher among Afro-descendants than among non-Afro-descendants in almost all departments, particularly in those with the highest percentage of Afro-descendant people (e.g. 6 % in Rivera, 4.7% in Cerro Largo, and 4.3% in Artigas). Inequalities in education

negatively impact Afro-descendants' job opportunities: they tend to occupy lower-skilled jobs because Afro-descendants abandon the education system to start working to support their families. Unemployment, particularly among women, is higher among Afro-descendants than among non-Afro-descendants. Finally, their salary per hour is 29% lower than that of the non-Afro-descendant population (Cabella et al, 2013: 25-71). Inequalities can also be seen with regards to poverty; while 51.3% of Afro-descendants have at least one unsatisfied basic need (UBN), the rate of people with at least one UBN among the non-Afro-descendant population is only 32.2%. In addition, although poverty overall has been decreasing over the last decade in Uruguay, Afro-descendant people have not benefitted from that socio-economic improvement. They are still suffering in significant numbers from this condition: while 12.4% of the total population in Uruguay was living in poverty in 2012, the rate was 27.2% for Afro-descendants. While 55% of Afro-descendants located in the north and center of Uruguay present at least one UBN, only 35% of non-Afro-descendants located in the south of Uruguay present at least one UBN. In Montevideo, Afro-descendants who have at least one UBN are located in the north and west of the city, in the neighbourhoods with the lowest rates of human development such as Casavalle, Punta de Rieles, Casabó, Nuevo París, Colón, Pajas Blancas, among others (Cabella et al, 2013: 25-71; M. Villar, p.c., September 23, 2019). Inequity and exclusion of Afro-descendant communities has remained invisible to the state and society for decades thanks to the national myth of whiteness and exceptionality of Uruguay, known as "*la Suiza de América*" (the Switzerland of the Americas). This exceptionality was built based on political, socio-economic and cultural factors, such as the spread of the welfare state, established during Dr. José Batlle y Ordóñez's presidencies (from 1903 to 1907 and from 1911 to 1915) at the beginning of the twentieth

century and the increasing migration from Europe that influenced the Uruguayan national identity and imaginaries as one of whiteness.

Uruguay was also known for a progressive legal framework that improved working conditions; the promotion of universal access to public education at the primary school level; the development of industrialization, communications and infrastructure; and the increasing migration from Europe that influenced the Uruguayan national identity and imaginaries as one of whiteness (Caetano & Rilla, 1994: 93-102; Caetano, 2010: 161-175; Chagas & Stalla, 2009: 16-22).

Indeed, it was recognized as the most egalitarian, homogenous and modern country in the Latin American region. Yet minorities like Afro-descendants and indigenous people were denied and forgotten by the national state for decades. Indigenous people like Charrúas, Guenoas, Minuanes, Bohanes, Arachanes, Guaraníes and Chaná were murdered by the Spanish in the sixteenth century and persecuted and murdered by the national state during the presidency of Gr. Fructuoso Rivera, in particular during the battle of *Salsipuedes* in 1831. In addition, cultural homogenization was enforced by the national state through public education, including the teaching of only one language (Spanish) and a slanted discourse about national history conveyed through school books, national symbols, rituals and dates in order to build and communicate the national imaginary and identity of Uruguay. This national identity was spread through the countryside, leading to the exclusion of ethnic minorities from social and cultural life. For instance, Afro-descendants were not allowed to enter social clubs, restaurants, cinemas, or stores located not only in Montevideo but also in Melo, the capital of Cerro Largo Department, and in the rest of the cities in Uruguay, until 1980[6]. Furthermore, some residents in Melo recalled

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[6] Social and cultural clubs like *Renato Marán, el Gordillo* and *Centro Uruguay* were founded between the decade of 1930 and 1950 by Afro-descendants, exclusively for Afro-descendants in Melo (Cerro Largo) since they were not allowed to enter the non-Afro-descendants clubs in this city (Chagas & Stalla, 2009: 99-107).

that they were prohibited from having relationships with or even entering the houses of their Afro-descendant classmates when they were kids (UY# 43). However, Uruguayans believe they were and are an egalitarian society without prejudices or racism (Caetano & Rilla, 1994: 19-32); Caetano, 2010: 161-175; Chagas & Stalla, 2009: 16-22; Chagas & Stalla, 2019: 207-213; Escobar, 2008).

As explained before, territory can also be a space for resistance against the historical consequences of this violent process of the creation of the nation-state based on Western values (da Silva, 2017: 144-146; Escobar, 2008: 1-25). This is the case of a movement that resists the racism and discrimination suffered by Afro-Uruguayans known as *Movimiento Negro Uruguayo* (Uruguayan Black Movement) which emerged after the dictatorship in order to denounce and make visible their historical oppression rooted in slavery during colonialism, as well as their socio-economic and political exclusion in the present (Olaza, 2017: 63-82). In addition, social networks such as Red Namúa, cultural organizations and associations such as Asociación Cultural y Social Uruguay Negro or ACSUN, Organización Mundo Afro, Casa de la Cultura Afro-Uruguaya; neighbourhood clubs; and feminists groups and NGOs such as Afrogama and Mizangas have emerged over the last decades to denounce discrimination, to empower Afro-descendant women, to make their situation visible, to recover their self-esteem, and to recognize their cultural and historical heritage as African descendants in one of the most supposedly white and homogenous countries in the region. Most Afro organizations are located in Montevideo, and are led by Afro-Uruguayan feminists who have been working to gain rights for their community, improve their living conditions, include ethnic data in national censuses, make their communities visible, and to promote relationships with regional and international networks and organizations such as the Afro-Latin Women's Network (Johnson, N., p.c., October 19, 2018; UNFPA, 2019).

Indeed, Afro-Uruguayan feminist NGOs like Mizangas along with other Afro-feminist and sexual diversity organizations in Uruguay, which denounce the historical racism in this country, organized the visit of the Afro-American Marxist philosopher and feminist Angela Davis to Uruguay. This visit was promoted in the context of the Afro-Latin Women Network's meeting to review the new human rights agenda established by the national government in the past decade (N. Johnson, p.c., October 19, 2018; B. Ramírez, p.c., September 19, 2018; T. Ramírez, p.c., May 17, 2019; E. Suárez, p.c., May 18, 2019). Furthermore, Afro-Uruguayans have been increasingly engaged in politics in the last years, mostly within the leftist political party *Frente Amplio,* to participate in departmental and national government such as the Intendencia of Montevideo (Secretariat for Ethnic Racial Equality and Migrant Populations) and national offices created at the Ministry of Social Development to promote Afro-descendant human rights and gender equality (B. Ramírez, p.c., September 19, 2018; T. Ramírez, p.c., May 17, 2019; E. Suárez, p.c., May 18, 2019). The national government led by the *FA*, particularly during José Mujica's presidency, promoted a national agenda built on the promotion of human rights including Afro-descendant issues and rights in Uruguay (B. Ramírez, p.c., September 19, 2018). During Tabaré Vázquez's last presidency (2015-2020), the *FA'*s administration promoted the National Plan for Racial Equity and Afro-Descent of Uruguay 2019-2022, fulfilling the Durban I Conference[7] recommendations under UN auspices; in the context of the International Decade for People of African Descent (2015-2024); and to achieve the SDGs in Uruguay, proposed by the UN in the Agenda 2030 (O. Rivero, p.c., September 5, 2018; M. Villar, p.c., September 23, 2019).

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[7] The World Conference Against to Racism, Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms was celebrated in Durban-South Africa in 2001, under the auspices of the United Nations. Uruguay together with all participating nations agreed to eradicate racism and discrimination, and to promote racial equity in their countries in the following years. The Conference was followed by the 2009 Durban II Conference in Geneva and the 2011 Durban III Conference in New York.

In the context of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Uruguay, as a state party, was committed to eliminating racism and any discrimination based on colour, sex, religion, political opinion, or language; and to recognize the cultural diversity among its population, especially Afro-descendants and indigenous people. From 2003 to 2013, the Uruguayan government promoted a new legal framework, new mechanisms and new institutional arrangements to eradicate racism and discrimination against ethnic minorities in its territory. For instance, the Thematic Unit of Afro-descendant Rights in the Municipality of Montevideo was created in 2003; the Law N° 17.817 Against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination in 2004; the Law N° 18.059 that declared the National Day of *Candombe,* Afro-Uruguayan Culture and Racial Equity in 2006; the Law N° 19.122 to ensure access to employment and education in 2013 (Olaza, 2017: 63-82; UNFPA, 2019).

Despite all these efforts to promote equality and eliminate racism and discrimination against Afro-descendants in Uruguay, Afro-descendants are still suffering from socio-cultural and political exclusion. For instance, Afro-descendants still live under extreme poverty and indigence in the rural towns such as Medio Luto, located in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía. This rural small town or *rancherío* was named Medio Luto because people believed that half of its population were Afro-descendants and the other half were non-Afro-descendants or *mulatos* (mixed-race). Medio Luto is located only five kilometres from Isidoro Noblia and 50 kilometres from Aceguá (on the border with Brazil). It was founded by Afro-descendant families who had worked for non-Afro-descendant farmers and had received a small piece of land to live on once slavery was abolished in Uruguay; and by enslaved Afro-descendants who escaped from farms or from *quilombolas* (a sheltered space where slaves ran away from plantations in many Latin American countries), located in the south of Brazil, more than one hundred years

ago. Therefore, inhabitants in Medio Luto, like other people who live on the border with Brazil, speak *Portuñol* (a language that is a mix of Spanish and Portuguese). Medio Luto's population has been decreasing in the last decades and only about ten or fifteen families live there in the present. They live in extreme poverty, without sanitation services, electricity, drinking water, healthcare or decent housing. The only basic service established in this territory was public school number 28 (known as *La 28*) which allowed children to access basic education. Electricity and drinking water were installed in Medio Luto only a few years ago thanks to the Ministry of Social Development and its collaboration with other public organisms (P. Beck, p.c., September 29, 2019; UY # 49).

2.4. b Mapuche Community in Chile

Indigenous people in Chile have also suffered from exploitation and violence since the colonial period as in the rest of the Latin American region. This situation has continued through the centuries because national authorities, influenced by European cultural patterns (eurocentrism) and by the conservative wing of the Catholic Church, denied their dignity and rights as human beings. Even though the Spanish Crown recognized the territorial rights of Mapuche communities through the *Tratado de Quillen* (Treaty of Quillen) in 1641, after many years of conflict between the Spanish and the Mapuche, the denial and persecution against indigenous people has persisted into the present. The main cause of this conflict between indigenous people (particularly Mapuche communities) and the national state in Chile has been the ownership of land[8] appropriated by private firms (e.g. the forestry industry, salmon and hydroelectric companies) in the recent decades. Land and natural resources in the south of Chile have been always in dispute

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[8] Mapuche communities have their own worldview about space, water, landscape and knowledge which considers human being as integrated with environment and other beings.

between national and transnational companies, following their own economic interests, and indigenous people, who settled there many centuries ago and hold beliefs in ancestral rights to the land (M. González, p.c., May 20, 2019; Loncon, 2014:109-120; Valenzuela, 2003: 9-25; Bravo et al, 2017:163-187).

This historical discrimination against and socio-economic exclusion of Mapuche communities, and their conflict with the national/regional state, have influenced their cultural identity and imaginaries, their possibilities to develop self-organization capacity in order to participate in local government and to advocate for their human rights. Indeed, this situation has negatively affected social and power relations of Mapuche communities which remain as subaltern, dependent and isolated subjects in Chilean society.

After the dictatorship and in the context of the democratization process, the national government recognized the existence of at least nine ethnic groups in Chile, namely the Mapuche, Aymara, Rapa Nui, Likan Antai, Quechua, Colla, Diaguita, Kawésqar and Yagán or Yamara through the Law N° 19.253, or Indigenous Law, approved in 1993. Although they represent almost 13% of the total population in Chile, ethnic and cultural diversity was denied by the national state and Chilean society for decades (INE, 2018; Loncon, 2014: 109-120). For instance, the ethnicity of the population had not been recorded in national statistical data until 1992, when the national censuses included a question about self-perception of ethnicity for the first time. In addition, this dimension was also included in the CASEN or *Encuestas de Caracterización Socio-Económica* (Socio-Economic Characterization Surveys), conducted by the Ministry of Social Development for the first time in 1996 (Valenzuela, 2003: 9-23). One of the most important indigenous groups in terms of population and cultural significance in Chile is the Mapuche community, which represents almost 79.8% of the total indigenous population, followed by the Aymara (7.2%), the Diaguita (4.1%) and the Quechua (1.6%)

communities. The Mapuche people are located mostly in the *La Araucanía* Region where they represent almost 33% of the total of indigenous people in the country. They are also located in the Aysén (26.8%), Los Lagos (26.6%), Los Ríos (24.2%) and Metropolitan (8.6%) regions (INE, 2018).

In the context of the democratization process in Chile, international and national legal frameworks and institutions became significant instruments which with to defend and protect the human rights of the Mapuche. For instance, the Special Commission of Indigenous People was created in 1990 in order to advise the President of the Republic on social and economic problems that affected indigenous communities as well as to promote their culture. This commission was formed by representatives of indigenous people and representatives of the national and regional government. In 1993, the Chilean government created the *CONADI* or *Coorporación Nacional para el Desarrollo Indígena* (National Corporation for Indigenous Development) through the Law N° 19.253. This Corporation was established to promote local development of indigenous communities through social and economic projects; to foster their participation in the design and implementation of public policies; to improve their capabilities for economic endeavours; and to foster their cultural identity through the teaching of indigenous languages in schools.

In addition, the *Comisión Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato con los Pueblos Indígenas* (Historical Truth Commission and the New Deal with Indigenous People) created in 2001 during the presidency of Ricardo Lagos (Comisionado Presidencial para Asuntos Indígenas, 2008); the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People in 2007; and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention known as ILO 169, approved during the first Bachelet presidency in 2008, demonstrated governmental commitment to protect the human rights of indigenous people. Various mechanisms to assiste indigenous

people were created by the national government such as the *Fondos de Tierra y Aguas* (land and water funds), *Fondos de Desarrollo* (development funds), indigenous development areas and legal assistance to indigenous communities. Yet, indigenous people still face many struggles and structural inequalities when compared to non-indigenous people in terms of access to land, drinking water, health services, education (including the right to learn in their own languages), and housing. Consequently, conflicts between indigenous peoples, particularly Mapuche communities, and the state have not only persisted over the years: they have increased (INDH, 2013; Loncon, 2014: 109-120; Valenzuela, 2003: 9-25).

According to CASEN[9], the incidence of poverty affects more indigenous people than non-indigenous people in all regions, particularly in rural areas. They also must overcome many difficulties to preserve and spread their culture, language (e.g. Mapuzungún), customs and rituals since most regional and municipal governments only regard indigenous culture as a tourist attraction without a genuine process of self-organization, empowerment and citizen participation. The administrative boundaries of municipalities were defined based on political logic by the national government without taking indigenous territoriality into account. A historical process of cultural assimilation was implemented by the national government to create a homogenous national identity from the Independence period to the present. In addition, indigenous people have been considered more an object of social assistance by government than an autonomous subject of rights capable of making decisions about their lives and their territories (Loncon, 2014:

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[9] According the 1996 CASEN, while the 35.0% of indigenous people lived in poverty, measured by the poverty line; only 22.7% of non indigenous people lived in that condition. This unfair situation remained over years since according the last 2017 CASEN, while the 30.2% of indigenous people live in poverty, measured in a multidimensional way (including five dimensions: education; health; work and social security; housing; and social networks and cohesion); only 19.7% of non indigenous people live in poverty. In addition, according the same 2017 CASEN, while the 14.5% of indigenous people, live in poverty, measured by the poverty line; only 8.0% of non indigenous people live in poverty. Furthermore, higher illiteracy, unemployment, temporary or unprotected employment rates are observed among indigenous people than among no indigenous people in all regions (CASEN, 2017).

109-120; V. Cayul, p.c., March 15, 2019; Gonzalez, M, p.c., May 5, 2019; Orosman, L, p.c., March 15, 2019; Valenzuela, 2003: 27-38).

In the present, 75.4% of indigenous people live in urban areas, while only 24.6% live in rural areas; this is due to the historical incidence of migration from these areas to the metropolitan region. This migration was caused by a lack of job opportunities; insufficient programs and resources transferred by the national and regional government to local communities in rural areas; a lack of access to land and drinking water; and insufficient social policies (e.g. health centers and schools). Indigenous people who used to live in rural villages where they preserved their customs and beliefs linked to the land, migrated to urban areas to avoid poverty and social exclusion. However, many could not improve their living conditions in the metropolitan region, because of enduring unemployment, temporary employment (mostly in commercial activities) and self-employment (CASEN, 2017; Orosman, L, p.c., March 15, 2019; Valenzuela, 2003: 9-27).

However, as explained earlier, territory is not only a place for recognition of differences and construction of identities but also a space for resistance, empowerment and politics (Escobar, 2001; Gudynas, 2011). Other geographical and political imaginations and beliefs are needed and possible for Mapuche communities in order to resist, re-create and re-signify their lives within a historical (colonial) heritage and contemporary context of domination, exploitation, homogenization and exclusion (da Silva, 2017; Escobar, 2008). For instance, regarding the political participation of the indigenous community, a significant social movement led by representatives of Mapuche communities has emerged in recent years in the La Araucanía region to advocate for recovering their lands and improving their opportunities in this territory. However, this movement and the actions of Mapuche organizers have been considered as terrorism by the regional government and private companies located in *La Araucanía*. Indeed, the state has repressed and

criminalized this social movement and its demonstrations in Temuco, making necessary dialogue between Mapuche communities and the state seem even more difficult to achieve in the present than in the past (M. Ojeda, p.c., March 23, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, p.c., March 21, 2019). Some experts consider that recent public policies and social programs implemented by national and regional governments, became instruments or strategies to end this conflict. True dialogue and a new deal between indigenous people and the state require that the state return lands it expropriated in the past (Haughney, 2012: 203-207; Valenzuela, 2003: 27-38).

Some Mapuche leaders have emerged from the commissions created by the national government and have started to participate in politics. Indeed, although there are no quotas for required minimum number of indigenous people serving in political office in Chile, some Mapuche leaders have become mayors and councillors through municipal elections, and they have won a seat at the national parliament as deputies. According to some researchers, indigenous people have taken one of three ways to manage the historical conflict with the state: 1) To respect and keep the deal with the state; 2) To break up the relationship with the Chilean state; or 3) To create and develop their own way as Mapuche communities (M. González, p.c., May 5, 2019; Valenzuela, 2003: 27-38).

Mapuche political leaders created the *Asociación de Municipalidades con Alcalde Mapuche* or AMCAM (Association of Municipalities with Mapuche Mayors) in 2013 to support Mapuche municipal management; to promote local development; and to foster the Mapuche culture and the anti-racism from the *Kume Mongen* or *"buen vivir"* approach. However, indigenous people have had to overcome many difficulties to participate in regional and local government. For instance, most indigenous people do not want to be engaged in politics because they do not trust the Chilean political system—the

political project, political parties, representatives and leaders—since they feel politicians (non-indigenous people or *huilas*) manipulate them to pursue their own interests. This imaginary was caused by the historical exclusion of and discrimination against indigenous people from the political system, particularly against Mapuche women. According to the *Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades* or AChM (Chilean Association of Municipalities), only 5% of the elected Municipal Councillors (109 out of 2224), and 3.7% of Mayors (12 out of 345) were Mapuche, during the municipal elections held in 2012. In addition, interviews conducted for this research project suggested that the Mapuche do not trust their own political leaders because of their low self-esteem, internalized racism or because they think they are being manipulated by non-indigenous people or *huilas* (Cayul, V., p.c., March 15, 2019; Gonzalez, M, p.c., May 5, 2019; Lemonao, R, p.c., March 19, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, p.c. March 21, 2019; Valenzuela, 2003: 9-27).

To conclude, although the political project and its institutional design are important to understanding participatory decentralization outcomes in the Latin American region, an understanding of territorial dynamics can enrich the current explanations about the main obstacles to successfully implementing this policy. In due course, it may also help transform subalternity what have historically been the most excluded and discriminated-against communities like Afro-descendant population and indigenous people. Indeed, the socio-cultural dimension of territory contributes to understanding how pre-existing state-civil society relations influence PD outcomes through the analysis of power relations, social relations, identities and imaginaries. As explained earlier, the most successful experiences in terms of PD were observed where civil societies enjoyed significant self-organization capacity. Thus, a qualitative analysis may improve existing studies about

local PD challenges, particularly in the rural areas which have been invisible to states and
excluded from socio-economic life in Latin American countries.

Chapter 3: <u>Methodology</u>

3.1 <u>Research questions</u>

The aim of this research project is to study the ways that territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) influences the participatory decentralization initiatives of the state, and the ways it impacts human development in Uruguay and Chile, from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. The socio-cultural dimension of territory consists of socio-cultural characteristics of a specific territory which include the ways that a community is organized in order to face and manage their development problems; the types of relationships that are built over years, including the construction of leadership and the distribution of power within the community; and the identification process, which requires the internalization of commonly-held values, customs, ideas and feelings about self and others. Therefore, this socio-cultural dimension of territories is understood to consist of four sub-components: social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries.

This research project aims to explore the following hypothesis: The socio-cultural dimension of territory, which supposes a subjective and symbolic construction (e.g. social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries), influences citizen capabilities for/access to political engagement and can generate participative processes at the local level that transform the current centralist and sectoral political culture. Therefore, the project aimed to answer the following general question: Which are the most important factors that influence participatory decentralization outcomes in certain Latin American countries in the last decade? And to respond the following specific questions:

1. What is the role of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on PD outcomes in Uruguay and Chile?

2. In what ways do social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries within territories influence the capacity of civil society and local government to implement participatory decentralization in selected municipal cases in Uruguay and Chile?

3. What is the role of the political project/model of decentralization on PD outcomes in Uruguay and in Chile, in the last decade?

3.2 Methodology

This project analyzed decentralization at the municipal level within the national context of political decentralization processes that began in the 1990s in Uruguay and Chile. The Uruguayan cases were compared with Chilean ones based on Mill's method of difference, also known as "most-similar design," which is considered one of the most useful qualitative approaches in terms of studying democratization in Latin America (George & Bennett, 2005). However, I used Mill's method in two distinct ways, comparing similar municipalities between the two countries to vary the political project; and comparing municipal cases within each of the two countries, to permit variation in the socio-cultural dimension of territory within a single participatory decentralization model.

The importance of the participatory decentralization (PD) project/model therefore varies in a broader context of comparability. The two countries share: a unitary system of government, experimentation with municipal decentralization, past colonial and authoritarian legacies, a current level of socioeconomic development, a relatively high institutional quality for the region, and Spanish culture. While the model of decentralization implemented in Uruguay could be considered marked by the strength of civic engagement among social organizations and neighbours, in Chile it can be considered to have been inspired by a technocratic, anti-participative and economistic

management model influenced by the authoritarian regime and focused on making the state more efficient (Eaton, 2004; Garretón, 1983; Moulian, 1997; Navia, 2010).

Uruguay and Chile have a unitary government system characterized by historical centralism and strong presidentialism. Both countries have implemented decentralization policy reforms in the last decade to deepen and improve their processes. More detailed analysis about decentralization policy implementation is presented in Chapters 4 and 5. However, it is important to highlight that there are some similarities and differences in terms of fiscal, administrative and political decentralization between Uruguay and Chile (Table 3.1). For instance, in terms of fiscal decentralization both countries spend almost the same percentage of expenditures of their GDP (3.4% in Uruguay and 3.0% in Chile) as well as collect the same percentage of revenue of their GDP from their subnational government (3.4% in Uruguay and 3.2% in Chile) based on OECD data (Rius, 2018: 6). Both countries established central bodies for implementing fiscal and administrative decentralization policy such as the *Oficina de Planemiento y Presupuesto* or OPP (Budget and Planning Office) in Uruguay, and the *Sub-Secretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo* or SUBDERE (Sub-secretary for Regional and Administrative Development). These national organisms transfer financial resources to the intermediate government, namely Intendencias (Uruguay) or Regional Governments (Chile) which assign some of these resources to their respectively municipalities. Both countries also created some redistributive mechanisms to support the poorest municipalities such as the *Fondo de Incentivo a la Gestión Municipal* or FIGM (Municipal Management Incentive Fund) in Uruguay and the Fondo Común Municipal or FCM (Municipal Common Fund) in Chile.

Specifically, the Uruguayan national government transferred about CAD $ 614.000.000 to all Intendencias through different programs and funds such as FIGM, *Fondo de*

Desarrollo del Interior (Interior Development Fund), rural roads, Metropolitan Area, lighting, national routes, and the *Programa de Desarrollo y Gestión Subnacional* (Subnational Development and Management Program) during 2020 (OTU, 2021).

In Chile, the FCM transferred about CAD $ 2.700.000 in total to all municipalities in 2020. Furthermore, regional government distributes financial resources to municipalities through the *Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional* or FNDR (National Regional Development Fund). Some Chilean municipalities also receive financial resources from national ministries and institutes, such as the *Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agropecuario* or INDAP (National Institute for Agriculture Development) as well as from the Coorporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena or CONADI (National Coorporation of Indigenous Development) in order to promote development projects among indigenous communities settled in municipalities.

However, there are some important differences between Uruguay and Chile in terms of administrative decentralization. For instance, while in Uruguay, the administrative decentralization has been mostly implemented through intermediate level of government namely Intendencias (executive body) and Juntas Departamentales (legislative body), in Chile, the administrative decentralization has been mostly implemented through the local level of government. Indeed, while Municipalities are the last level of government created in Uruguay in 2010, provincial (Governors) and regional (Intendentes) are the latest level of government created in 1974 and in 1991 respectively in Chile. Regional government manages sectoral policies through the *Secretaría Regional Ministerial* or SEREMIs (Regional Ministerial Secretariat) in Chile. Therefore, national government transfers financial resources to these ministerial secretaries, which assign economic and human resources to municipalities and supervise the implementation of different national policies at the local level. Regional government has acquired planning functions in the last several

years in this country. Municipalities have been responsible for providing health and education services since the period of dictatorship. However, both the intermediate and the local level of government have been asking for more economic and human resources in Chile. Municipalities also suffer from the lack of economic and human resources as well as from insufficient training for managing their territories and for promoting citizen participation in Uruguay (Freigedo, 2015: 87-92).

In terms of political decentralization, there are also significant differences between Uruguay and Chile. While *Intendencias* have acquired a relative autonomy over the years in Uruguay, all municipalities—except for the ones located in the Intendencia of Montevideo—suffer from the lack of autonomy and decision-making capacity in the context of a historical centralism and dependency on departmental governments (Freigedo, 2015: 87-92). However, regional government presents significant challenges in terms of autonomy and legitimacy while municipalities are the most autonomous and legitimized level of government in Chile. In fact, while municipal government is elected by citizens, regional executive bodies have been appointed by the President until the present in Chile. In Uruguay, although municipalities around the country were recently created, all levels of government have been elected since they were established by legal frameworks. To summarize, while Uruguay has implemented a decentralization that is more political decentralization than it is fiscal or administrative, Chile's been more administrative than political and fiscal.

Table 3.1

Comparison of fiscal, administrative and political decentralization between Uruguay and Chile.

Municipal Decentralization		
	Uruguay	Chile
Fiscal Decentralization* (% of Expenditure/GDP)	3.4 %	3.0%
Expenditure instruments & organisms	OPP/"Uruguay Integra"/Sectoral Commission of Decentralization/FDI, FIGM, Metropolitan Area Funds, PDGS, Rural & national roads, lighting.	SUBDERE/FCM/FNDR
Fiscal (% of Revenue/GDP)	3.4%	3.2%
Expenditures from national ministries & programs	MTOP, + Local (OPP)	INDAP, CONADI
Administrative Decentralization	National, (19) Departmental (Intendente + Departmental Board) & Municipal (112 in 2015) governments. Municipalities are the most recent created level, lowest capabilities, resources & responsibilities.	National, (16) Regional (Intendente + Regional Council & SEREMI), (56) Provincial (Governor until 2021) & (345) Municipal (Mayor + MC). Regions and Provinces: the most recent created level. Municipalities: more responsibilities (education, health) but few resources & capabilities.
Political Descentralization	Municipalities: Lowest autonomy, decision-making capacity and not own financial resources to manage their territories except for the municipalities in Montevideo. Three levels are currently elected (municipalities since 2010). Difficulties for inter-governmental coordination. Mechanisms of citizen participation established by law (Cabildos, public audiences). Previous experience on PD at the Intendencia of Montevideo. Fewer influence of political rivalry on PD.	Municipalities: Medium autonomy, decision-making capacity and own resources to manage their territories. Two levels are elected (national, municipal & legislative body of regional government). Regional executive body appointed by the President through 2021. Difficulties for inter-governmental coordination. Mechanisms for citizen participation. Political rivalry affects inter-governmental coordination and PD.

*Source: Rius, A (2018) "*Transferencias de los gobiernos nacionales a los gobiernos sub-nacionales en pequeños países unitarios*" (based on OECD data). Montevideo: Centro de Estudios Fiscales.

To examine this research issue, it was necessary to use a qualitative and comparative methodology supplemented with a participatory approach when appropriate, which aimed to develop a holistic understanding of participatory decentralization experiences in both countries (Chambers, 1994; Dessai & Porter, 2006, 2011; Harris, 2002). Field research was conducted from an interdisciplinary perspective, which involved the attempt to integrate certain theoretical and methodological frameworks from different disciplines such as political science, cultural anthropology, human geography, philosophy and social

work to better understand the subject of this investigation—as well as to contribute to the study of international development (Harris, 2002).

Regarding the unit of analysis, even though decentralization has been promoted at the national level through different institutions, policies, specific programs and legal framework in the last decades, promotion at the local level through the municipalities is the most widespread process. A focus on municipalities facilitates not only a comparison between the selected case studies, but also an understanding of how decentralization works. Indeed, it allows for the analysis of intergovernmental relations; participatory budgeting processes; the consequences of new legal frameworks; and electoral reforms. Furthermore, studying the local level offers crucial insight into the socio-cultural dimension of territory and the cultural patterns of daily life related to governance.

In order to test the hypothesis and answer the research questions, this project developed case studies using a qualitative and participatory methodology. This methodology was complemented as appropriate by statistical data from national and municipal governments and local communities in order to describe and analyze demographic characteristics, socio-economic performance, management, budgeting, transfers, and political participation. Qualitative methodology assumes that reality is complex and dynamic, so although hypothesis and research questions had been defined, they were refined as a result of the investigative process. In fact, research questions were redefined taking into account the main sub-components of the socio-cultural dimension of territory as well as the potential role of the political project/model on PD outcomes. In addition, a qualitative approach acknowledges the impossibility of complete documentation of any social phenomenon, but nonetheless aims for deep engagement with and study of social actors, their relationship with others, and their political roles, beliefs and practices. This allows one to "triangulate" answers from an interview, for example, with informal talks and the

observation of practices. Finally, this research was conducted within a human rights framework, so interviewees and participants were considered not as objects but as actors, capable of generating a transformative process in their communities and institutions. As a researcher, I acted as a facilitator, to establish trust, listen and learn but not to control to participants (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004: 1415-1437; Chambers, 1994; Dessai & Porter, 2006, 2011; Harris, 2002, p.489).

3.3 Criteria for selecting case studies and comparisons

This research compared the Uruguayan and Chilean decentralization experiences at the municipal level over the last decade. Specifically, this research studies the implementation of decentralization policy in Uruguay throughout the last decade (2010-2019) which started when the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law was approved and the first municipalities were created in Uruguay. In the case of Chile, this project mostly focused on the last decade (2007-2019) when the most important legal framework and institutional arrangements regarding municipalities have been implemented in this country.

As Falleti (2010) states, a comparative approach may rely on a macro-social comparative historical method as well as on the micro, individual-level, decision-process-oriented one. Thus, even though this project did not explicitly include a longitudinal analysis, the decentralization process is contextualized over the course of a decade in both countries, taking into account actors´ preferences, their perceptions, evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, their expectations, strategies, and the limits of their actions.

In this project, three cases, two rural municipalities and an urban one in Uruguay were compared with corresponding cases in Chile. These six cases allowed two types of comparisons: Type 1) Cross-country comparison between most-similar cases

(municipalities in Uruguay and in Chile), where the main factor that varies is the political project or model of decentralization. Type 2) Comparison within a country, where the principal factor that varies is the socio-cultural dimension of territory, holding the national political project or model of decentralization stable.

The within-country comparison between rural/ethnic group cases allowed me to focus on variation in the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality and its effects on participatory outcomes within one country. The within-country comparison between rural/non-ethnic group and urban/non-ethnic group permitted identification of the geographical residence effect within one country. If the three municipal cases in Uruguay evidenced national similarities, and the three municipal cases in Chile also showed national similarities, but that the Uruguayan cases were different from the Chilean ones, we may infer that political project is the most important factor to explain PD outcomes. Thus, in more nationally similar cases, one could infer that the political project effect on participatory outcomes within one country is a more important factor than the socio-cultural dimension of territory.

However, if the cross-country comparisons between the matched municipal cases exhibited more important similarities than the three cases do within each country, then we may infer that the socio-cultural dimension of territory is a more important factor in understanding PD outcomes than the political project. Thus, one could infer that the political project is not the key factor to explain the differences between the case studies, while territory emerges as being crucial to explaining PD outcomes.

To understand the influence of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization outcomes, certain variables were kept relatively stable across the three municipal cases selected within each country, namely a low or middle socio-economic

level (measured by the percentage of the population with unsatisfied basic needs). Other characteristics were varied depending on which effect on PD outcomes was being analyzed: the presence of ethnic minorities (measured by significant percentage of Afro-descendant population in Uruguay and Mapuche communities in Chile) to analyze the ethno-cultural dimension of the territoriality effect; and the geographical residence (rural or urban areas) to analyze the geographical residence effect.

The socio-economic level (low or middle), the geographical residence (rural or urban) and the ethnicity are variables that characterize a specific territory. Indeed, they are variables associated with some of the sub-components of the socio-cultural dimension of territory such as identity.

The two types of comparisons could be graphically represented as follows:

Table 3.2
Territory vs Political Project Effects on PD outcomes

Within-country comparison in Uruguay/UY Model (Social & Political)	Within-country comparison in Chile/CH Model (Technocratic)		Cross-country comparison (Uruguay & Chile)
1.Rural + Poor + Ethnic **(Municipality of Isidoro Noblía)**	1.Rural + Poor + Ethnic **(Municipality of Perquenco)**		
2.Rural + Poor + Non-Ethnic **(Municipality of Santa Rosa)**	2.Rural + Poor + Non-Ethnic **(Municipality of Empedrado)**		
Ethnic effect on PD within one country (cases 1 & 2: Comparison Type 2; holding **UY Model**)	**Ethnic effect on PD within one country** (cases 1 & 2: Comparison Type 2; holding **CH Model**)		**Broader Ethnic Effect on PD** (Cross Country: Cases 1 and 2 in both countries, Type 1)
3.Urban + Poor + Non-Ethnic **(Municipality A)**	3.Urban + Poor + Non-Ethnic **(Municipality of Recoleta)**		
Geographical residence effect on PD (cases 2 and 3; Type 2)	**Geographical residence effect** on PD (cases 2 and 3; Type 2)		**Broader Geographical Residence Effect on PD** (Cross country: Cases 2 & 3 in both countries, Type 1)
More nationally similar: Political project effect on PD (cases 1, 2 & 3) in Uruguay	**More nationally similar:** Political project effect on PD (cases 1, 2 & 3) in Chile		**More cross country similarity:** Political project is not the key factor but territory is.

Socio-cultural dimension of territory vs Political Project Effects within one and cross-country.
Two types of comparisons.

The selected case studies in Uruguay were: Municipality of Isidoro Noblía, considered rural, with a low socio-economic level and a high or significant percentage of ethnic groups namely the Afro-descendant population (rural/ethnic group); the Municipality of Santa Rosa considered rural, with a low socio-economic level and principally white (rural/non-ethnic group); and Municipality A (Montevideo), considered urban, with a low

socio-economic level and principally white (urban/non-ethnic group). In terms of whether we may consider Isidoro Noblía and Santa Rosa as representative of rural municipalities elsewhere in Uruguay, there is good evidence to suggest that both are fairly typical. Isidoro Noblía is considered within a group of ten other municipalities with a significant Afro-descendant population (about or more than 9.9 %), located in the northeast of the country (Artigas and Cerro Largo departments). It consists of about 800 square kilometres, with less than 3000 inhabitants; it is characterized by the highest territorial segregation, the lowest development indicators and most people vote for the Partido Nacional (Cabella et al, 2013: 2-80; OTU, 2017). Similarly, Santa Rosa appears to be fairly typical of 15 other rural municipalities with a population that is 80% or more white, mostly located in Canelones, Maldonado and San José departments, with an average of about 4000 inhabitants and middle or low socio-economic level; most people vote for the Partido Nacional and very few for the Partido Colorado, and recently the Frente Amplio has gained popularity (OTU, 2017).

In Santa Rosa, the Frente Amplio has obtained local government for the first time, so this municipality is experiencing a transition from a historically Partido Nacional administration to the new FA administration, which is shared with few other rural municipalities in Uruguay. All these case studies are characterized by insufficient financial and human resources, a significant dependency on departmental government (*Intendencias*) and national government, and the lack of political autonomy. However, these difficulties seem not to be the main obstacles for implementing participatory mechanisms; rather, civil society capabilities and political competition at the local level are more determinant (Freigedo, 2015: 83-123). Finally, the Municipality A in Montevideo Department represents all urban municipalities created based on the previous institutional and political reforms implemented by the Intendencia of Montevideo under

the Frente Amplio administration since the decade of 1990. This Municipality, along with three other municipalities, are the most densely populated (more than 150.000 inhabitants) municipalities, with a population that is less than 8.0 % Afro-descendant and the lowest development indicators in the capital of Uruguay. They also represent 30% of total municipalized population of the country (OTU, 2017).

The selected case studies in Chile were the Municipality of Perquenco, considered rural, with a low socio-economic level and a high percentage of indigenous people Mapuche communities (rural/ethnic group); the Municipality of Empedrado, considered rural, with a low socio-economic level and without a significant proportion of indigenous people (rural/non-ethnic group); and the Municipality of Recoleta (Santiago), considered urban, with a low socio-economic level and with an indigenous population below the national average (urban/non-ethnic group). In terms of whether we may consider Perquenco and Empedrado as representative of rural municipalities elsewhere in Chile, there is good evidence to suggest that both are fairly typical. They are classified as strongly rural communities characterized by their economy that is dependent on agriculture, and also by the lowest development indicators in this country, namely poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, lowest access to public services (Berdegué et al, 2010: 14; CASEN, 2017).

Both are located in the most rural regions such as Maule region (77.8% rural) and La Araucanía region (70.4%) followed by Los Ríos and Bío Bío regions. Perquenco is classified, along with 79 other rural municipalities, as strongly rural that represents 37.4% of all rural *comunas* (Berdagué et al, 2010: 17-23). Perquenco also is classified within rural municipalities that present the highest percentage of indigenous people (mostly Mapuche) not only in the La Araucanía region but also in the whole country, along with the municipalities from Arica y Parinacota and Aysén regions (CASEN, 2017). Most municipalities in the La Araucanía region are led by Nueva Mayoría, followed by UDI-

Chile Vamos and by Independents. A majority of municipalities in Maule region are led by UDI-Chile Vamos.

The Municipality of Recoleta is located in the Province of Santiago, one of the most unequal provinces of the country. Recoleta is one of the most densely populated municipalities in this region (more than 150.000 inhabitants) and has a middle-low socio-economic level (about 7% of the population live in poverty), which it shares with other seven municipalities. This Municipality also has smaller percentage of indigenous people (mostly Mapuche) than the national average (11%) which also is shared with these other seven municipalities in this region. Among these municipalities, Recoleta has been led by a leftist political party in the last years (Communist Party-Nueva Mayoría) together with four other municipalities in this region (SINIM, 2019; Gobierno Regional Metropolitano de Santiago, 2017).

Ethnic group cases were defined as the Municipality that presents a significant percentage of Afro-descendant population or indigenous people. A significant percentage of Afro-descendant population in Uruguay and of indigenous people in Chile implies a percentage above the national average of these populations in each country. The ethnic group case in Uruguay, namely the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía, has a relevant percentage of Afrodescendants (12.4%) which is, according to the 2011 Census, higher than the national average of 8.1% (Nion & Feo, 2017; Cabella, Nathan & Tenenbaum, 2013: 2-80). Most Afrodescendants in this territory settled in rural villages such as Medio Luto, which is located one kilometre away from the town and close to the border with Brazil (Borucki et al, 2004: 161-171; Martínez, 2019: 81-96). The two non-ethnic group cases in Uruguay, namely Municipality of Santa Rosa and Municipality A, have only 1.5% and 6.6% of Afro-descendant population respectively (OTU, 2019; Nion & Feo, 2017). In addition, these non-ethnic group or white cases are located in departments such as Canelones and

Montevideo where the percentage of Afro-descendant people is less or almost similar to the national average: about 7.5% and 9% respectively. However, the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía is located in Cerro Largo Department and in the northwest of the country with one of the highest percentages of Afro-descendant population in this country 11% (OTU, 2019; Cabella, Nathan & Tenenbaum, 2013: 2-80).

According to the 2017 Census, the indigenous case in Chile, namely the Municipality of Perquenco, presents 51% indigenous population, of which 78% are Mapuche, while the national average of indigenous people in Chile is about 13% (INE, 2018:17). However, the two non-ethnic group cases, namely the Municipality of Empedrado has only 4% indigenous people, of which 95.9% are Mapuche, and the Municipality of Recoleta has 11% of indigenous people of which 77.4% are Mapuche (INE, 2017). Furthermore, the Municipality of Empedrado and the Municipality of Recoleta are located in regions with population of indigenous people that are less than the national average of 13% such as the Maule Region (4.9%) and the Metropolitan Region (10.1%). Although the percentage of indigenous people (11%) in the Municipality of Recoleta is higher than in the Municipality of Empedrado, Recoleta is not considered as an ethnic group case because the process of ethnic identification of urban Mapuche population is more recent than in Perquenco. Indeed, Mapuche are settled and organized as communities in Perquenco. However, most of the Mapuche population in Recoleta emigrated from the rural areas of Chile in the last decades because of economic reasons as is stated later in Chapter 5.

In addition, the character of the Mapuche' struggles in Recoleta are more related with recognition and cultural rights than with political participation in terms of representativeness and decision-making processes in local government. The promotion of Mapuche socio-cultural inclusion along with other excluded populations like immigrants and the LGBTQ community through different socio-cultural programs and offices by the

Mayor is a recent policy, and more related to multi or pluri culturalism than to the participatory decentralization process (Arancibia, 2017: 60-67; Chihuailaf, 2006; Municipality of Recoleta, 2017; M. González, p.c., May 5, 2020). However, the Municipality of Perquenco is considered as an ethnic group case because it is located in La Araucania region which presents 43.3% indigenous people much higher than the national average and one of the highest percentages of indigenous people in the country (INE, 2018). These selected case studies could be graphically represented as follows:

Table 3.3
Selected case studies in Uruguay and Chile.

	Municipalities (Uruguay)		Municipalities (Chile)	
Geographical residence + Socio-economic Level	**Ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality**		**Ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality**	
	Ethnic group (%Afrodescendants)	**Non-ethnic group (%Afrodescendants)**	**Ethnic group (% indigenous people, mostly Mapuche)**	**Non-ethnic group (% indigenous people, mostly Mapuche)**
Rural + Low socio-economic level	1. Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (12.4%)	2. Municipality of Santa Rosa (1.5%)	1. Municipality of Perquenco (51%)	2. Municipality of Empedrado (4%)
Urban + Low socio-economic level	---------------	3. Muncipality A (6.6%)	--------------	3. Municipality of Recoleta (11%)

Selected case studies in Uruguay and Chile, based on the ethnic and geographical residence dimensions of territory.

Figure 3.1: Adapted from Pose, S. (2021) *Map of selected cases in Uruguay*. Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. [Unpublished map], University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on the MVOT geoservice and QGIS.

Figure 3.2: Adapted from Pose, S. (2021) *Map of selected cases in Chile*. Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. [Unpublished map], University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (BCN) and QGIS.

3.3.a <u>Case studies in Uruguay</u>

The Municipality of Isidoro Noblía is located 448 kilometres from Montevideo, by way of the national route N° 8; 45 km from Melo, the capital of Cerro Largo Department; and 12 kilometres from the border with Brazil in the northeast of Uruguay, the poorest region of the country (Calvo et al, 2013). According to the Territorial Observatory of Uruguay, called *Observatorio Territorio Uruguay* [OTU] in Spanish (2019), 52.1% of the population of this municipality have unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) which is higher than the departmental average (44.8%) and the national one (33.8%). The Municipality of Isidoro Noblía was formed in the Cerro Largo Department along with 10 others through the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N°19.272 in 2015. This law established that locations with more than 2,000 inhabitants would become municipalities, except for departmental capitals (Nion & Feo, 2017).

In terms of its socio-demographic characteristics, the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía has 2,808 inhabitants and 665.2 square kilometers with almost 80% of its population settled in urban areas. It is classified within the Eleven Group[10] of Municipalities. Although the municipalities that belong to this Eleven Group are not considered purely rural ones, for the purposes of this investigation it is considered a rural municipality because its population density is very low (only 4.2%) and as part of the Eleven Group it is characterized by its isolation, its small or intermediate population, its distance from the capital of the department, and the low socio-economic and educational level of its population. Furthermore, there is still an important percentage of rural population (almost 20%) in Isidoro Noblía in the context of the most urbanized country in Latin America.

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[10] According to the socio-territorial classification of municipalities based on demographic, socio-economic and territorial characteristics, elaborated by the OTU (Uruguay Integra Program, OPP), Isidoro Noblía belongs to Eleven Group.

Almost 60% of Isidoro Noblía's population was born there. It also has a relevant percentage of Afro-descendants, 12.4%, which is higher than the national average of 8.1%. Most Afro-descendants in this territory settled in rural villages such as Medio Luto which is located one kilometre away from the town and close to the border with Brazil (Nion & Feo, 2017; Cabella, Nathan & Tenenbaum, 2013:2-80).

The Municipality of Santa Rosa is located in the central area of Canelones Department, by way of national route N° 6, 800 metres from national route N° 11, and 51 kilometres from Montevideo. Santa Rosa is included within the micro-regions number two of Canelones Department along with San Bautista, San Antonio and San Ramón. This Municipality was created through the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N° 18.567 that established 89 Municipalities in communities of 5,000 or more inhabitants around the country in 2010. Indeed, Canelones Department is one of the most municipalized, with thirty municipalities in its territory. Santa Rosa has 192.5 square kilometres, 6,751 inhabitants and its population density is 35.1 inhabitants per square kilometre, which is lower than the average in Canelones Department (114.7 inhabitants per square kilometre).

Almost half of Santa Rosa's population is rural, but only 1.5% is Afro-descendant; 96% is white, and almost 56% was born in its territory (OTU, 2019). In the last few years, around 220 people arrived to this municipality from Cuba (mostly from Ciego de Ávila) to work in rural areas. Since September 2017, many Cubans have arrived in this Municipality seeking to improve their living conditions. According to the National Directorate of Migration of Uruguay, during 2018, almost 2,232 definitive residences were granted to Cubans by the migration office of Uruguay (Urwicz, 2018). This

municipality is classified as rural and belongs to the Nine Group[11]. Municipalities of this group are located in Canelones Department and are characterized by their high percentage of elderly people. In terms of local development, 33% of the population of this Municipality has at least one UBN, which is similar to departmental and national averages. Their population is focused on primary production (Nion & Feo, 2019).

Municipality A is located in the southwest of Montevideo Department, the department containing the capital of Uruguay. This Municipality has 207,911 inhabitants and its population density is 1,441.6 inhabitants per square kilometre; 96% of the population is urban, of which 87.5% are not Afro-descendants and only 6.6% are Afro-descendants (OTU, 2019). Therefore, it is considered an urban municipality and classified within the Group Two[12] by the OTU along with Municipality D and F in Montevideo Department. This group of municipalities is characterized by their high population density and their lowest development indicators such as lower educational level, higher poverty and lower aging rates (Nion & Feo, 2017). This municipality has a UBN rate of 38.3%, which is higher than the departmental average (26.8%) and the national one (33.8%). In most of the neighbourhoods that belong to Municipality A, more than 40% of the population has at least one UBN (Calvo et al, 2013). This municipality has an unemployment rate (8.6%) which is higher than departmental and national averages. In addition, there is a 1.5% rate of illiteracy population among teenagers and young adults. The high school truancy rate is higher in Municipality A than in Montevideo Department as a whole (Nion & Feo, 2017).

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[11] According to the socio-territorial classification of municipalities based on demographic, socio-economic and territorial characteristics, elaborated by the OTU (Uruguay Integra Program, Budget and Planning Office called Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto or OPP in Spanish), Santa Rosa belongs to nine group.

[12] According to the socio-territorial classification of Municipalities based on demographic, socio-economic and territorial characteristics, elaborated by the OTU (Uruguay Integra Program, OPP), Municipality A belongs to Two Group.

Municipality A was created through the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N° 18.567 that established 89 municipalities in communities of 5,000 or more inhabitants around the country in 2010. The process of participatory decentralization started in Montevideo Department in the decade of 1990 through the creation of 18 Centros Comunales Zonales or CCZs (Zonal Community Centers) in order to promote administrative deconcentration together with a political and social decentralization. Therefore, once the Law N° 18.567 was approved by the Parliament, Intendente Ana Olivera created eight municipalities taking into account territorial similarities among the neighbourhoods that formed each CCZ in 2010 (Olivera, A, p.c., August 31, 2018). Consequently, municipalities in Montevideo were established with two or three CCZs. The creation of Municipality A was based on the working-class neighbourhoods of Montevideo: La Teja (CCZ14), Cerro (CCZ 17) and Paso de la Arena (CCZ 18).

3.3.b <u>Case studies in Chile</u>

The Municipality of Perquenco is located in the central valley of the IX Region of *La Araucanía* between the Andes Mountains and the coastal mountain range. This region is divided into two provinces: Cautín and Malleco, with 32 municipalities in total. Perquenco is located in the north of Cautín Province, 45 kilometres from Temuco City, the regional and provincial capital, and 24 kilometres from Victoria. Perquenco borders the Municipality of Victoria to the north, the Municipalities of Victoria and Lautaro to the east, the Municipalities of Traiguén and Galvarino to the west, and the Municipalities of Lautaro and Galvarino to the south. Its territory has 331 square kilometres along route N° 5 and it is traversed by the Perquenco River. Furthermore, there is a small rural town named Quillén which is located in the south of Perquenco. This municipality has 7.366

inhabitants, of which almost 50% live in rural areas, and it has 22% population density (Sandoval & González, 2010: 21-26; PLADECO, 2018; SINIM, 2019).

According to some researchers, the rurality of municipalities in Chile should be analyzed in terms of rurality-urbanity and therefore should include significant variables such as official rurality, economic activity, population density, the access to urban centers, human capital, and access to basic services (Berdagué et al, 2010: 10-16). Indeed, *La Araucanía* region presents the highest percentage of rurality (32.5%) and almost all of its Municipalities are classified as rural. Therefore, Perquenco is classified within Group One formed by strongly rural communities with agriculture-dependent economies and strong forestry industries, and with low human capital, as only 2.6% of its population has completed university education and almost 50% face difficulties accessing public services (Berdagué et al, 2010: 17-23; Sandoval & González, 2010: 21-26). According to the 2017 Census, 51% of the total population in this Municipality are indigenous people, of which 78% are Mapuche—Perquenco has 23 Mapuche communities, which are mostly settled in rural areas (INE, 2017). In terms of social development, around 22% of the population of Perquenco lives in poverty (SINIM-CASEN, 2019).

The Municipality of Empedrado is located in the VII Region of Maule, which is considered the most rural region, in the south of the Province of Talca. This municipality has 565 square kilometres and around 4,461 inhabitants (Berdegué et al, 2019:10; SINIM, 2019). Empedrado is located 45 kilometres from Constitución and 438 metres above sea level along the mountain range, surrounded by pine and eucalyptus forests and winding, dangerous roads (Arellano, 2003: 7-10). Empedrado borders Constitución to the north, San Javier and Cauquenes to the east, Cauquenes and Chanco to the west, and Cauquenes to the south. It currently has seven Neighbourhood Units in its urban area, but is classified within Group One of municipalities, which are strongly rural communities (40.3%) with

agriculture-dependent economies and a strong forestry industry; with a high level of poverty (17%); with low access to public services such as drinking water (57%) and low human capital: only 2.3% of its population has completed university education and almost 32% of the population is non-trained working class (Berdagué et al, 2010: 17-23; 29-38; PLADECO, 2014: 19; SINIM-CASEN, 2018). According to the 2017 Census, indigenous people represent only 4% of the total population; of that 4%, 95.9% are Mapuche (INE, 2017). Empedrado also has other small rural towns such as Pellines Dos, Cuyuname, Puico, La Aguada, Linda Vista, Colmenares, La Orilla, Rari and Melencura. The only urban center is San Ignacio of Empedrado, which has almost 59% of the total population of this Municipality (PLADECO, 2014: 27).

The Muncipality of Recoleta is located in the north of Santiago de Chile, the capital of Chile, in the Metropolitan Region, in the Province of Santiago. Its territory has 16 hectares, bordering Huechuraba to the north, Independencia and Conchalí to the west, Providencia and Vitacura to the east, and Santiago to the south. The Mapocho River and San Cristobal Hill are its natural borders. In the past, this territory used to be a sector of "La Chimba" neighbourhood. From 1945 to 1980 its territory was managed by the Municipalities of Santiago and Conchalí. Recoleta was created as a municipality by the Local Decree N°29-18.992 in 1981. This municipality was divided into nine macro-zones and 35 neighbourhood units (*unidades vecinales*) by the *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario* or *DIDECO* (Community Development Department). This municipality has 182,082 inhabitants, of which 23,515 are immigrants who have been arriving to Santiago from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia and Cuba in the last few years (SINIM, 2019). Most are Afro-descendants or indigenous people.

Regarding the percentage of indigenous people, there are two different sources of statistical data of the percentage of indigenous people in the Municipality of Recoleta:

the *CASEN* or *Caracterización Socio-Económica Nacional* (National socio-economic characterization) survey conducted by the Ministry of Social Development and the national censuses conducted by the National Institute of Statistics. According to the 2015 CASEN survey, indigenous people are only 3.5% of the total population in the Municipality of Recoleta (Santiago Metropolitan Regional Government, 2017: 23). However, as stated by the 2017 Census, Recoleta's indigenous population is 11%, of which 77.4% are Mapuche (INE, 2017). Mapuche are mostly located in specific territories close to Recoleta, namely the Municipality of Cerro Navia (SINIM, 2019; F. Chaves, p.c., March 4, 2019).

In the report of the official statistical data, the Regulatory Plan and the latest research on rurality versus urbanity in Chile, this municipality is located in one of the most urban regions and is classified among the extreme urban group of municipalities in this country. In this study, urbanity or rurality are not only defined based on population density (10.7% in Recoleta) but also on other variables such as economic activity and access to public services. Finally, almost 100% of its population is classified as urban (Berdagué et al, 2010: 5-8; INE, 2017; SINIM, 2018; F. Chaves, p.c., March 4, 2019). In terms of local development, according to the National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (CASEN) conducted by the Social Development Ministry in Chile, almost 7% of the population of Recoleta lives in poverty as measured by household income (SINIM, 2019).

3.4 Operational definition of variables and causal relations

This research analyzes the relationship between two variables: the socio-cultural dimension of territory (independent variable) and the outcomes of participatory decentralization (dependent variable). Territory implies a constructed reality built by people through their political actions toward collective goals in order to improve their

communities (Agnew, 2013: 1-4; Antonsich, 2010: 422-425). From the perspective of this project, territory is not only conceived of as a physical reality but also as a socio-cultural construction in which social relations (interaction, communication, self-organization, networks); power relations (the relationship between local government and citizens, the relationship between leaders from organized civil society and municipal officials, and the relationship between these leaders and participating citizens); identities (social constructions within specific territories that depend on history, ethnicity, culture, economic structure, social conflicts and political-administrative boundaries); and imaginaries (ideas, feelings, perceptions about land and others) are crucial in determining the form, function and significance of a given territory.

The socio-cultural dimension of territory can be defined as the ways that a community organizes itself in order to face and manage their development problems; the types of relationships between political/social leaders and citizens, which imply the construction of leaderships and the distribution of power within the community; and the individual identification process based on the internalization of agreed-upon values, customs, ideas and feelings about self and others. Because of the number of indicators, territory constitutes a very complex and challenging concept to be operationalized and measured or to use to make causal inference by researchers; however, this concept proved to be crucial for analyzing participatory decentralization, and this research project aimed to contribute to the explanatory potential of the concept of territory in this academic topic. Indeed, a more complex framework for analyzing PD outcomes rather than a simpler framework—such as transfer of economic resources, social capital or clientelism—in a separate way gives insight on micro-processes in local communities from daily life, offering possibilities for overcoming structural socio-cultural obstacles to successfully implementing this policy.

In terms of operationalization, the socio-cultural dimension of territories is understood to consist of four sub-components: 1) Social relations, 2) Power relations, 3) Identities and 4) Imaginaries.

1) Social relations imply the interaction and communication between individuals who belong to a specific territory and develop their capacity for self-organization to satisfy their social needs and to find solutions to their development problems (Castel, 2000: 5-24; Delamaza et al, 2012; Weber, 2002: 3-47). These social relations could be characterized as weak or strong. This sub-component could be considered as self-organizational capacity.

2) Power relations refers to different interactions: a) Relationship between local government and citizens characterized either by caudillism, paternalism and clientelism; or by independence, social control over local government and a horizontal relationship. Caudillism refers to the charismatic relationship between powerful leaders and dependent followers, involving the exchange of economic benefits for political support or legitimacy. In its modern version, it is understood as clientelism, which is observed not only during elections but also in daily life (Auyero & Benzecry, 2016: 221-246; Lynch, 1992: 402-424; Pizano, 2001: 74-82). Power relations could vary from strong clientelism to political independence. b) Relationship between leaders/representatives from organized civil society (NGOs, associations, unions, social networks, churches, social clubs) and institutional or political actors related to decentralization policy (e.g. mayors, councillors and municipal officials) characterized by a vertical or horizontal relationship. And c) relationship between these leaders/representatives and participating citizens which could be characterized as weak or strong.

3) Identities are conceived of as social constructions within specific territories and depend on factors such as history, ethnicity, culture, economic structure, social conflicts and political-administrative boundaries (Berdegué et al, 2015; Escobar, 2008: 206-208). Identities could be categorized into two groups: more traditional and conservative values and customs, disengagement and isolation that mostly characterize rural areas; or more modern values and customs, collective mindset and strong social cohesion that mostly characterize urban areas. Thus identities vary from traditional/disengaged to modern/cohesive (Larrain, 1989: 85-110; Weber, 2002:3-47). Disengaged identity means the withdrawing process or apathy from involvement in activities related to local communities as well as being part of social organizations, social networks, political parties and local government.

4) Imaginaries refer to how people perceive and feel connection with their land which is extremely important for indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. They also refer to ideas and feelings that motivate interaction with groups, organizations and/or institutions and the reasons to trust others or not (Anderson, 2006; Escobar, 2008: 209-226; Sartre, 2006: 4-16). Imaginaries could be characterized by weak or strong connection with land; by weak or strong trust or distrust between different groups, organizations and institutions; the belief that politics is a matter very far from people's everyday life, an issue related to corrupt and powerful men, or that it is an activity related to people's social problems and needs, and a channel to improve people's community. Imaginaries vary from reliant to distrustful.

Participatory decentralization implies a well-functioning representative democracy and specific institutional arrangements in order to promote empowerment processes in everyday life. This kind of decentralization assumes redistributive efficiency, accountability and quality of representation. Redistributive efficiency requires devolution

of political power in terms of the transfer of authority and autonomy, economic and human resources by the national and/or regional/departmental government to the municipal. In addition, devolution of political power also implies the transfer of responsibilities within municipal government through different institutional arrangements and practices that engage civil society (e.g. co-management to provide municipal services, participatory planning). However, devolution of political power depends more on the national political project of decentralization and institutional arrangements, which include the regional (Chile) or departmental (Uruguay) government's capabilities for participatory decentralization, than on the municipal government. Local government must be prepared to receive economic and human resources, and to manage municipal services with participatory and transparent governance. These capabilities were analyzed by this study through the socio-cultural dimension of territory.

Therefore, field research looks at how the socio-cultural dimension of territory influences participatory decentralization processes in both kinds of actors: the state and the civil society, in both countries. In terms of operationalization, this research studies participatory decentralization outcomes for the state in terms of: 1) the promotion of mechanisms and spaces for accountability by local government that facilitate the building of horizontal governance through empowerment and learning processes of local civil society; and 2) the quality of representation of political leaders and municipal officials which requires transparency, qualification and legitimacy.

As for civil society, this study analyzes: 1) the existence of a relationship between local government and civil society in terms of co-governance, co-management and networking, so-called horizontal governance; 2) the appropriation of channels and spaces for accountability promoted by local government; and 3) the capabilities and skills for decision-making processes in order to improve local development. These variables imply

a learning process in terms of the internalization of skills, values and competences to analyze, decide and propose alternatives, as well as synergy, coordination and solidarity among different local actors.

The intervening variable is therefore the political project and institutional arrangement of participatory decentralization in both countries. In fact, the political project/model of participatory decentralization in Uruguay, based on progressive politics, has been centered on political and social decentralization through strengthening citizen capacities for decision-making processes and civic engagement in local government, increasing participatory planning processes, transparency of representativeness and autonomy. In contrast, the political project/model of decentralization in Chile, has been focused on technocratic reforms to the legal framework, institutional design, administrative decentralization, effectiveness and efficiency and the transfer of jurisdiction from the national level to the local level, such as education and health services, without the required economic and human resources.

Therefore, independent, dependent and intervening variables could be graphically represented as follows:

Table 3.4
Operationalization of independent, dependent and intervening variables

Socio-cultural dimension of territory (Independent variable)	Political project and institutional arrangement (Intervening variable: e.g. Participatory budget)	Participatory decentralization outcomes—local government (Dependent variable)	Participatory decentralization outcomes—civil society (Dependent variable)
1. Social Relations 2. Power Relations 3. Identities 4. Imaginaries	Social and political decentralization, led by FA in Uruguay (Left) versus administrative decentralization, led by Concertación and UDI in Chile (Technocratic)	1. Accountability	1.Horizontal governance
		2. Quality of representation	2. Appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability
			3. Capacity and skills for decision making process and improving local development

Consequently, this study explores how the socio-cultural dimensions of territory influence participatory decentralization outcomes in both actors: local government and civil society. Social relations influence PD outcomes in local civil society in terms of the existence of horizontal governance (e.g. social networks and co-management experiences) in a specific territory, since this type of governance requires high levels of communication between individuals as well as a significant self-organizational capacity in order to propose and find solutions for their particular social problems and needs (Castel, 2000: 5-24; Delamaza et al, 2012; Weber, 2002: 3-47). In addition, social relations also impact the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, which supposes empowerment and informal learning processes by local civil society (Freire, 1970: 71-86). Therefore, social relations also affect capabilities and skills for

decision-making processes of civil society in order to foster local development. Consequently, strong social relations foster horizontal governance, high appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and high capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of local civil society (Delamaza et al, 2012). However, weak social relations impede horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and influence low capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of local civil society (Figure 3.3)**.**

Figure 3.3 Influence of social relations on PD outcomes in Local Civil Society

Concerning power relations, relationships between political leaders, institutional actors and citizens which are characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism influence the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by citizens such as Cabildos*[13]* and are used to deepen dependence on political leaders instead of to promote

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[13] Cabildos are spaces or mechanisms for accountability promoted by municipal government in order to provide information to the neighbours about the Municipal Development Plan and Municipal Budget. During the first Cabildo, the local authorities must present and inform about the municipal plan to citizens who will control its fullfilment in the

autonomy and cooperation between local government and citizens (Auyero & Benzecry, 2016: 221-246; Pizano, 2001: 74-82). Furthermore, more vertical relationships between political actors and social leaders and representatives from civil society reproduce clientelism and paternalism instead of promoting genuine processes for accountability through spaces such as Cabildos. However, more horizontal relationships between them foster learning and empowerment processes in social leaders, horizontal governance, and can also improve transparency and genuine legitimacy of political and institutional actors. In addition, horizontal relationships between social leaders and citizens foster capabilities to propose improvements for local development (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 Influence of Power Relations on PD outcomes in local government and civil society

Traditional/disengaged identities based on isolation, conservative values and customs influence participatory outcomes in both: local government and civil society. In fact,

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following Cabildo's sessions. Cabildos should be organized by local government at least once a year. Their existence and functioning are established by legal frameworks in Uruguay and Chile.

traditional identity, which implies the historical exclusion of and discrimination against ethnic groups (e.g. Afro-descendants in Uruguay) and indigenous people (e.g. Mapuche community in Chile), contributes to the insufficient or nonexistent spaces and mechanisms for accountability; authoritarian leadership; the lack or difficulties for self-organization; and weaker skills and capabilities for decision-making processes of civil society. On the other hand, modern and cohesive identity, which integrates and includes ethnic and cultural diversity, produces a horizontal, transparent and qualified leadership of political leaders that promotes empowering spaces and mechanisms for accountability as well as capabilities for self-organization and decision-making processes of civil society (Escobar, 2008: 206-208; Larrain, 1989: 85-110; Weber, 2002:3-47).

Figure 3.5 Influence of Identity on PD outcomes in local government and civil society

Finally, imaginaries that involve a strong connection with the land, trust between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity related to social problems and needs have a different impact on civil society: civil society is more engaged;

horizontal governance, strengthened by synergy and networks between local government and civil society, is more likely; and people show stronger motivation to participate in the political process (Delamaza et al, 2012; Sartre, 2006: 4-16). Furthermore, these kinds of reliant imaginaries increase the likelihood of the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by local government. On the other end of the spectrum are distrustful imaginaries that have a weak connection to the land, that show distrust between individuals and groups, and that hold the belief that politics constitute an issue very far from individuals' social problems and needs or that it is an activity related to corruption and clientelism; these factors cause apathy and reduce motivation to collaborate with local government to improve communities to become political leaders such as mayors or municipal councillors, and to participate in community spaces (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 Influence of Imaginaries on PD outcomes in local government and civil society

This study analyzes the dependent variable (participatory decentralization outcomes or what degree of commitment to participation and what kind of participation) in all its possibilities: failure or success. Based on the hypothetical effect of the political project/model on participatory decentralization outcomes in both countries, this study expected to find more autonomy, resources and political power within the municipalities in Uruguay than in those in Chile. In addition, more spaces, channels and mechanisms for political participation, decision-making, accountability processes, transparency, horizontal co-governance networks and quality of representation promoted by the local government were expected in Uruguay than in Chile. Finally, related to civil society, deeper empowerment, capabilities and skills for decision-making processes were expected in Uruguay than in Chile. Less empowerment, capabilities, learning, and skills for decision-making processes on the part of civil society were expected among municipalities with a higher percentage of ethnic groups (Afro-descendants or indigenous people) than among municipalities without them since this population has been historically excluded from political participation in both countries.

In addition, fewer experiences of co-governance were expected to be observed among local communities with ethnic groups in both countries. Another expected difference in terms of capabilities, experiences and skills for political participation and for improving local development was that between rural and urban municipalities. The lowest performances in terms of local development was expected be found among rural municipalities with ethnic groups since they have been systematically racialized, discriminated against and marginalized, in both countries, in the past as well as today. However, the research also explicitly considered the possibility that grass-roots alternatives to participation in the official decentralization project may exist and may be more attractive to citizens, especially marginalized groups. In sum, these differences

would confirm that the socio-cultural dimension of territory influences participatory decentralization outcomes and human development, as stated by the hypothesis.

3.5 <u>Techniques and instruments</u>

This project applied different techniques and instruments to collect information, including the analysis of institutional documents related to decentralization, development planning, citizen participation mechanisms promoted by the state, national and municipal legal frameworks, national planning and budget, UNDP reports, human rights reports regarding ethnic groups and indigenous people; as well as a bibliography on the cultural identity and history of case studies. In addition, analysis was undertaken of quantitative data related to poverty, demography, decentralization and political participation at a national level from the national statistical institutions of Uruguay and Chile. Finally, statistical data about political participation at a local level, such as municipal elections; spaces or channels for citizen participation and accountability; as well as any other participatory processes of local planning in the last decade were analyzed qualitatively.

Drawing on qualitative methodology, the project applied the following techniques: semi-structured interviews, focus groups, observation, participant observation, and social and resources mapping (Desai & Potter, 2011: 1-15; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015: 149-166; Mack et al, 2005: 51-77). The national and central officials who were interviewed were selected taking into account their career, representativeness, expertise and engagement with the decentralization policy in each country and based on the key informants in each country such as NGO RIMISP (Latin American Center for Rural Development) in Chile and public offices in Uruguay such as the Budget and Planning Office or *Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto* (OPP), particularly the Uruguay Integra Program; the Secretary of the Board of Mayors (Congreso de Intendentes); the Ministry of Social

Development or Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (MIDES) and the Intendencia of Montevideo. Social leaders from civil society at a local level were selected according to their representativeness and engagement with their communities and with local government.

Participating citizens were selected according to their engagement in participatory spaces and mechanisms (e.g. Cabildos, participatory planning, neighbourhood councils, participatory budget, social networks, clubs or associations), promoted by local government and led by the interviewed social leaders from civil society. In addition, some social leaders and representatives from civil society and participating citizens, who were not engaged in official spaces or processes, but in other alternative spaces (e.g. Mapuche organizations, NGOs, churches, networks, unions), were also interviewed. All participants were recruited by mayors of each municipality with the support of the NGO RIMISP in Chile and the aforementioned organisms in Uruguay. Finally, semi-structured interviews were also conducted with experts and scholars in each country, taking into account their expertise and engagement with decentralization policy and human development in each country; as well as their expertise and activism with ethnic groups (Afro-descendants in Uruguay) and indigenous people (Mapuche community in Chile). Fieldwork was conducted from August 2018 to June 2019 and included different techniques and instruments which were applied to almost 195 people (Table D1 & Table D2 in the Appendix).

3.5.a Semi-structured interviews

The research interview implies an interpersonal situation, a conversation between two interlocutors about a mutual interest where the knowledge is created "inter" the points of view of the interviewer and the interviewee. The semi-structured interview seeks to obtain

descriptions of the "life world" of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena. This type of interview includes an outline of topics to be covered with suggested questions (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015: 149-166). This technique was applied to at least five officials and professionals of each municipality in order to study the following issues: a) institutional discourses and perceptions about decentralization in terms of learning, achievements, opportunities, difficulties, obstacles and resistances from the state; b) institutional discourses and perceptions about the role and relevance of civil society in these processes and experiences from the perspective of state; c) capabilities of local government in promoting and deepening participatory decentralization and human development through local bureaucracy; and d) capabilities, beliefs and sense of belonging of local communities involved in these processes. The same issues were discussed with the officials, directors and professionals of ministries or organisms related to the process of national and municipal decentralization process in Uruguay and in Chile at central and national levels.

The number of people interviewed depended on the availability of interviewees in each country. Semi-structured interviews about the same topics were undertaken with key informants from civil society (at least five leaders/representatives and ten participants per municipality) involved in participatory experiences promoted not only by municipalities but also by civil society such as social movements, networks, NGOs, associations, unions and churches. Finally, this technique along with online interviews were also applied to some scholars and experts who specialize in the main topic of this investigation to contextualize this approach.

In Uruguay, this technique was applied to ten national officials (Budget and Planning Office and Ministry of Social Development), to five officials of the Intendencia of Montevideo, four from the Intendencia of Cerro Largo and two from the Intendencia of

Canelones. Furthermore, seven municipal officials, five social leaders/representatives form civil society, ten participating citizens, and ten neighbours from *Medio Luto* were interviewed in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Cerro Largo Department). Thus, 32 semi-structured interviews were applied in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía. Semi-structured interviews were also applied to six municipal officials, to five social leaders/representatives from civil society and to ten participating citizens in the Municipality of Santa Rosa (Canelones Department). Thus, 21 semi-structured interviews were applied in the Municipality of Santa Rosa. This technique was administered to 11 municipal officials, to six *Concejales Vecinales* (Neighbourhood Councillors) from the *Centros Comunales Zonales* (Zonal Community Centers) 14, 17 and 18, and to 11 participating citizens from the three CCZs in Municipality A (Montevideo Department). Thus, 28 semi-structured interviews were applied in Municipality A. Finally, eleven scholars and experts from the University of the Republic, from the United Nations and from an NGO (Mizangas) were interviewed.

In Chile, semi-structured interviews were applied to five central officials from the *Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Administrativo* or SUBDERE (Sub-secretary for Regional and Administrative Development) and from the Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades or AChM (Chilean Association of Municipalities) and to one governor (Cautín Province-La Araucanía region). In addition, this technique was applied to nine municipal officials, to six social leaders/representatives from civil society of whom three were leaders from Mapuche communities and others were members of the Consejos de la Sociedad Civil or COSOCs (Communal Council of Civil Society), and 11 participating citizens in the Municipality of Perquenco (La Araucanía Region). Thus, 26 semi-structured interviews in total were applied in the Municipality of Perquenco. In addition, seven semi-structured interviews were applied to municipal officials, six to social leaders/representatives from

civil society, including presidents and secretaries of *Junta de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Boards), and ten to participating citizens in the Municipality of Empedrado (Maule Region). Thus, 23 semi-structured interviews in total were applied in the Municipality of Empedrado. Also, 13 interviews were applied to the municipal officials, seven to social leaders/representatives from civil society, including members of the COSOC, and *Junta de Vecinos*, and ten participating citizens in the Municipality of Recoleta (Metropolitan Region). Thus, 30 semi-structured interviews were applied in the Municipality of Recoleta. Finally, this technique was applied to six scholars and experts from *RIMISP*-Chile (Latin American Center for Rural Development), from the *Universidad de Los Lagos*, from the Ministry of Social Development, and from the National Development Bank office in Chile. Therefore, 199 semi-structured interviews were applied in total: 112 in Uruguay and 91 in Chile.

In regard to the reference system, all interviews were enumerated (# 1, # 2, etc) taking into account the following order of group of interviewed: national & central officials, municipal officials, social leaders/representatives from civil society, participating citizens and scholars & experts in each country. Numbered interviews were coded with prefix according to the country in which the interview ocurred (e.g. UY in the case of Uruguay, and CH in the case of Chile) when anonymity was required and in the case of all participating citizens in each case study. For instance, UY #1 and CH # 1.

3.5.b <u>Focus group</u>

A focus group is a qualitative data collection method in which one or two researchers and participants meet as a group to discuss a research topic. These sessions are taperecorded and sometimes videotaped. One researcher ("moderator") leads the discussion by asking participants to respond to "open-ended questions". The main advantages of this technique

are the large amount of information, the effectiveness in accessing a broad range of views on a specific topic as well as the variety of opinions within a population. The richness of the focus group is the group dynamic and potential diversity. Participants influence each other through their presence and reactions to what other people say. Focus groups can be useful to collect information about the experiences and views of individuals, their cultural norms, opinions and values. The "moderator" should open the focus group with a general comment and wait for a response; invite a range of comments by asking participants for experiences, thoughts and definitions; use silence to think about the questions; and limit his/her participation once the discussion begins (Mack et al, 2005: 51-77).

This technique (one per municipality) was applied in the six case studies in order to analyze and compare the perceptions and discourses of municipal officials and leaders/representatives from civil society about participatory decentralization processes within the selected municipalities in terms of their main learning, achievements, opportunities, difficulties, obstacles and resistances. It was applied to at least five officials and professionals related to decentralization policy, such as mayors, municipal councillors and at least five neighbourhood councils or leaders/representatives of civil society related to participatory processes.

3.5.c Social and resources mapping

Social mapping is a participatory technique in which participants in a group draw a visual map of important institutions (e.g. hospitals, churches, schools) and places people congregate in the community. The explored issues could be the importance of institutions in the community, where and how people spend their time and where children, women, and old people gather together. Resource mapping is also a participatory instrument in which participants draw a visual map of where they go to get the important resources in

their community. The explored issues could be, for example, the location of crops, animals and water (Desai & Potter, 2011: 1-15).

In this project, social and resources mapping was applied to the main issue analysed in this investigation: participatory decentralization and human development. This technique aimed to observe the appropriation of spaces and channels of participation, not only as promoted by the state but also by civil society, as well as the main obstacles and difficulties for implementing participatory decentralization as perceived by participating citizens. In addition, their capabilities, skills and the learning process as it influences and proposes alternatives to the social programs and development projects were observed during this activity. Participants identified their main development problems, their possible causes and the community resources in order to propose solutions. There were about ten key participating citizens involved in the participatory processes related to municipal government and in other spaces promoted by civil society. This instrument was applied in all municipalities; in some cases it was applied during the interviews with these participatory citizens. In some municipalities, this technique was also applied during the focus group discussion with municipal officials and representatives from civil society.

3.5.d Participant observation

Participant observation is a core ethnographic technique, appropriate to qualitative study of cultural groups. It opens things up and makes it possible to collect data that one may not know to look for at the beginning of a study. In addition, it can reduce the reactivity of participants, help to figure out which questions are important, and contribute to developing an intuitive understanding of social dynamics. This technique was applied by the researcher as an outsider ("participant observer") who participates in some aspects of life and records what is possible to record. The different stages of participant observation

were taken into account during field work, such as "the initial contact, possible culture shock, discovering the obvious, the break, focusing and leaving the field" (Bernard, 2006: 347). Conducting appropriate participant observation requires learning some skills during the investigation such as "language, explicit awareness, building memory, maintaining naiveté, writing, hanging out, rapport and objectivity" (Bernard, 2006: 347). During observation the field notes are extremely important as is coding them after field activities (Bernard, 2006: 342-386).

Observation or, when appropriate, participant observation, took place with both local government and civil society. In the case of local government, observation was focused on describing the delegation of functions, political power and resources from the national or regional/departmental to local bureaucracy, power relations (between mayors and councillors, between municipal officials and representatives from civil society, between social leaders and participatory citizens), as well as the inclusion of the territorial perspective through participatory planning processes. For this purpose, municipal council sessions and meetings were attended and observed. In addition, municipal activities which involved both the local government and local civil society were attended and observed, such as Cabildos, participatory planning meetings, participatory budget and neighbourhood councillor elections, and delivery of municipal services in all municipalities. In the particular case of civil society, observation was undertaken of any activity promoted by representatives related to local government and development such as meetings in community centers or neighbourhood boards (*Juntas de Vecinos* in Chile); as well as any other event that was useful to explore socio-cultural dimensions within the selected communities in both countries, for instance, informal gatherings on weekends, religious and state holidays such as the San Sebastian feast, and the Mapuche ceremonies in Perquenco; traditional festivals in Isidoro Noblía (dancing festival) and in Santa Rosa.

At these social occasions, informal discussions, interactions, and behaviours provided crucial insight into pertinent social relations, power relations, identity, traditions, imaginaries and practices.

This investigation presented specific methodological challenges as perfect control of the variables considered was not possible. In addition, although Afro-Uruguayans can be found mostly at the border with Brazil, they constitute a small percentage of the population around the country, including Montevideo City. It is not possible to find perfectly comparable Uruguayan and Chilean municipalities in terms of demography and socio-economic levels. Indeed, the official classification between rural and urban municipalities presented challenges, since the discussion about rurality and even about the criteria of administrative boundaries is still controversial and dynamic in both countries, but more so in Uruguay where the creation of municipalities is more recent than in Chile (Alvarado et al, 2018; Berdegué et al, 2010; OPP, 2017). With respect to similarities between Uruguay and Chile in terms of past authoritarian legacies and political institutions, it is important to acknowledge that the welfare state in Chile experienced more changes after the dictatorship (which affected the relationship between civil society and the state) than occurred in Uruguay (Garretón, 1983: 23-35; Navia, 2010: 298-328). Additional challenges included the potential influence of the political campaign for national elections in Uruguay, which occurred in October and November 2019 in Uruguay, close to the time of fieldwork.

Regarding the socio-cultural dimension of territory, it is important to highlight some important challenges for the researcher. Although territory constitutes a powerful tool for explaining and analyzing participatory decentralization outcomes, it proved a very complex notion to be operationalized and measured. In addition, the causal inference from the relationship between the independent and dependent variables presented some

weaknesses in terms of confidence in findings, due to the complexity of the socio-cultural dimension of territory. These weaknesses were managed through the comparative case study methodology which allowed for some control over the variation of key control variables (George & Benedet, 2005: 151-160). Uncertainty about causal inferences will never be eliminated, but this research tried to explicit about this challenge. Exploring causal inference is appropriate if researchers are cautious in detailing uncertainty of the inference. The most important area in which caution is necessary is in defining "the counterfactual event" and a key part of defining the appropriate counterfactual condition is clarifying what we are holding constant while we are changing the value of the "treatment variable" (King et al, 1994: 75-114). Considering of the counterfactual (political project) was an integral part of this research project.

3.6 <u>Ethics</u>

This research was approved by the University of Ottawa Research Ethic Board in 2018 and renewed in July 2019 for another year until July 2020. Therefore, in its methodology and design, this project followed the Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans from the Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement in terms of consent, fairness, privacy, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest. Furthermore, this project was conducted taking into account the core principles of respect for the persons, concern for welfare and justice as well as other relevant policies and applicable law and regulations in the selected countries. Regarding the consent of the subjects interviewed, the objectives and field research activities of this project were communicated and explained to all of them. A letter of consent was given to all participants before starting any activity, in order to ensure their verbal consent, support and engagement during the whole process based on the ethical principle which states that participation in research must be voluntary. In addition, the researcher was conscious of and sensitive to the power dynamics during the

fieldwork regarding to the most vulnerable population and ethnic groups such as Afro-Uruguayans and indigenous people like the Mapuche community in rural areas, and was careful in to avoid any misunderstandings and expectations related to their access to public services through this investigation. A feedback mechanism during and after the research was established for the interviewees from different public offices and the representatives of local communities. The recorded interviews and the collected data were preserved securely (password protected) on my computer and by my supervisor until the next study on this topic.

With regard to the anonymity or confidentiality of the interviewees, it is important to mention that they were asked about their preferences. If some of the interviewees preferred to preserve their absolute anonymity, their names, titles and positions were not mentioned in the written version of this project and numbers were used instead. However, if some of them preferred to appear and to be recognized, they were included in this document. For fairness, it is important to highlight that the positionality of the research was explicitly considered as objectivity and necessary criticism were ensured on the part of the researcher, as she also used to work in public offices related to decentralization in Uruguay. In order to avoid any risk of bias, the needed independence and autonomy were secured through the national and international academic support and legitimacy from the University of the Republic, National Agency for Innovation and Research of Uruguay (ANII) and the University of Ottawa. The potential contribution of this project to improving the participatory decentralization process and territorial planning in Uruguay, were also explained to politicians and public actors involved in this investigation.

Chapter 4: <u>Implementing Participatory Decentralization in Uruguay</u>

4.1 <u>National processes, progress and challenges</u>

The purpose of this section is to analyze the implementation of participatory decentralization in Uruguay over the last decades—taking into account origin and historical context; the main actors involved in this process; and the institutional design that implies legal framework reforms—in order to understand the role of the political project on PD outcomes in this country. Although significant legal framework reforms and institutional arrangements have been established within a broader political project based on political and social decentralization in the last few years in Uruguay, and despite the existence of the previous internationally famous experience of participatory decentralization of Montevideo showed advances in democratization, transparency, civic engagement and territorial perspective, there are still many obstacles to implement this process in the whole country. In addition, even though the experiment in the *Intendencia* of Montevideo supposed a process of moving away from a clientele-based, bureaucratic, paternalistic and centralized system of government, citizens did not believe that their participation had an impact on government decisions (Canel, 2010: 198-213; Goldfrank; 2002:51-83; W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019).

All these obstacles and difficulties were evident within all the selected case studies, but particularly in the rural municipalities where historically-rooted centralism, caudillism, clientelism and paternalism remain. In order to better understand the Uruguayan process of decentralization and its current challenges, it is important to take into account the historical impact of the welfare state and the traditional caudillism on the passive role of civil society and the state's tradition of centralism and sectorial management (Buquet & Piñeiro, 2016: 139-150; Cardarello et al, 2011: 57-67).

Uruguay was part of the United Provinces of the River Plate in 1810 and this is considered a cultural legacy that has influenced its current unitary character (P. Apezteguía, p.c., August, 16, 2018). After that period, the *Provincia Oriental* (Eastern Province) became a unitary and centralist nation with the National Constitution in 1830 that established departmental governments in order to control national territory and maintain internal security. Before the creation of the national state, political parties such as *Partido Nacional* and *Partido Colorado* emerged as the most significant actors in the political organization of this new nation. Once the national state was created in 1830, the Presidency of the Republic appointed departmental authorities; this process could be considered delegation, but not devolution, since political power remained at a central level. In 1908, the role of *Intendente* was created and separated from the sheriff and military roles it had previously included (A. Oroño, p.c., September 9, 2018).

The National Constitution of 1918 established local government and administration and promoted citizen participation through a plebiscite, assemblies and referendums. Later, the Constitution of 1934 created the electoral system for the Departmental Governments, with the elections every five years. This Departmental Government[14] was formed by the *Intendentes* and *Juntas Departamentales* (Departmental Boards), currently with 31 *ediles* (aedils or councillors) that were elected by the citizenry for the first time in 1938, almost 30 years after their creation. This Constitution also set three types of *Juntas Locales* (local boards): 1) Centralized ones that were created by departmental government decree and appointed by the *Intendente* with the approval of *Junta Departamental*; 2) Autonomous or expanded boards that were appointed by the *Intendente* with the approval of *Juntas Departamentales*, with some level of financial autonomy; 3) Expanded and elective ones

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[14] The territory of Uruguay was divided among Departments which constituted political, financial and administrative units of government and the first ones were created in 1816: Montevideo, Canelones, San José, Maldonado, Soriano and Colonia.

like Río Branco, set in 1960, and, San Carlos and Bella Unión, created in 1990 (A. Oroño, p.c., September 9, 2018). The creation of Departmental Governments constitutes a significant milestone in the process of decentralization in Uruguay, which differs from most of other Latin American countries, where municipalities were the first local government created (e.g. in Chile municipalities were created in 1833), much earlier than the creation of regional or provincial governments (Ruiz Díaz & Selios, 2018:14-16).

Although the National Constitution of 1918 promoted the autonomy of the departmental government and created elected *Juntas Locales*; and the Municipal Organic Law N° 9.515 created the elective *Juntas Locales* in 1935, centralism remained in the Uruguayan state throughout the 20th century. Indeed, for decades centralism was rooted in both levels of government: the national and the departmental (Ruiz Díaz & Selios, 2018:14-16). During the dictatorship (1973-1985), the National Parliament was dissolved, the *Juntas Departamentales* were dismissed and replaced by neighbourhood boards, *ediles* were replaced by Secretaries of *Juntas Locales* and *Intendentes* became Inspectors or were replaced by colonels (e.g. in Canelones, Maldonado, Paysandú, San José, Tacuarembó departments). Secretaries of *Juntas Locales* were appointed by the *Intendentes* but not elected by citizens. After the dictatorship, departmental governments assumed new functions but power still remained at the national and departmental levels (A. Oroño, p.c., September 9, 2018).

In 1989, when the left coalition *Frente Amplio* (*FA*) reached the municipal government for the first time, participatory decentralization was implemented in the Municipality of Montevideo. Decentralization was fostered not only as a strategy to reform the state but also to bring it closer to citizens. The *FA*'s electoral success was the result of the party's complex transition from a predominantly urban, center-left mass party to a professional electoral organization (Luna, 2007:1-27). This top-down project was led by *FA* in the

context of the expansion of market-oriented decentralization policy in Latin America promoted by international agencies, and as a result of the democratization process developed by political parties in this region after the dictatorship (Eaton, 2004:18; Grindle, 2000). However, the Uruguayan model of decentralization was designed with influence from one of most participatory attempts to decentralize the state in Latin America: Porto Alegre's project of participatory budgeting. This model conceived of decentralization as an opportunity to deepen democracy and participation, to promote social equality as well as to transform the model of the state from an alternative perspective (Avritzer, 2010; Canel, 2010:198-200; De Souza Santos, 2005: 307-368; Goldfrank, 2001).

Decentralization and participation were considered to be deeply linked and their combination was proposed as the key to improving government performance, activating citizens and deepening a substantive democracy (Frente Amplio, 2003; Goldfrank, 2002: 53-55; Veneziano, 1999). These alternative projects and models of decentralization based on citizen participation, accountability and inclusive local development emerged in Latin America such as the experience of Participatory Budget (PB) in Porto Alegre in 1989; in the Municipality of Montevideo (Uruguay) in 1990; and in the metropolitan area of Caracas (Venezuela) by 1993 (Frente Amplio, 2003; Goldfrank, 2011).

The Brazilian and the Uruguayan left parties aimed to transform an elitist democracy into a deliberative one from the local level (De Souza Santos, 2005: 307-375; Buquet & Piñeiro, 2016: 139-151; Oszlak & Serafinoff, 2009: 13-28). The core of their reform focused on creating new institutions to give citizens influence over government infrastructure budgets. The decentralization policy in Uruguay aimed to develop spaces and channels for social and political participation in a complex national context: the recent transition from dictatorship to democracy.

This transition brought with it significant challenges in terms of the relationship between the state and civil society after almost twelve years of authoritarian government. Dictatorship had repressed, persecuted, tortured, kidnapped, raped and murdered political and social leaders, scholars, students, women and children during that regime in Uruguay. Indeed, most of the leftist political parties that formed the coalition Frente Amplio such as the Communist Party had suffered brutal repression by military elites. Furthermore, some of the most popular leaders and potential candidates for national elections like Líber Seregni (Frente Amplio) and Wilson Ferreira Aldunate (Partido Nacional) had been proscribed to participate in the presidential election in November 1984, when the military still exercised significant control over the political system, social organizations and the economy, as a result of the previous negotiations between the military elites and political parties in the *Pacto del Club Naval* (Schelotto, 2015:1-23). Political prisoners, media censorship, the prohibition of labour unions and political meetings during that regime negatively impacted citizens' awareness of recovering freedom of speech and the necessity of participating at a local level, especially in urban areas such as in the capital city Montevideo. Consequently, participatory spaces were considered to be crucial by the Frente Amplio, not only for implementing decentralization but also for recovering and deepening democracy in Uruguay (W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019; A. Olivera, p.c. August 31, 2018).

In this national context, Frente Amplio elaborated a political project of participatory decentralization for the Intendencia of Montevideo which also constituted a way to participate in the government as political party for the first time. Therefore, the new Mayor, Dr. Tabaré Vázquez, defined new administrative boundaries within the territory of Montevideo, creating local bodies in 18 zones of Montevideo (*Centros Comunales Zonales* or *CCZs*) in October 1990. The creation of these *CCZs* was the first step in the

process of participatory decentralization in terms of transfer of competences, authorities, resources and management spaces (Oszlak & Serafinoff, 2009: 13-28). Each district included two or more neighbourhoods, depending on the boundaries defined by the Territorial Division Decree (1993). The creation of three areas reflected the delegation of political power as well as administrative decentralization: a local political board formed by representatives from all political parties in Uruguay (such as *Partido Nacional, Partido Colorado* and *Frente Amplio*); a local bureaucracy led by a Director who managed administrative staff and professionals like social workers, architects, psychologists, teachers and journalists and a *Concejo Vecinal* (Neighbourhood Council), formed by social leaders and representatives from civil society elected by residents of each district. This Concejo Vecinal (CV) deliberated on and advised local boards on plans for health, housing, environment, work, education, culture and programs for children, youth and the elderly.

Over the years, the municipal government has fostered the commitment of the citizens in municipal planning and budgeting. For this purpose, each *CCZ* has been promoting participation through different mechanisms to allow citizens to decide about their own main problems and needs in order to achieve better local development. This participatory planning was named *PLAEDEZ* (*Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo Zonal*), the Strategic Plan of Zone Development. The budgeting was defined by citizens through a mechanism called 'Participatory Budgeting' which allowed people to make decisions about the best project proposed by social organizations and individuals for local development in the areas of social welfare, environment, infrastructure, social cohesion and culture. In fact, local government promoted self-organization of neighbours for improving their communities in each *CCZ*. Participatory Budgeting became a binding participatory

mechanism, insofar as local governments had to include people's priorities in their plans and programs.

One of the most significant milestones in the Uruguayan decentralization process during the decade of the 1990s was the National Constitutional Reform in 1996 which codified the importance of decentralization; recognized the *Congreso de Intendentes* (Congress of Intendentes) as the representative body for Intendentes; created a national fund for sub-national development plans and programs; separated national elections from departmental elections; and distinguished departmental from municipal issues. This Reform also created the Sectoral Decentralization Commission, formed by the *Congreso de Intendentes* and Ministries, coordinated by the Budget and Planning Office. The aim of this Commission is to elaborate plans and programs to promote decentralization in the country (A. Oroño, p.c., September 9, 2018; Ruiz & Selios, 2018: 14-16). This National Constitutional Reform influenced the political culture of Uruguay in terms of increasing the weight of the departmental governments compared to the national government through different innovations (Cardarello et al, 2011; Laurnaga, 2001: 11-37).

The second step in the national decentralization process started when the *FA* obtained the presidency for the first time in 2004. Although decentralization had been on the public agenda since 1980 (Oslak & Serafinoff, 2010), only by 2005 did it emerge as the main objective of the national project (Goldfrank, 2007). In this first presidency of Tabaré Vázquez, a Social Council comprising different national ministries was created to promote coordination among public offices and a territorial perspective on public policies. This Social Council is chaired by the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) which was also created in 2005. Over the last ten years, MIDES has been promoting a territorial management model in order to integrate the territories' needs and problems on its planning as well as to further decentralization (A. Olivera, p.c., August 31, 2018;

Midaglia, 2009). In this context, the Budget and Planning Office has been implementing different programs in the last years such as *'Uruguay Integra'* to foster a social and territorial cohesion, particularly in rural areas, through the European Union cooperation.

In September 2009, after a long debate in Parliament, a new legal framework - the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N° 18.567 -, was approved to create a third level of government, namely, municipalities. The initiative was again led by Tabaré Vázquez (*FA*), the President of Uruguay, who proposed this regulation to the *Congreso de Intendentes* in 2007 and then to the National Parliament in 2008. This law was passed in the middle of a long debate at the National Parliament not only among traditional political parties but also among *FA*'s representatives. There was not a consensus about the importance of this new legal framework (Cardarello et al, 2010).

The Law N° 18.567 allowed the creation of 89 municipalities in communities of 5,000 or more inhabitants throughout the country. The creation of these municipalities did not automatically generate greater citizen participation but fostered transparency in public management, the opportunity to become the state closer to citizens in small cities and towns, and the increasing delegation of functions from the national or departmental government to local one. By the second *FA* administration (2010-2015) the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law Nº 18.567 was implemented and local authorities were elected by citizens for the first time. During the implementation of the third level of government, many difficulties and challenges emerged such as a lack of autonomy, coordination with the *Intendencias* as well as with the national government (Olivera, A, p.c. August 31, 2018; Orsi, Y., p.c. February 26, 2019).

Therefore, in 2014 this law was reformed through the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N° 19.272 in order to define municipal and departmental

functions, particularly the mayor's functions, and municipality human and material resources. Indeed, this law established the distribution of national funds to municipalities as well as the design of five-year and annual plans for each municipality. Furthermore, it sets Municipal Councils as the local government formed by five Councillors elected by citizens who live within the boundaries of their municipality. The councillor who receives the most votes would be designed as the mayor of his/her municipality.

The Law N° 19.272 was written in compliance with the National Constitution of the Republic statement in its Art. N° 262 & N° 287, which established that a municipality is made up of any town with a population of more than two thousand people who share a defined social and cultural personality and common interests that require political representatives and that facilitate citizen participation. For the local communities that do not reach the required inhabitants established in these articles, a municipality could be created through a decision of the *Junta Departamental,* the *Intendente* or 15 percent of registered citizens eligible to vote who inhabit a locality. Finally, the creation of a municipality in the territory of the departmental capital requires an initiative from the *Intendente* and the will of the *Junta Departamental* (Gil de Vargas, 2013). In addition, this new law also established participatory mechanisms such as accountability to the *Junta Departamental* as well as other local initiatives on the part of civil society. Indeed, each municipality will create spaces and mechanisms to promote citizen participation through processes of consulting, initiative and control over local government (Art. 5°). If these participatory spaces are not established by the local government, neighbours have the right to request for them to the Municipal or Departmental government (Art. 16°).

In terms of fiscal decentralization, municipalities did not have autonomy and their funding was limited to three sources: the departmental government, the national government, and donations. These new regulations constitute the third important step in

the Uruguayan process of decentralization; the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law was considered the institutional expression of the National Constitutional Reform of 1996 which basically established political decentralization (Ruiz Díaz & Selios, 2018). As was mentioned before, the Budget and Planning Office (OPP) became one of the most important state actors for leading decentralization policy in Uruguay through strategic departments, offices and programs such as Decentralization and Public Investment Direction and *'Uruguay Integra'* (Orsi, Y, p.c., February 26, 2019; Veneziano, A, p.c. August 14, 2018). For instance, *'Uruguay Integra'* has been implementing strategies for fostering municipal capabilities and potential for decentralization such as the *Fondo de Incentivo a la Gestión Municipal* or FIGM (Municipal Management Incentive Fund) established in the Law N° 19.272 and distributed based on three criteria: unsatisfied basic needs (UBN), education level and population density.

Furthermore, there are three kinds of funds to be distributed among municipalities: The first one (established in the *Literal A*[15]) is distributed among all municipalities; the second one (established in the *Literal B*) aims to compensate or reduce territorial inequalities regarding their capabilities and is distributed based on the criteria stated by the Sectoral Commission of Decentralization based on the percentage of UBN, the educational level and the population density[16]. The third (established in the *Literal C*) aims to promote Municipal capacities and its distribution depends on the fulfillment of local government objectives. Municipalities also have to design a Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), Annual

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[15] Three kinds of funds are established in the Law N° 19.272 through the Literal A, Literal B and Literal C.

[16] Municipalities with population with more than three UBN, lower education level and less population density (dispersed population) receive more resources (Gallo, Nuesch & Feo, 2019).

Plans named *POA (Plan Operativo Anual)* and Management Commitments (Budget and Planing Office, 2019; M. De Barbieri, p.c., September 11, 2018).

By 2015, the new Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law, created 23 additional municipalities in order to further expand local government throughout the territory of the country. Indeed, 11 of these 23 municipalities were created via the mandatory mechanism based on population (more than 2000) and 12 of them, were created via the mechanism of *Intendentes'* request[17], regardless of the population of the municipalities. These 112 municipalities represent 31% of the national territory with 73% of the total population of Uruguay living in their territories. There are still 890,000 inhabitants who do not live in any municipality, but most of these live in the departmental capitals. Three departments have 46 municipalities (Montevideo, Canelones and Maldonado); 69% of the national territory has no municipalities; most of the population in municipalities is urban; the largest 10 of the 112 municipalities have one and a half million inhabitants, while the smallest 10 represent 0.26% of the population. Thus, Uruguay shows significant territorial inequality in terms of the expansion and creation of municipalities (Presidency of the Republic, 2018).

By September 2018, the Presidency proposed a new reform of Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N° 19.272 to the Congress, which established some important changes to the criteria for the creation of municipalities; the guidelines for citizen participation, particularly during the design and implementation of Developmental Municipal Plans, and the importance of transparency in municipal government. Another important change proposed in this reform was about the number of municipal councillors

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[17] According to the Law N° 19.272, a municipality is formed by any town with a population of more than two thousand people. For the local communities that do not attain the required number of inhabitants, a municipality could be created through a decision of the *Intendente.*

and the possibility of receiving a salary depending on the number of inhabitants of each municipality (Presidency of the Republic, 2018; A. Oroño, p.c., September 9, 2018).

Although participatory decentralization is part of a broader political project and has been promoted through a new legal framework in the last decade, there remain many obstacles to effective implementation (Canel, 2010: 207-213; Cardarello et al., 2011; Frente Amplio, 2008; Goldfrank, 2002; Eaton, 2004:1-22). With regard to the role of the state, this process still suffers from resistance of political leaders and political parties to transfer functions and responsibilities, as well as financial and human resources, from national to local government (Orsi, Y, p.c., February 26, 2019; Botana, S, p.c., August 30,2018). The Intendente of Cerro Largo, Sergio Botana, explained: "People are afraid of delegating power. Uruguay has not decentralized resources so municipalities are not able to manage national public services". The Intendente of Canelones, Yamandú Orsi, also opined: "The most responsible for this situation (centralism) are the political parties which are too centralized and could not adapt to the new legal framework and institutions in Uruguay". And the Intendente of Montevideo, Daniel Martínez, considered that "the implementation of participatory mechanisms at local level depends on the character of political leadership and economic resources in each territory. However, some Intendentes do not like mayors and consider them as enemies, no matter which political party is in the charge".

For its part, civil society faces challenges in increasing political participation. For instance, although the experiment at the Municipality of Montevideo supposed a process of change from a clientele-based, bureaucratic, paternalistic and centralized system of government, many citizens did not believe that their participation had an impact on government decisions. In addition, the *Concejales Vecinales* (Neighbourhood Councillors), which were supposed to be autonomous from the local government, operated under institutional constraints and did not have sufficient resources and skills to

respond social demands (Canel, 2010: 198-213; Goldfrank; 2002:51-83). Over the years, rather than growing, civic engagement in Montevideo has stagnated or even declined. Nor has the decentralization project sufficiently promoted social inclusion of the historically marginalized; earlier optimism has been replaced by a moderate assessment of the ability of institutional changes to develop the local capacity to transform clientelism or *asistencialismo* to generate sustained civic engagement (Buriani, J., p.c., August 27, 2018; Canel, 2010: 198-213; Goldfrank; 2002:51-83). Finally, there are many differences between municipalities in the whole country, in terms of local capacities and learning over the recent years (Buriani, J., p.c., August 27, 2018; Oroño, A p.c. September 17, 2018). In addition, even though municipalities are conceived as a socio-cultural unit with common interests, there is little attempt to link it a socio-cultural definition of territory, instead, the only criterion for municipalities' boundaries is the electoral boundaries (Alvarado, Fernández & Frank, 2018:10-18; Cardarello, A, p.c., August 8, 2018).

4.2 Participatory decentralization from a territorial perspective: *Characterization of three case studies in Uruguay*

In this section, the three case studies (municipalities) in Uruguay are described from a territorial perspective, based on the two main variables which are examined in this research: the influence of the socio-cultural dimension of territory (independent variable) on the PD outcomes (dependent variable) in order to analyze which experiences are the most successful or unsuccessful in the following comparisons within one country and cross-country. The socio-cultural dimension of territory is observed through the study of social relations; power relations; identity; and imaginaries. The impacts of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on local government are observed through the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and the quality of representation. The effects of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on civil society are studied through the existence of horizontal governance; the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and the capabilities and skills for decision-making process.

Therefore, the characteristics of the local government, the existing participatory mechanisms and the main development problems in these cases are summarized, since they reflect some aspects of PD outcomes in each case study. Social and community resources and the cultural identity of each selected case study of this research are also presented in order to understand significant aspects of the socio-cultural dimension of territory (independent variable) in the wider Uruguayan decentralization process. Finally, resources and capabilities reflect aspects of the intervening variable, namely political project on decentralization in terms of devolution of political power, and the transfer of economic and human resources. These characteristics are taken into account in the comparisons within each country and between Uruguay and Chile in Chapter 6.

Significant differences are observed among the three selected case studies in Uruguay in terms of the socio-cultural dimension of territory, PD outcomes, the devolution of political power and the transfer of economic and human resources from the national/departmental government to the local level. Regarding social and community resources, Municipality A is characterized by a very active and participative community, and high self-organization capacity with many civil society organizations, social networks, associations, cultural organizations, sporting clubs and state institutions. However, the Muncipality of Isidoro Noblía and the Municipality of Santa Rosa are characterized by weak self-organization capacity and a more passive community. Furthermore, while the cultural identity of Municipality A was built based on the historical working-class neighbourhoods such as La Teja, Cerro and Paso de la Arena, the influence of immigration from Eastern Europe, and popular festivals like Carnivals; the cultural identity of the rural municipalities is rooted in rural customs and traditions, in the historical influence of *caudillos* like Aparicio Saravia, the founder of the *Partido Nacional* (e.g. Municipality of Isidoro Noblía) and the Catholic Church (Municipality of Santa Rosa). The cultural identity of the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía has been strongly influenced by the way of life on the border with Brazil (smuggling) and the presence of an Afro-descendant community that settled in a small village named *Medio Luto.*

Regarding the observed PD outcomes, the local government in Municipality A (Montevideo Department) is characterized by enhancing horizontal governance with social leaders/representatives from the local civil society named *Concejales Vecinales* (Neighbourhood Councillors); and the promotion of several spaces and mechanisms for accountability, empowerment and decision-making processes in civil society through *Cabildo Abiertos* (Open Councils), participatory budget and participatory planning (PLAEDEZ) in the context of the internationally known participatory decentralization

process established in the Municipality of Montevideo in the decade of 1990. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Cerro Largo Department) and the Municipality of Santa Rosa (Canelones Department) still face many difficulties and challenges in terms of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and building horizontal governance. Furthermore, these rural municipalities suffer from structural development problems which reflect a historical centralism compared with Municipality A, which manages more economic resources and autonomy to implement local development projects. Indeed, although the national Budget and Planning Office (Uruguay Integra Program), transfers economic resources to municipalities through the Municipal Management Incentive Fund to promote capabilities, rural municipalities still suffer from insufficient economic and human resources and capacities to successfully implement PD. Finally, municipalities in Montevideo have the autonomy to hire their own staff according to their requirements. Municipality A has developed the capacity to manage its own human resources and to plan and decide about different projects, activities and services. This political and financial decentralization process in Montevideo that started more than three decades ago must be considered in this comparison with the rest of the country and its contribution to achieve better PD outcomes than rural municipalities.

4.2.a <u>Municipality of Isidoro Noblía</u>

<u>Local government</u>

The local government is led by a Municipal Council formed by five members[18]. They have weekly sessions to discuss and plan their local management. During 2018, this

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[18] The Municipal Council of Isidoro Noblia for the period 2015-2020, is formed by four members from the *Partido Nacional* (*Herrerismo-Movimiento de Unidad y Trabajo*) Fabio Freire (Mayor), Eduardo Gutiérrez (Councillor), Virginia Ferreira (Councillor) and Alejandro Sorondo (Councillor) and one from the *FA-MPP* Pablo Beck (Pérez & Pose, 2017:181-201).

Municipal Council held about 43 sessions. The mayor's vote is worth double when there is a tie among councillors in order to make a decision. However, the mayor requires the support of two councillors to make decisions about financial resources management. Although councillors are allowed to administer up to CAN $ 247 per month to support different initiatives from citizens, the mayor is the only one who receives a salary (CAN $ 2,188 per month) within the Municipal Council and this situation is considered to be an obstacle for improving performance of the council (E. Gutiérrez, p.c., September 28, 2018; Departmental Board of Cerro Largo, Decree 20/10, 2019).

According to the current legal framework (Law N° 19.272, Art. 12), the Municipal Council's functions are to fulfill the National Constitution, Laws and Departmental Decrees; to supervise and to manage efficiently and effectively the municipal offices and their personnel; to promote local capabilities in order to accomplish the main objectives; to implement public works; to control local transit, public spaces and electricity in their territory; to manage cemetery services and waste collection; to control popular markets; to approve the Municipal Development Plan; to design and implement cultural and social programs; to elaborate and present a report for public audience about their local government; to create and promote citizen participation through different initiatives and mechanisms; to administer and to be accountable to departmental government about their financial resources management; to coordinate different development projects with departmental and national government to promote local development and to promote human rights at the municipality. There is also a Federation of Mayors in Cerro Largo Department created by the current *Intendente* Sergio Botana, who belongs to the *Partido Nacional-Alianza Nacional* (F. Freire, p.c, September 27, 2018).

Participatory mechanisms

In relation to participatory mechanisms and spaces promoted by the municipality, this local government promotes Cabildos (open town-hall meetings) once a year. However, very few people participate in Cabildos due to the lack of information about it, or due to the lack of capabilities to participate and propose initiatives for improving their community in these spaces. In addition, the mayor tends to invite partisans who may approve of his performance. In 2018, the local government promoted two Cabildos in Isidoro Noblía. The Municipal Councillor E. Gutiérrez explained that "The Mayor uses Cabildos for his own political interests. The Mayor is too populist. He does propaganda of his actions as mayor but he never recognizes that most of these actions were proposed by Municipal Councillors". Also, Municipal Councillor P. Beck said that "the Mayor talks almost one hour and half but people do not ask for information in Cabildos. Municipal councillors do not know which issues will be discussed in the Cabildos". Beck also explained: "I wanted to be mayor to change this clientelism in Noblía".

Municipal Council sessions are open to citizen participation; however, people are not accustomed to attend to this space. Some councillors broadcast their sessions on the radio in order to improve communication with citizenry as well as their transparency as political representatives. There is no participatory budgeting in this Municipality (P. Beck, V. Ferreria, E. Gutiérrez p.c., September 28-29, 2018). During the focus group, the Municipal Councillors and social leaders/representatives from local civil society in Isidoro Noblía discussed the lack of citizen participation at Cabildos promoted by the Mayor. Municipal Councillors recognized that they do not know how to promote citizen participation in this town nor how to implement the new legal framework.

Local development

According to the Territorial Observatory of Uruguay, called *Observatorio Territorio Uruguay* [OTU] in Spanish, 52.1% of the population of this municipality have at least one unsatisfied basic need (UBN[19]) which is higher than the departmental average (44.8%) and the national one (33.8%). In addition, employment and activity rates in Isidoro Noblía are lower than the national averages (OTU, 2019). As stated in the Isidoro Noblía's Five Year Plan 2016-2020, the objectives for improving local development are focused on the following problems and challenges: infrastructure and housing in flood zones, insufficient sanitation (only 23% of its population have sanitation services), housing, youth unemployment, informal employment, limited access to education (6% of the population is illiterate, and this location lacks educational institutions such as University and professional training centers) that causes migration to the Departmental capital Melo or other cities, scant local tourism, female unemployment (among women who are heads of household), inadequate municipal infrastructure and machinery and insufficient human resources. Furthermore, there are some social problems such as drug addictions and violence caused by unemployment and the lack of educational opportunities for youth; the lack of infrastructure and human resources at the health center; and the lack of cultural and social activities for elders (A. Sorondo, P. Beck, p.c., September 28-29, 2018; Focus Group, October 12, 2018).

Mayor Freire (2018) also claims that the rural population does not have access to national social programs and inhabitants are still very excluded from social policies and services like housing, education, health, connectivity and transport. In Isidoro Noblía there are around 100 square kilometres of rural zone with some small villages like *Mugrel*, *Arriera*,

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[19] Unsatisfied Basic Needs: decent housing, drinking water, sanitation, electricity, comfort artifacts and education.

La Mina, *Paso María Isabel*, *La 28* or *Medio Luto, San Diego, Astorga,* and *Paso San Diego* where local government promotes peanut production through a cooperative organization. The municipality has also encouraged the establishment of a rural school close to the village *Medio Luto,* and access to water in *Cruz de Piedra*. The main productive activities are agriculture (mostly rice), cattle-husbandry, public services like the municipality, schools, the police and commerce; women work at duty free shops in Aceguá (on the border with Brazil). The creation of this municipality has improved their opportunities and capabilities for local development and fostered self-esteem in the community (F. Freire, p.c., September 27, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September 28, 2018).

Resources and capabilities

Regarding municipal resources and capabilities, Isidoro Noblía has around 39 municipal officials in different areas and functions such as administrative procedures, works, diner and driver's licenses. In terms of administrative decentralization, this municipal office provides public services such as waste collection, cleaning of public spaces, barometric, electricity, paving, pruning, traffic order, sporting events, social and cultural programs, cemeteries, and neighbourhood markets. In this municipality, local government collects its own taxes which are allowed to be kept in its own administration. Each municipality in Cerro Largo has an account in a bank and receives around CAN $ 18,381 per month from the Intendencia, which receives this amount from the national government. The Budget and Planning Office, *(Uruguay Integra)* through the Municipal Management Incentive Fund *(FIGM)* transferred around CAN $ 304,001 in total to Isidoro Noblía in 2019. Noblía is one of the municipalities that receives the most financial resources from the national government based on the criteria stated in the *Literal B* of the *FIGM*. Regarding its Management Commitments (*Compromisos de Gestión*) for 2018, this municipality accomplished all of them and its Operative Annual Plan (POA) for 2019

aims to achieve six general objectives that matches with some of the SDGs (*Municipio Digital, Uruguay Integra,* 2019; Budget and Planning Office, 2019; F. Freire, p.c., September 27, 2018; E. Gutiérrez, p.c., September 28, 2018).

Social and community resources

Community and social resources in Isidoro Noblía such as civil society organizations, neighbourhood associations, cultural and sporting clubs, social networks, public institutions and offices; have been increasing in the last ten years. In fact, there are educational centers for children (*CAIF,* kinder garten, Social Clubs, primary school N° 99), and for youth (rural public high school, Youth *Center Charrúa*). In addition, there are cultural organizations such as *Centro MEC;* a dancing group *Arte y Coraje,* created by a social leader that promotes traditional and folklore dances; *Club Hípico Los Potros,* which also develops and fosters cultural traditions such as *raids*, festivals and gaucho customs. In 2008, the Rural Development Board (RDB) was established by national government (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing) and constitutes an important social network that has achieved many goals for small farmers and their families who live in rural areas such as *Medio Luto, San Diego, Cuchilla de Melo, Paso de Melo, Mangrullo, La Mina* and *Cruz de Piedra*. Through this social network, rural people learnt to claim their rights to national and local government and achieved many important goals for their social development, for instance, basic services such as electricity, water, and school as well as training courses for increased employment opportunities.

RDB is formed by the National Colonization Institute, the National Administration for Public Education and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Mining. The Social Development Ministry also implemented a social program for training courses in order to increase access job opportunities for people with a low socio-economic and educational

level (*Uruguay Trabaja*), professionals who work with this population (Territorial Teams for Familiar Assistance, *ETAF*) and a social service office at a local level named *SOCAT (Servicio de Orientación, Consulta y Articulación Territorial)* in Youth Center *Charrúa.*

Cultural identity

Isidoro Noblía was founded as a village named *Punta de Carretera* in the decade of the 1940s because its territory was considered the end of the national route. The origin of this town is closely tied to the history of the famous chieftain *(caudillo)* Aparicio Saravia, the leader and mentor of the *Partido Nacional* which took the first steps in Uruguay's modernization process. This process was characterized by the construction of national routes and railways centralized in the capital Montevideo; the development of communications through the telegraph and the telephone; the expansion of urban and rural police stations and the perimetral fencing in the context of the end of the Aparicio Saravia Revolution in 1904[20]. All these policies attempted to consolidate control of the furthest territories of the country under the national state. The cultural identity of this municipality was built based on popular stories about Isidoro Noblía, a leader and Police Commissioner who was a partisan supporter of Aparicio Saravia (Caetano & Rilla, 1994: 137-160; Pérez & Villamil, 2014).

Furthermore, Isidoro Noblía's local identity was built on *gaucho* traditions that characterize the rural areas of Uruguay; the way of life on the border with Brazil influenced by smuggling and the presence of an Afro-descendant community that settled in *Medio Luto.* According to F. Martínez, a senior neighbour of Isidoro Noblía interviewed during the fieldwork, this is the *camino de los quileros* (the path of

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[20] In September 1904, the Saravia's troops surrendered through the agreement known as La Paz de Aceguá (The Peace of Aceguá) when Aparicio Saravia was wounded by a bullet. The end to the Revolution led by Aparicio Saravia constitutes a milestone in the urbanization process of Uruguay through the emergence of a new kind of political leadership with Don José Batlle y Ordóñez.

smugglers). Quileros used to ride horses in the decade of 1940 but now they ride motorcycles or bikes slipping away from policemen who follow them along the way. That rural small town or *rancherío* was named Medio Luto because people believed that one half of its population were Afro-descendants and the other half were non-Afro-descendants or *mulatos* (mixed-race) and Luto means mourning (black).

Medio Luto is located only five kilometres from Isidoro Noblia and 50 km from Aceguá (on the border with Brazil). It was founded by Afro-descendant families who had worked for non Afro-descendant farmers and had received a small piece of land to live there once slavery was abolished in Uruguay; and by enslaved Afro-descendants who escaped from farms or from *quilombolas*[21] located in the south of Brazil, more than one hundred years ago. Futhermore, Isidoro Noblía's identity was also influenced by the Catholic Church customs and the expansion of the public primary school in *La Mina* settlement (Chagas & Stalla, 2009; Frega et al, 2019: 207-213; Pérez & Villamil, 2014; UY# 49, 2018). Rural and *gaucho* traditions have survived over the years thanks local cultural organizations such as *Arte y Coraje* or *Sociedad Criolla Rural*, cultural activities like the *raid*[22] and popular festivals like the Harvest Rice Festival *(La Fiesta de la Cosecha del Arroz).*

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[21] Quilombo (brothel) is a Bantu origin word. Quilombo was a sheltered space where slaves ran away from plantations in many Latin American countries.

[22] Raid are the traditional horse marches organized by social and cultural clubs since the decade of 1940, in the rural area of Uruguay.

4.2.b Municipality A

Local government

The municipal government is led by a Municipal Council formed by five members[23], four of whom belong to the *FA* and one of whom represents *Concertación[24]*. Mayor Otero was elected for this position for the second time in this municipality. Holders and alternates work together on the Council and participate in monthly sessions as well as in the regular meetings with two CVs of each of the three CCZs (14, 17 and 18) in Municipality A. During 2018, the Municipal Council organized around 18 sessions (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; Intendencia of Montevideo, 2016).

In 1993, based on its political project, Intendencia of Montevideo created a unique institutional design very different from the rest of the country named *Concejos Vecinales* (CVs). These CVs are social organisms that should advise and control local government. They are formed by a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary, a Pro-Secretary and a secretary, who rotate every six months. Around 40 CVs per CCZ are chosen in elections which also approve Participatory Budget projects every two years (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; M. Villasante, p.c., October 9, 2018; B. Bagnado, p.c., November 21, 2018; W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019; Intendencia of Montevideo, 2016).

Almost 65% of CVs are elected for the first time to play this role at Municipalities. CVs work on different thematic commissions (e.g. tourism, traffic, culture, sport, infrastructure) to promote local development in each CCZ. However, CVs' participation has been decreasing in terms of candidates for CV election as well as the campaign

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[23] This Municipal Council, for the period 2015-2020, is made up by Mayor Gabriel Otero (*FA*, *Movimiento de Participación Popular*); Nelson Moreira (*FA-Socialist Party*); Mirtha Villasante (*FA*); Fabio Balsa, holder and Nancy Valli, alternate (*Partido Nacional Lista 71-Concertación*); Luis Gorriarán, holder (*Partido Colorado-Concertación*).

[24] *Concertación* is the electoral coalition created by *Partido Nacional* and *Partido Colorado* to compete against *FA* in Montevideo at departmental and municipal elections in Montevideo by May 2015 (Freigedo & Milanesi, 2017:31-65).

process in the last few years once the new institutional design (Municipal Council) was established, since they are not consulted by departmental government, they cannot manage and solve problems, they cannot make decisions about municipal policies, nor they do not have access to resources as they used to in the past. Indeed, during the last ten years, while CVs have been growing less representative, social networks and civil society organizations have been increasing and improving their capability to represent different groups and sectors in the municipal government. The Intendencia of Montevideo also fostered departmental five-year plans through a citizen consultation process from 1993 to 2009 (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; M. Villasante, p.c., October 9, 2018; B. Bagnado, p.c., November 21, 2018; W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019; Intendencia of Montevideo, 2016).

Since 2000, each CCZ has been organizing the Zonal Development Strategic Plan (*PLAEDEZ*) in order to encourage citizen participation and collaborative management for local development among residents, officials and local authorities. This *PLAEDEZ* planning process experiences resulted in an important tool for the new municipality government. Furthermore, Management Commitments defined by CVs and Participatory Budgets established in 1990 and redesigned over the years in the 18 CCZs are considered to be relevant policies for improving the participatory decentralization process. Finally, open councils (*Cabildos Abiertos*), the Municipal Plan of Development and the Five-Year Budget Project were established alongside the creation of eight municipalities in order to make decisions about Participatory Budget projects as well as to control and analyze municipal management. Open Councils (*Cabildos Abiertos*) are organized by municipal councillors together with CVs and civil society representatives at least once a year for an accountability process. They are chaired by mayors and promote citizen participation in each municipality (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019;

Intendencia of Montevideo, 2016). The Intendencia of Montevideo promoted citizen assemblies, thematic commissions and dialogue with communities in 1990; from 1992 to 2014 departmental government organized citizen forums to analyse and improve social and political democratization in Montevideo.

Participatory mechanisms

All municipalities achieved the two management commitments established by the Intendencia of Montevideo related to citizen participation and cultural decentralization during 2018. Municipality A fulfilled them through Participatory Budget and Neighbourhood Council Elections celebrated on November 11th, 2018. In addition, this local government also organized many festivals and events to promote local identities in 2018 (Digital Municipality, 2019; OPP, 2019). Municipality A promotes different participatory mechanisms such as open councils (*Cabildos*), Participatory Budgeting, and regular meetings with CVs and social networks of the three CCZs at least once a month. The Municipal Council also promotes meetings with CV, professionals and residents in order to design the Five-Years Municipal Plan together. In 2018, Municipality A organized four Cabildos in the poorest neighbourhoods and CVs and Participatory Budget elections were celebrated in November. Cabildos are considered as very participative spaces in which around 23 commissions and 700 people participate during the whole process. They are not used for political interests by the mayor (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; N. Moreira, p.c., November 9, 2018). The Participatory Budget mechanism implies that social organizations, institutions or residents from each CCZ are able to propose a project to be voted on by citizens who live in its territory. The most voted projects by citizens are approved and receive around CAN $ 105,861 to be implemented. Finally, CVs organize meetings and call for citizen participation to define their activities

and propose Participatory Budget projects for each CCZ (H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 2018; J. Rodríguez, p.c., November 26, 2018).

There are also some important co-management and co-governance experiences such as "*Siete Zonas Plan*" in which national, departmental and local government work together with the community (five social organizations) for improving security, equality and social cohesion through infrastructure investment, health and educational centers, socio-cultural activities and sporting events in the poorest neighbourhoods of this municipality. The civil society center *Tres Ombúes* is also considered a successful experience of co-governance that articulate and coordinate national and local government together with civil society organizations (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; M. Villasante, p.c., October 9, 2018). Other important experiences of co-management between local government and community are *Rescate 11* at High School institution number 11 which promotes social inclusion and education among teenagers, *El Tejano* community project (N. Moreira, p.c., November 9, 2018; M. Ramírez, p.c., November 21, 2018). Finally, monthly meetings between municipal councillors and CV representatives of the three CCZ once a month to exchange information, discuss social problems and the needs of each neighbourhood as well as to design a plan for the Municipality are considered a mechanism for co-governance by CVs (L. Pereyra, p.c., October 17, 2018; H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 2018).

One of the most important challenges for the participatory decentralization process in Municipality A is the role of CVs because they are not the main actors as they used to be in the past. There are many reasons for this situation such as the new roles of municipal councillors who used to be CVs, the emergence of other social actors such as neighbourhood commissions, civil society organizations, and social networks that interact with local government with a high level of legitimacy and representativeness. Social

leaders are more diverse and have different participatory spaces and channels to work with local government than in the first steps of decentralization in Montevideo (W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019). Furthermore, according to the last study conducted by the Intendencia of Montevideo about CVs, a decrease in citizen participation at CVs and Participatory Budget elections could be observed in most Municipalities including Municipality A between 2004 and 2013 (Intendencia of Montevideo, 2016). For some political leaders, there are new and spontaneous mechanisms of citizen participation which are most often appropriated by youth and women: social movements and marches like International Women's Day, Diversity Day and Justice and Memory March, among other movements in Uruguay that have became an important way to promote human rights and improve people's lives. In addition, there are new spaces through the Internet and cellphones that have influenced citizen participation at a local level (D. Martínez, p.c., October 4, 2018).

Local development

This municipality has a UBN rate of 38.3%, which is higher than the departmental average (26.8%) and the national one (33.8%). In addition, employment and activity rates in Municipality A are similar to the national rates, but lower than the departmental ones. However, this municipality has an unemployment rate (8.6%) which is higher than departmental and national averages. In addition, there is a 1.5% of illiteracy population among teenagers and young adult ages. The high school truancy rate is higher in this municipality than in Montevideo department (OTU, 2019).

According to the Municipality A's Five-Years Plan 2016-2020, the objectives for improving local development are focused on the following problems and challenges: housing; poverty; and inequality and social exclusion that affect childhood, youth, elders

and people with disabilities. Other priorities are: gender equality, pollution, environmental quality, weather emergencies, transport, traffic, road safety, accessibility, infrastructure, streetlights, unemployment, local tourism, and territorial management as well as Cultural identity, a sense of belonging, social cohesion and citizen participation are still crucial challenges for local government in this territory. For municipal councillors and CVs, drug addiction, poverty, illiteracy, informal housing settlements, unemployment, transport, and the lack of access to public services such as education and healthcare, child sexual exploitation, informal housing settlements are the main development problems in Municipality A (N. Moreira, p.c., November 9, 2018; M. Villasante, p.c., October 9, 2018; L. Gorriarán, October 3, 2018; N. Valli, p.c., November 15, 2018; Focus Group, December 18-19, 2018). Finally, sanitation in many settlements like *Cachimba del Piojo*, *Maracaná*, *La Paloma* and *Fortaleza* as well as in some neighbourhoods such as *Santa Catalina, Baurú, Casabó* and *Paso de la Arena* is still required by their communities to avoid health problems. Weather emergencies like floods in most of these neighbourhoods are still an important challenge for the municipality. Neighbours are working toward formalizing these settlements and toward increasing employment opportunities amidst of new economical projects that have changed land use in the area (Social and resources mapping, December 19, 2018; H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 2018; J. Rodríguez, p.c, November 26, 2018).

Resources and capabilities

The local government of Municipality A has around 230 municipal officials in total including the headquarters of CCZ 14, CCZ 17 and the municipal government's office. This municipality has around thirty cars and trucks, five architects, one engineer, four technicians specialized in green areas, ten social workers, three social work students, three journalists and three journalism students (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018). In each

CCZ there is a staff formed by professionals, municipal officials and a director. Administrative deconcentration has been fostered in Montevideo department since the decade of the 1990's in Montevideo through the creation of bodies in 18 zones named *Centros Comunales Zonales* or *CCZs*. Therefore, when the eight municipalities were created in 2010, these CCZs were redesigned in terms of political decentralization, but continued working with their own administrative structure. In addition, most municipalities also created a municipal headquarter in order to implement the administrative, political and social decentralization policy in their territories (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; M. Scasso, p.c., October 17, 2018; Digital Municipality*,* 2019; Intendencia of Montevideo, 2019).

Municipalities in Montevideo department have the autonomy to hire their own staff according to their requirements. Municipality A has developed the capacity to manage its own human resources, to plan and to decide about different projects, activities and services for improving local development over the past few years.These resources and capabilities are crucial for deepening administrative, political and social decentralization in the Montevidean municipalities. This decentralization process is more difficult for other municipalities around the country where financial resources and political autonomy are more limited than in Montevideo department. All mayors in Montevideo receives a salary of CAN $ 6,300 per month (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; M. Scasso, p.c., October 17, 2018; Digital Municipality*,* 2019; Intendencia of Montevideo, 2019).

Local government in Municipality A is responsible for public lighting, roads, sweeping, small green areas, storm drains and septic service. However, national routes, avenues and streets in which more than two lines of buses may transit are managed by departmental government. In addition, this local government also manages socio-cultural programs and, sporting events and offers public attention to all citizens who are able to request

municipal services, information and municipal administrative procedures, except issuing birth certificates. Finally, Municipality A implements specific actions to attend to weather emergencies and natural disaster in its territory. All Municipalities in Montevideo have an administrative staff that reports to a local chair person. However, municipal officials, as public employees, depend on Intendencia of Montevideo's structure including the local chair who has to report to the Intendencia (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; M. Scasso, p.c., October 17, 2018).

The Budget and Planning Office *(Uruguay Integra)* through the Municipal Management Incentive Fund *(FIGM)* transferred around CAN $ 4,005,465 in total to Municipality A in 2019 to fulfill its main goals. The Annual Operative Plan (*POA*) for 2019 established the following main goals: To promote territorial local management prioritizing housing improvement policies that align with SDGs 1, 3, 5 and 10; to foster youth integration through cultural and sporting activities, in alignment with SDGs 3, 4, 5 and 10; to designate and coordinate national, departmental and municipal resources in order to implement comprehensive policies for people with disabilities; in alignment with SDGs 3, 5 and 10; to promote social programs for improving the quality of life in early childhood, in aligment with SDGs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10; to foster gender equality according to the Departmental and Municipal Gender Equality Plan in aligment with SDGs 3, 5 and 10; to improve environmental quality through water cleaning and eliminating dumps, in alignment with SDGs 3, 6 and 8; to control activities that may cause pollution in its territory, in alligment with SDGs 3, 6, 9, 12 and13; to promote educational programs that preserve the environment in alligment with SDGs 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 15; to promote safe transit; to foster employment, to promote cultural identities, a sense of belonging, and capabilities for self-organization among neighbourhoods; and, to foster social

organizations and citizen participation (*Digital Municipality, "Uruguay Integra",* 2019; OPP, 2019).

Municipality A receives around CAN $ 9,310,000 per year from the Intendencia (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018). Previous experiences on participatory decentralizations through different institutional designs such as CVs and Participatory Budgeting elections, PLAEDEZ planning process as well as administrative deconcentration through the creation of the 18 CCZs has contributed to the new municipality abilities for local government in this department. Currently, there is a Zonal Planning Team formed by professionals, local authorities and CVs that work together for planning in each CCZ. In addtion, there is a Unit of Municipal Development and Participation at central level of the Intendencia that supports Municipalities and CV management (W. Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2019; J. Buriani, p.c., August 28, 2018; H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 28; UY# 13, October 5, 2018).

Social and community resources

Regarding social and community resources, this municipality has been historically a very active and participative community with many civil society organizations, unions, social networks, associations, cultural organizations, sporting clubs and state institutions that have influenced on its local identity. This municipality received an award (*Premio Reina Letizia 2016 de Accesibilidad Universal*) for promoting accessibility for people with all kinds of disabilities to different services such as education, culture, tourism, and transport. Another important community resource for improving local development is the Industrial Technology Park (*PTI*). In addition, Carnival parade (*murgas and comparsas*) as well as local theatres, social clubs and community centers (e.g. Florencio Sánchez, El Tejano, Progreso Club and Arbolito Club) are considered not only cultural projects but also

economic ones because they promote employment and improve local tourism. Furthermore, a departmental program known as *Esquinas de la Cultura* is implemented very well in this municipality, fostering socio-cultural organizations in many neighbourhoods.

Self-organization capacity as well as co-management between neighbours and local government are very high and evident in this municipality through different social networks (elders, health disabilities, addictions, childhood) and social associations (e.g. *Quelavi*), cultural centers such as *Centro Julia Arévalo*, *SOCAT* (*Servicio de Orientación, Consulta y Articulación Territorial*), unions (glass, refrigeration), *APEX Cerro* Program (University of the Republic) for elders, community radios (CCZ 14, *El Tejano*), athletic squares, social and athletic clubs (Club *Progreso*, Club *Arbolito*) and around 24 neighbourhood commissions such as in *Paurú, La Vía* and *Gori* among others. Small farmers who work in rural areas of this municipality are organized in *Sociedad Fomento y Defensa Agraria* in order to defend their interests and to claim to improve their opportunities. There are around 60 social organizations in total in this municipality (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; S. Silva, p.c., January 10, 2019; H. Coitinho, p.c. November 8, 2018; Focus group, December 12, 2018; Social and Resources Mapping, December 19, 2018).

Cultural identity

Municipality A was created alongside with seven other Municipalities in Montevideo through the Political Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law N° 18.567 in 2010. Thus, the socio-cultural identity of this municipality is based on the three existing CCZs 14, 17 and 18. Each of these CCZs is characterized by a historically rooted cultural identity built in working-class neighbourhoods such as *La Teja* (CCZ 14), *Cerro* (CCZ

17) and *Paso de la Arena* (CCZ 18). Consequently, there is no one cultural identity in Municipality A, but there are different cultural identities based on neighbhorhoods and each neighbourhood's political and administrative decentralization experiences since CCZs were created in the 1990's (Canel, 2010).

However, political actors (the mayor and some municipal councillors) as well as social leaders and representatives (CVs) do agree on promoting a unique cultural identity as Municipality A taking into account CCZs characteristics. For instance, Cerro neighbourhood was established as a multicultural community named Villa Cosmópolis in 1834 to provide job opportunities for national workers as well as for immigrants from Eastern Europe such as Lithuanians, Yugoslavians, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Germans, and Armenians who settled in this area of the city between 1880 and 1940. An incipient industry, mostly based on meat processing, was established in this area of Montevideo; it fostered not only local employment but also a sense of belonging for the working-class community. Immigrants created ethnic associations to preserve their cultural traditions (Canel, 2010). Self-organization capacity through different spaces like unions, associations, clubs, commissions and networks created a culture of social and political engagement that characterizes Cerro. In addition, the coast along the River Plate provided a unique landscape and economic activities (such as fishing) that characterize this zone of Montevideo as well as Vaz Ferreira Park (J. Barrios, p.c., November 15, 2018).

In this municipality there is a low percentage of Afro-decendants who participate in different cultural activities such as cultural commissions at CCZs and Carnival festivals (e.g. *comparsa Canceribó*) but they do not participate as political or social representatives (N. Moreira, p.c.,November 9, 2018; L. Gorriaran, p.c.,October 3, 2018). In the past, most Afro-decendants were dislodged from their original homes known as "Conventillos" in

Barrio Sur and Palermo neighbourhoods to *Cerro* during the dictatorship in Uruguay. In the last few years, an NGO called *Mizangas* has been promoting human rigths of Afro-descendants, women and sexual diversity in this municipality (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; T. Ramírez, p.c., May 17, 2019). Municipality A also has the only town in Montevideo department, in zone 18 called *Santiago Vázquez*; it also contains one of the most important rural areas in the capital of the country where residents have created their own cultural identity based on traditional festivals (e.g. *La Fiesta del Río y La Convivencia* along River Santa Lucía), customs, cultural traditions and ways of life. *Paso de la Arena* is one of the most historic neighbourhoods of this Municipality characterized by farms were workers settled. Furthermore, rural customs and traditions are still alive through the *Sociedad Fomento y Defensa Agraria* organization in this zone (Rodríguez & Villasante, 2006).

La Teja neighbourhood is also characterized by popular festivals like Carnival (*murgas* like *La Reina de la Teja* and *Diablos Verdes*) that is celebrated each February, historical social and athletic clubs such as *Arbolito* where neighbours participate and organize themselves to improve their communities. Solidarity and activist culture through popular unions like *Federación del Vidrio* (Glass Union) and social movements against repression during the dictatorship as well as Meatpacking Unions and anarchist movements are the most significant elements of this neighbourhood's cultural identity (Canel, 2010).

4.2.c Municipality of Santa Rosa

Local government

Local government is led by a multi-party Municipal Council[25] whose members belong to the FA, Partido Nacional (Todos) and Partido Colorado. They have regular sessions each Tuesday to plan and manage local government. Santa Rosa local government is responsible for cleaning, public lighting, waste collection, litter management, traffic, social and cultural events, cemetery service, neighbourhood markets and health programs (Digital Municipality, 2019). Mayor De León was elected for the first time by citizens for the period 2015-2020 but she was also a Municipal Councillor during the first experience of municipal government when this municipality was created (2010-2015). The Mayor elected for the first experience of this municipal government, belonged to the Partido Nacional (Dra. Gretel Ferraro). Historically, Santa Rosa as Local Board (*Junta Local*) used to belong to Partido Nacional and the Secretary of the Local Board used to be appointed by the Intendente, but not elected by citizens (R. Martínez, p.c., November 30, 2018). At the central level of the Intendencia of Canelones, there is a Local Development and Citizen Participation Department that promotes and supports Municipalities in terms of capabilities for participatory decentralization and development through different strategies and programs (J. Tons, p.c., February 13, 2019).

Participatory mechanisms

According to what was established in the Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), the Municipal Council should hold two Cabildos and one public audience at least once a year (Digital

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[25] Municipal Council of Santa Rosa, for the period 2015-2020, is formed by Mayor Margot De León (MLN in the past and 609 List-FA currently); Councillor Gladys Rodríguez (Independent-FA); Councillor Verónica Fernández (Todos-Partido Nacional); Councillor Rubén Darío Martínez (Todos-Partido Nacional) and Councillor Federico Cabrera (Partido Colorado).

Municipality, 2019). In 2018, they held three Cabildos: two in the rural area (one at rural schools) and one in the urban area, as well as one public audience (M. De León, p.c., November 6, 2018). In addition, Municipal Council sessions are open to citizen participation. MCs request information from neighbours in order to design development projects based on their priorities and needs. These projects are financed by the Budget and Planning Office and it could be considered similar to a Participatory Budget. Examples of these projects include: projects to repair streets and infrastructure that would improve social cohesion. Citizens are able to vote for their projects by Internet. Municipal councillors also promote citizen participation through cultural activities organized by both municipality and families such as popular festivals, King's Day on January 6th and Carnival in February (V. Fernández, p.c., November 16, 2018).

Local development

In terms of local development, 33% of the population of this municipality has at least one UBN, which is similar to departmental and national averages. Employment and economic activity rates are similar to the national ones; unemployment rate is lower than departmental and national rates. This municipality has 61.8% economic activity, 59.0% employment and 4.5% unemployment according to the Census 2011. In relation to educational level, 2.3% of young people are illiterate and the primary school attendance rate is lower than in the rest of Canelones Department as well as in the rest of the country (OTU, 2019). For Municipal Councillors, social leaders and representatives from civil society, the main development problems are related with unemployment that cause migration to urban areas or to Montevideo; drug addictions; security; infrastructure (roads); the lack of some services such as banks, sanitation, traffic inspection and a municipal health center. Furthermore, taxes collected by the municipality are not managed or invested in the community but rather have to be sent to the Intendencia. In

terms of sociability, individualism influences on civic engagement and commitment to local community, as well as the suicide youth rate. The main source of employment is in poultry farms, the Windmill of Santa Rosa (a production cooperative) and public services. In the last few months, migration from Cuba has had some cultural and economic impacts on the local community since Cubans have different lifestyles, traditions and customs (M. De León, p.c., November 6, 2018; G. Rodríguez, p.c., November 30, 2018; F. Cabrera, November 6, 2018; V. Fernández, p.c., November 16, 2018; R. Martínez, p.c., November 30, 2018).

Social leaders and representatives from civil society consider that the primary problems of development in their community are the recent migration that has reduced job opportunities for locals and situation of most migrants who live in small places or in bad conditions, and suffer from xenophobia and discrimination. In addition, isolation of the rural area where there are no economic politics and the lack of engagement of people with their community in the urban area. Another problem is related with current responsibilities of the mayor who is not able to focus on local development due to the lack of economic and human resources. In terms of opportunities for employment and development, the most important sources are small farms, poultry farms, public offices including the Municipality, the police force, and educational institutions (A. Lemus, p.c., November 30, 2018; J. Marrero, p.c., November 30, 2018; D. Pirotto, p.c., December 15, 2018; W. García, December 15, 2018; H. Suárez, December 15, 2018). For both political and social actors, the three main challenges for development are territorial management, migration without planning, and its proximity to Montevideo which causes migration and unemployment (Focus group, December 21, 2018).

According to participating citizens, the main development problems in Santa Rosa are the lack of educational institutions (high school and professional education), the increasing

growing aging population, the lack of social organizations, a low level of citizen participation and social cohesion and the isolation of the rural area (Social and Resources Mapping, February 2, 2019). In addition, they also consider that social conflicts caused by recent migration from Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, the lack of services such as local banks and infrastructure (roads and streets) are the main development problems in Santa Rosa. People are generally very conservative, so the youth do not feel like part of the community and there are not enough spaces for their social, cultural and political participation (UY#63-72, p.c., December 2018 to February 2019).

Regarding the main objectives stated in the Five-Year Plan, the local government planned to offer an efficient and effective public service to people, to strengthen the third level of government through citizen participation, to improve the infrastructure of public spaces, to engage neighbours in cultural activities, to promote local artists and sporting events. In addition, local government also aimed to provide goods properly in order to serve neighbours at municipal offices (Digital Municipality, *Uruguay Integra,* 2019; OPP, 2019).

Resources and capabilities

This Municipality has around 40 municipal officials who are paid and controlled by the Intendencia. The municipality is responsible for some services such as waste collection; parks and gardens; environmental management; and neighbourhood markets. In addition, the local government manages local taxes, driver's licences, transit police and cemetery alongside the Intendencia. This municipality applied for some projects financed by the *Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto* (Budget and Planning Office) to improve infrastructure works in the municipality. The current municipal administration is

promoting transparent local management in order to eradicate clientelism, which was common practice in the previous administrations. However, there are still many difficulties and problems, such as inefficiency and corruption. Social Workers and other professionals are required to see people's needs and social problems. Municipal officials received training from the Intendencia to work in the municipality, but municipal councillors and the mayor took only a few workshops in Canelones City or Montevideo. Mayor De León receives CAN $ 2,520 per month according to the established scale of salaries for mayors (Intendencia of Canelones, 2019).

On the part of civil society, the interviewee suggested that there are not enough capabilities for participation in Cabildos since people are only focused on their own needs but they do not present proposals for improving local development (M. De León, p.c., November 6, 2018; V. Fernández, p.c., November 16, 2018; R. Martínez, p.c., November 30, 2018; G. Rodríguez, p.c., November 30, 2018). Leaders and representatives of civil society consider, on the one hand, that municipal councillors are not prepared or motivated enough to play their roles, since they ran to be mayors and they do not receive the necessary training from the *Intendencia* or from the political parties. On the other hand, civil society requires more civic education to participate and collaborate with local government (W. García, p.c., December 15, 2018; D. Pirotto, p.c., December 15, 2018; J. Marrero, p.c., November 30, 2018; A. Lemus, p.c., November 30, 2018).

The Budget and Planning Office (Uruguay Integra Program) through the Municipal Management Incentive Fund *(FIGM)* transferred around CAN $ 267,957 in total to the Municipality of Santa Rosa in 2019 to fulfill its main goals. The Annual Operative Plan *(POA)* for 2019 established the following main goals[26] toward offering an efficient and

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[26] These goals align with the SDGs 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 17.

effective public service to people, to strengthen this third level of government through citizen participation, to improve the infrastructure of public spaces, to engage residents for cultural activities, and to promote local artists and sporting events.

Social and community resources

Regarding social and community resources, Santa Rosa has public institutions to provide education at all levels, except university and professional education; social organizations focused on elders and retired people (e.g. *AJUPENSAR*[27]*, Aniceto Servieri*[28]) and humanitarian institutions like the International Red Cross. In addition, there are some social and cultural organizations such as the *Santas Latas* Project which was created to promote cultural activities (practice and play *Candombe*[29]) among teenagers and young adults at a symbolic public space for people where there used to be a famous social club. A social network formed by public organisms and civil society organizations facilitates and promotes the implementation of social policies at the local level (Focus Group, December 21, 2018; Social and Resources Mapping, February 15, 2019).

Rural customs, traditions and activities are preserved through cultural and social organizations such as *Sociedad de Fomento Rural* (Rural Promotion Society) and Creole Society *Avelino Miranda*. The Windmill of Santa Rosa is considered a historical social organization related to local cultural identity. The rural population also organized themselves to request the construction of houses through the social program *Movimiento de Erradicación de la Vivienda Insalubre Rural* or *MEVIR* (Rural Unhealthy Housing Eradication Movement). Sports activities are promoted by different clubs like *El Ideal*

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[27] Asociación de Jubilados y Pensionistas de Santa Rosa (Retirees and Pensioners Association of Santa Rosa).

[28] Nursing Home for Elders Santa Rosa named Aniceto Servieri.

[29] Candombe is a style of musica and dance that inmmigrated to Uruguay with enslaved Africans. Candombe became a cultural expression of resistance by Africans and Afro-descendants against the cultural homogenization implemented by the national state and the Catholic Church. In 2009, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) inscribed Candombe in its Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (Ruiz et al, 2015: 70-73).

and Santa Rosa Football Clubs that participate in local championships. Finally, there are three different evangelical churches and one catholic parish Church Santa Rosa, that was the first established in this town (Focus Group, December 21, 2018; Social and Resources Mapping, February 15, 2019).

Cultural identity

Santa Rosa was built as a community of migration from Spain (Canary Islands) where important families like the Sierra and Muñoz families arrived and settled there in the second half of the eighteenth century. These families lived close to the Artigas family, which settled in the location of Sauce. Santa Rosa's history is tied to the Revolution (1811), the founding of Canelones Department (1816), and the later fight between *caudillos* and political leaders of *Partido Colorado* and *Partido Nacional* (F. Rivera and M. Oribe). One of the most important institutions that influenced the socio-cultural identity of Santa Rosa is the Catholic Church, through the emblematic Chapel of Santa Rosa of Lima completed in December 1850 during Manuel Oribe's presidency. The original and the later building (a parish) has been providing a sense of belonging to the people of this town for decades. Therefore, the presence of *Partido Nacional* and the Catholic religion have been the most significant sources of local identity through the present (J. Pérez Guido, p.c., December 28, 2018; diapason, 2015).

On the 19th of August 1879, President Latorre visited the place and named it Santa Rosa. Later, in 1925 it was categorized as a village and in 1972 was declared a city. The name of the city recalls a famous Latin American famous saint: Rosa de Lima. This small city is included within the group of locations named as "*el santoral*" (saints) because of their names, such as San Ramón, San Antonio, San Baustista, San Jacinto and Santa Lucía. Religion and political power have been closely tied in the past and up until the present in

this community. By 1890 the train road line Montevideo-Nico Pérez crossed through this town, Castellanos and San Ramón. The train was very important for building a sense of belonging too. Another symbolic building for people of this town is the Windmill of Santa Rosa, which was built in 1825 by Campomar along with refrigerators, and it has long been an important economic and cultural organization as a production cooperative. The Windmill of Santa Rosa was built in front of the train station. Rural customs and traditions are also important elements of cultural identity of Santa Rosa (J. Pérez Guido, p.c., December 28, 2018).

Since its origins, the main productive activities have been wine and wheat in Canelones Department. Farms were established around Montevideo and Canelones in order to produce perishable products closer to the capital. It is for this reason the Windmill of Santa Rosa was built. Wheat production was later relocated to the border with Argentina. Therefore, in the present, the most popular festivals of this municipality are *La Fiesta del Pan y del Vino* (Wine and Bread Festival) which is held in the Windmill of Santa Rosa. In addition, the *La Ollada* festival and the religious feast of Santa Rosa each 31st of August, led by the Catholic Church (Parish of Santa Rosa) and supported by civil society organizations and municipality, are the most significant activities of this community. Carnival and football are also very popular, as they are in the rest of the country, but there is a unique group of young people called *Santas Latas* whol self-organized with the purpose of preserving and renewing *Candombe* (J. Pérez Guido, p.c., December 28, 2018).

Chapter 5: <u>Implementing Participatory Decentralization in Chile</u>

5.1 <u>National processes, progress and challenges</u>

The purpose of this section is to analyze the implementation of participatory decentralization policy in Chile throughout recent decades—taking into account the policy's origin and historical context; the main actors involved in this process; and the institutional design—in order to understand the role of the political project on PD outcomes in this country. The Chilean process of decentralization can be also characterized by the influence of a historical caudillism, clientelism and paternalism like in Uruguay; by the impact of the authoritarian government established during the dictatorship; the excessive emphasis on reforms to the legal framework and institutional design (administrative deconcentration); and the current challenges and difficulties due to a rooted centralism, a scant or low civic engagement and the insufficient political and social decentralization.

Although a significant process of democratization that implied more transparency, civic engagement and territorial perspective occurred in the Chilean decentralization during Michelle Bachelet's first presidency; there are still many challenges and difficulties. Indeed, the most recent PB experiences implemented during the presidency of Sebastián Piñera (a right-wing government) were more focused on efficiency than empowerment of people. The decentralization policy in Chile has been focused much more on administrative processes than on strengthening citizen capacities and civic engagement (political decentralization). Therefore, political power is too concentrated in mayors but municipal councillors are limited in their roles because of the lack of resources, infrastructure and specific mechanisms. Chile has implemented an administrative decentralization but not a political and fiscal decentralization (I. Borkoski, p.c., March 28, 2019; P. Olguin, p.c., March 29, 2019; Serrano & Fernández, 2003).

The process of decentralization in Chile started in 1974 during the authoritarian regime led by General Augusto Pinochet and had three different periods of reforms. As Eaton (1994) argues, in order to understand the contemporary decentralization process, one cannot start with the democratic transition but instead must first consider military-led reforms of sub-national governments. The first period (1974-1976) during the dictatorship, focused on the administrative reorganization of the state, prioritizing economic, social, geographical and administrative coordination to achieve economic growth and political control. The process began as administrative decentralization through the creation of 13 regions and 51 provinces but with political power remaining centralized. In the second phase (1976-1989) Pinochet's institutional engineering at the municipal level generated its own legacy: in the attempt to bolster his regime's legitimacy, the dictator channeled significant resources to the municipalities, in the broader context of privatization and reducing the role of the central state. The authoritarian regime was committed to strengthening municipalities and administrative decentralization, expanding the transfer of responsibilities such as health and education services to the municipalities. The third period (1990 to the present day) can be characterized by the democratization of local level politics and the promotion of decentralization at a sub-national level (Eaton, 1994; Serrano & Fernández, 2003).

Before 1973, there were 25 provinces and 300 municipalities. Provincial governments were appointed but municipal authorities were elected. During the dictatorship, the administrative decentralization process reorganized 25 provinces into 13 regions. In that time, some *desarrollistas* (developmentalists) proposed implementing regional development plans to the military government. Therefore, some economic activities such as forestry, mining and the production of salmon in Los Lagos, started to be developed around the country. However, all these economic activities were fostered by private

companies, and not by municipal or provincial governments based on a neo-liberal model of the state. In addition, this deconcentration process did not promote any local empowerment but rather increased the political control by military administration (G. Delamaza, p.c., January 28th, 2019). In 1984, during the dictatorship, the Subsecretary for Regional and Administrative Development (SUBDERE) which depended on the Ministry of Interior and Public Security, was created in order to implement a decentralization policy (SUBDERE, 2019; O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019).

This subsecretary was established to create and develop sub-national government: both regions and municipalities. In the present day, SUBDERE's institutional objectives consist of promoting and leading the institutional reforms for decentralization policy implementation through an effective transfer of responsibilities and political, economic and administrative competences to the regional and municipal governments. In addition, this Subsecretary encourages organizations at the regional, provincial and municipal levels to foster territorial development; increase engagement and participation of regional governments in public investments; further administrative, political and fiscal decentralization; and improve coordination between municipalities and regional governments (SUBDERE, 2019; O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019). To achieve these general objectives, SUBDERE sets the following strategic goals: to design legal reforms and public policies to strengthen administrative, economic and political competences of regional and municipal governments; to strengthen regional and municipal capacities for local development through an academic program; and to administer and transfer financial resources and services at a regional and municipal level in order to foster effectiveness and efficiency of public policies. Currently, this central office has four divisions: the Division of Regional Development, the Division of Municipalities, the Division of

Policies and Territorial Development, and the Division of Administration and Finances (SUBDERE, 2019; O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019).

The main goal of both the Divisions of Regional Government and of the municipalities consists of improving the integral development of all territories through the reform of legal framework that provide financial resources, particularly for the most isolated and poorest municipalities. SUBDERE designed a typology of the poorest, most rural and most isolated municipalities in order to support them and overcome inequalities among them. In addition, the Municipal Common Fund distributes financial resources among the poorest municipalities. The richest municipalities (e.g. Las Condes) contribute with more financial resources to the Municipal Common Fund than others but do not receive the same amount of resources from this Fund as the poorest ones do. Indeed, there are some Municipalities that contribute much more than others, such as Las Condes, Vitacura, Santiago and Providencia. In addition, the richest municipalities have to pay higher taxes than the rest of Chilean municipalities (P. Cuevas, p.c., March 19, 2019). SUBDERE supports all municipalities no matter to which political party mayors belong to. This Subsecretary works with all Associations of Mayors that also include Councillors. Indeed, SUBDERE is studying a new project of law that considers their roles in order to improve transparency and citizen participation. Furthermore, SUBDERE fosters the association between municipalities and academic institutions in order to develop capacities; it also provides professional and technical assistance to more than 170 municipalities (P. Cuevas, p.c., March 19, 2019).

The process of administrative decentralization included the creation of regional governments in 1992 through the Constitutional Organic Law on Government and Regional Administration N° 19.175. This law established the Intendente and Regional Governors' jurisdictions and their relationship with national government. Their

legislative bodies were elected by regional councils who belonged to municipalities, and their executive body was appointed by the President of the Republic. The center-right political party *Renovación Nacional* (National Renovation) accepted popular elections of mayors: on the condition that an intermediate level of government be established, outlined in the Law 19.097 (Constitutional Reform) of 1991. From 1991 to 1994 regional governments were established and formed by a Regional Council and Intendente. In addition, the *SEREMI* or *Secretarías Regionales Ministeriales* (Regional Ministerial Secretariats) of Economy were formed to coordinate public services and to promote economic production. Thus, Intendentes were responsible for coordinating all these regional policies. Regional government through the National Regional Development Fund or *FNDR* (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional) were able to distribute resources to local government. From 1994 to 2005 a mixed model was created by a regional government and a deconcentration process through the *Intendentes*. However, *Intendentes* were still appointed by the President and Regional Council were voted by municipal councillors until 2013. In 2005 thanks to the reformed Regional Government Law, planning functions were transferred to regional authorities (O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019).

During Michelle Bachelet's first presidency (*Concertación*), relevant legal framework reforms for improving territorial decentralization were promoted and approved. In fact, Regional Councils (legislative body) started to be directly elected by citizens through the National Constitutional reform with the approval of the Law N° 20.390 (Art. 113) in 2009. This law defined the Regional Council as a regulatory and supervisory body, responsible for promoting citizen participation at a regional level. These legal framework reforms started to be implemented in March 2014. A decisive impetus was given by Michelle Bachelet in her second presidency, when she put decentralization at the core of

the 2014-2018 presidential programme. In the Presidential Decentralization Agenda, the government established a Presidential Advisory Commission for Decentralization and Regional Development which proposed a detailed action plan in October 2014 (OECD, 2017). In 2017, the new Constitutional reform through the organic Law N° 20.990 established that the executive body of Regional Government would be directly elected by citizens. In addition, the Law N° 21.073 stated the popular election of Regional Governor and the Law N° 21.074 declared the process of transferring competences to the regional governments. Finally, the law that regulates the election of regional governments was approved in 2018 so they will be elected by citizens in May of 2021. A new model of political decentralization with more legitimacy than in the past in Chile was set up from 2009 to 2019 (O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019; Dazarola, 2019).

The main actors in the decentralization process have been the mayors. Their efficiency and capacities were increased through the creation of the Chilean Association of Municipalities (AChM) in 1993 (Mardonez, 2006). The main goal of AChM is to represent municipalities related to international, national and regional organisms as well as to private organizations. AChM is a non profit assotiation that supports municipalities to improve their capabilities for deepening municipal management and decentralization. Currently, this Association represents 2300 councils and 345 mayors. In addition, AChM is focused on permanent training of mayors, councillors and municipal officials through seminars, workshops and meetings in association with universities as well as on strengthening Regional Associations. Therefore, there is a regional association in each region around the country. In 2012, AChM obtained its legal status (AChM, 2017; I. Borkoski, p.c., March 28, 2019; P. Olguin, p.c., March 29, 2019). Municipalities were created before regional governments and even before the Chilean state which was based on the Cabildos logic. Currently, they manage social programs for youth, the elderly,

women, primary and high schools and health centers. In addition, they also implement different policies related with transport, sport, infrastructure, roads, security, and the management of pharmacies and libraries. They are able to build houses for the poorest population, and to manage airports and subways. However, most public services are provided by national ministries, because municipalities do not have enough capabilities or resources. Furthermore, although the Municipal Common Fund distributes resources among municipalities, there are still many inequalities among them (O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019).

The 345 municipalities currently in Chile are regulated by Law N°18.695 (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades named as LOCM) which has been reformed almost 50 times. The LOCM establishes municipality functions (Mayor and Councillors); financing, and organization of the municipality; mechanisms for citizen participation; and municipal elections. This Law also defines that a *comuna* (commune) as consisting of a limited territory that includes people and goods. The legal nature of municipalities in Chile is dual because on the one hand they are considered national administrative organs (Law N° 18.575), but on the other hand they have autonomy to make decisions about their functions. The LOCM (Art. 3) also regulates specific functions of municipalities such as to design, approve and change the communal development plan that has to be coordinated with national and regional plans; to design the community regulatory plan and to lead the whole planning process; to promote local development; to regulate public transport and traffic within their territories; and to manage and organize construction and cleaning. Furthermore, the LOCM (Art. 4) also establishes that municipalitis are able to develop other activities directly or together with other public organisms. They are responsible for education and culture; public health and environment protection; social and legal attention; professional/job search; tourism and sport; housing development and

urbanization; public transport and traffic; prevention of emergencies and catastrophes; gender equality and local development (Dazarola, 2018).

Municipalites are also able to implement the communal development plan; to design and implement the municipal budget; to create neighbourhood units in their territories; to administer their territories; to apply taxes; and to implement and promote channels and mechanisms for citizen participation (Art. 5, LOCM). Mayors are able to represent municipalities; to make proposals for improving their communities to the municipal council; to manage municipal staff; to administer financial resources; to organize and chair municipal council sessions; and to call communal council of civil society organizations. Mayors require municipal council approval for communal development plans and municipal budgets as well as for community regulatory plans. Mayors also have to promote and organize an accountability process for the municipal council and for the communal council of civil society organizations each year. According to Art. 79 & 80, Municipal councillors are responsible for promoting citizen participation and controlling and overseeing the Mayor's management (Dazarola, 2018).

Finally, LOCM (Art. 93) also establishes that each Municipality has to promote citizen participation through different mechanisms and spaces such as public accountability (*cuentas públicas*), Cabildos and communal councils of civil society organizations called COSOCs (*Consejos Comunales de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil*). COSOCs were created by the Law N° 20.500 in 2011 to promote the association between people and citizen participation in public management in Chile during Piñera's administration. COSOC's' members are elected by representatives of territorial, social and community organizations such as *Juntas de Vecinos,* unions, Sport Clubs, Elders Clubs, Mother's Centers, neighbourhoods associations and indigenous committees of municipalities to participate in local government for four years. This communal council is chaired by the

mayor and organizes at least four meetings a year where leaders and representatives of civil society organizations are able to discuss and propose their ideas about municipal plans for improving local development (Dazarola, 2018).

The most significant achievement in this third period was the democratization of municipalities through the elections of mayors and councillors under the Organic Law of Municipalities in 1992 (Serrano & Fernández, 2003). Over the last ten years, many changes have occurred such as the elective intermediate (regional) level of government: both executive and legislative. Before that new legal framework, Intendentes were appointed by the President. The transfer process of competences and resources was established in order to improve infrastructure and to provide health centers and schools at the local level. In fact, national government approves the budget that will be distributed by Regional Government to Municipalities based on project proposals. Municipalities are able to decide their priorities and to design their projects for local development. Currently, regional government budget has three funding sources: 1) the national government (National Regional Development Fund) which is distributed based on important indicators such as poverty, population and territory; 2) regional resources established by laws that benefit different regions (e.g. casinos) and 3) conditional transfers (national funds) to specific areas (O. Henríquez, p.c., January 31, 2019).

Despite the initiatives to decentralize the state in the third phase, significant challenges remain. In fact, the decentralization policy in Chile has focused much more on legal frameworks and institutional design (administrative decentralization or deconcentration) than on strengthening citizen capacities and civic engagement (political decentralization). For instance, political power is too concentrated in mayors but councillors are limited in their roles because of the lack of resources, infrastructure and specific mechanisms. Chile has implemented an administrative decentralization but not a political and fiscal

decentralization (I. Borkoski, p.c., March 28, 2019; P. Olguin, p.c., March 29, 2019; OECD, 2017; Serrano & Fernández, 2003). Furthermore, the lack of coordination and relationship between municipal and regional governments; the lack of a territorial perspective from the municipal government and the current conflict between mayors and municipal councillors are still challenging obstacles for improving participatory decentralization.

Chile is still one of the most centralized countries in the world, comparable to the likes of Greece and Ireland. In 2014, subnational government expenditure in Chile accounted for 3.0% of GDP and 13% of public expenditure, versus the OECD average of 16.6% and 40.2%, respectively. Chilean municipalities still have limited own-source revenues and depend on central government transfers to fund sectors or activities. Chile is the only OECD country where local borrowing is prohibited. Policy design and implementation are still defined by national ministries in a top-down process. Policy is carried out by deconcentrated state territorial entities but partially implemented by municipalities, often according to national norms that do not take into account local or territorial needs (OECD, 2017).

Another relevant obstacle to participatory decentralization is that Chilean society is characterized by an economy with strong growth that hides significant inequality, in which individualistic, depoliticized, demobilized, "credit-card" individuals only seek material advancement. In this context, people tend not to believe in political ideologies other than neo-liberalism, meaning that unions and political parties become weak and fragmented (Moulian, 1997: 81-122). Decreasing interest in the political process could give the impression that people are fully satisfied, but there is significant evidence that the lack of interest indicates discontent with politicians and dissatisfaction with politics in general (Navia, 2010). However, socio-territorial conflicts have been observed in rural

areas of Chile since 2005, showing the capacity of social networks and indigenous actors to oppose intensified neo-extractivism throughout the country. These conflicts have had an impact on the modification of public and private investment projects related to extractivism (Delamaza et al, 2017).

The latest efforts to deepen participatory decentralization project in Chile reveal important challenges for the future. This is demonstrated by the historical socio-economic and political exclusion of indigenous communities affected by structural violence, racism, and poverty (Berdegué et al, 2008; Doran, 2018; Haughney, 2012). Indeed, poverty indicators of Chilean indigenous communities were high during the 2003-2011 period (Doran, 2018). The most numerous of Chile's indigenous peoples are the Mapuche. Since early in the twentieth century, the Mapuche have demanded recognition of their lands. The *Concertación* government criminalized actions and demands for collective rights to territory and autonomy as threats to national security. Furthermore, there is a combination of sensitivity to cultural diversity and adherence to neoliberal policies that denied collective political and territorial rights: "neoliberal multiculturalism" (Haughney, 2012: 203). A true participatory decentralization would requires a transformation of the current model of state management based on appointive selection of officials and a homogenous policy to include territorial decentralization based on democratic elections; the political inclusion of community identities and a more sustained civic engagement (Delamaza et al, 2012; Eaton, 1994; Goldfrank, 2002; Serrano & Fernández, 2003).

At the time of writing, the Chilean context is very difficult for participatory decentralization. The current economic model and National Constitution still remain after 29 years of formal electoral democracy, because the transition occurred without the defeat of Pinochet's forces. Thus, this economic and political model was legitimized during the democratic periods. In Chile, the dictatorship ended after those of other countries such as

Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil, and although many reforms were implemented after the dictatorship, citizen participation was not viewed as an essential factor for consolidating democracy. Indeed, there is no mechanism for direct democracy like in Uruguay (e.g. plebiscite and referendum). Therefore, citizen participation is too limited, and has little influence on political power in Chile. Citizen participation is a consultative process only, not a binding agreement. Furthermore, there is no quota for political participation of women or for indigenous communities in Chile. In the last decades, the Welfare State has been undermined, the private sector has became more powerful than the state, and the tax model is highly regressive (G. Delamaza, p.c., January 28th, 2019; E. Montecinos, p.c., February 28, 2019).

In terms of political decentralization, there are many obstacles, such as the lack of autonomy and clientelism at the local level. Some mayors have been leading their communities for 25 years; many of them belong to the UDI, particularly in the north of the country. According to Delamaza (2018), the Chilean political elite seem to be afraid of citizen participation. However, people do trust in municipalities and mayors much more than in Intendentes. Therefore, citizens believe that municipalities are responsible for local development, which is not completely true. Furthermore, although there is some equality among municipalities in terms of institutional design, there is a great inequality among them in terms of resources. For example: in Ñuñoa (a community of Santiago), neighbours have access to the best educational institutions because they are wealthier. Finally, Participatory Budgeting is not included in the institutional design in municipalities. The last PB experiences implemented by a right-wing government were more focused on improving the efficiency of local government than promoting citizen participation and empowerment. In addition, the lack of participatory experiences in Chile

may not be related to the lack of identity or social networks, but to the lack of resources to implement mechanisms to consult people (G. Delamaza, p.c., January 28th, 2019).

5.2 <u>Participatory decentralization from a territorial perspective</u>: *Characterization of three case studies in Chile*

In this section, the three selected case studies (municipalities) in Chile are characterized from a territorial perspective, based on the two main variables which are related in this research: the influence of the socio-cultural dimension of territory (independent variable) on the PD outcomes (dependent variable) in order to analyze which experiences are the most successful or unsuccessful in the following comparisons within one country and cross-country. The socio-cultural dimension of territory is observed through the study of social relations; power relations; identity; and imaginaries. The impacts of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on local government are observed through the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and the quality of representation. The effects of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on civil society are studied through the existence of horizontal governance; the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and the capabilities and skills for decision-making process.

Therefore, the characteristics of the local government, the existing participatory mechanisms and the main development problems of these cases are summarized since they reflect some aspects of PD outcomes in each case study. In addition, social and community resources, and cultural identity of each case study are also presented in order to understand significant aspects of the socio-cultural dimension of territory (independent variable) in the context of the Chilean decentralization process. Finally, resources and capabilities reflect some aspects of the intervening variable namely political project on decentralization in terms of devolution of political power, and the transfer of economic and human resources. These characteristics are taken into account in the comparisons within each country and between Uruguay and Chile in the Chapter 6.

Important differences are observed among the three selected case studies in Chile in terms of the socio-cultural dimension of territory and PD outcomes. However, all these municipalities face similar difficulties in terms of the devolution of political power and the transfer of economic and human resources from the national/regional government to the local government. Regarding social and community resources, while the Municipality of Recoleta (Santiago) is characterized by a very participative civil society with a high self-organization capacity; rural municipalities (Perquenco and Empedrado) are characterized by a lower self-organization capacity and a more passive community. In addition, the cultural identity of Recoleta is based on historical places and events: buildings such as Catholic parishes established by Franciscan and Dominican orders in the colonial era; the influence of the foundation of the city of Santiago; trade development; Palestinian migration and commercial activities from the post-colonial era to the present. Both rural municipalities are characterized not only by the influence of the Catholic Church (feasts and processions) but also by traditional customs and activities related to agriculture (Perquenco) and forestry (Empedrado). While Perquenco, which means "healing water" (*perken ko*) in the Mapuche language, *Mapudungún,* has been strongly influenced by the Mapuche culture; the historical forestry industry, based on pine and eucalyptus, contributed to the construction of the local identity in Empedrado.

Concerning PD outcomes, the Municipality of Recoleta has promoted different spaces and mechanisms for accountability, participatory planning and civil society engagement with local government (COSOC, open schools, PLADECO) in the last decades. However, despite the more recent initiatives for improving citizen participation in Perquenco (e.g monthly meetings between municipal authorities and social leaders/representatives from civil society, COSOC, PB, participatory planning), this community still faces many

difficulties for civil society engagement and must grapple with the historical exclusion of the Mapuche communities from social and political life.

Finally, even though the national (SUBEDERE) and regional governments have implemented different mechanisms for improving municipality capabilities for decentralization, when it comes to transfer of economic resources and training, they still face many struggles in terms of autonomy, infrastructure, and human resources to manage their own territories. However, Recoleta has promoted some unique initiatives to face development problems, such as people's pharmacies and public optometrists to facilitate access to medication and glasses at a lower cost than in the rest of the country and public bookstores for increasing access to culture.

5.2.a Municipality of Perquenco

Local government

The local government of Perquenco is led by Mayor Luis Muñoz Pérez, who used to belong to the Christian Democratic Party, but now belongs to *Nueva Mayoría;* he considers himself independent. He is an agricultural engineer who was elected as Mayor in 2004 and has been re-elected four times as Mayor of the Municipality of Perquenco. Most Municipal Councillors[30] of Perquenco belong to the center-left wing political parties in Chile. Councillor Urrutia, Sanhueza and Lara assumed their roles for their first time for the period of November, 2016-November, 2020. Urrutia was also elected as the second director of the *Asociación de Municipalidades de La Araucanía* (Association of Municipalities of La Araucania) *or AMRA* that promotes institutional capacities of the 32

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[30] The Municipal Councillors are Claudia Urrutia who belongs to the right-wing political party *Renovación Nacional*; Alejandro Sepúlveda, who belongs to the center-left political party *Nueva Mayoría-Partido Por la Democracia*; Miguel Lara Veldebenito (Socialist Party); Gerardo Sanhueza (Christian Democratic Party-*Nueva Mayoría*); Juan Luis Opazo (*Partido Por la Democracia*); and Elena Bravo Sepúlveda (Christian Democratic Party).

Municipalities in this region; she also belongs to the gender equality board of La Araucania. Councillor Lara works on Education, Health and Work Commissions. Councillor Sepúlveda, who was elected for the second time as Councillor of Perquenco, has been working with Mapuche communities and the *Coorporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena* or *CONADI* (National Corporation for Indigenous Development) in the last few years in order to solve their infrastructure problems such as the lack of access to drinking water, and also to manage local development issues for Mapuche communities. Sepúlveda expects to be the next Mayor of Perquenco. Councillor Opazo has been working as councillor since ten years ago and worked in the participatory Budget process (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14th, 2019; L. Opazo, p.c., March 20, 2019; A. Sepúlveda, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Urrutia, p.c., March 15, 2019; M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; SINIM, 2019).

Participatory mechanisms

This municipality promotes citizen participation through different mechanisms and processes such as a public account once a year (by April), bi-monthly meetings between the mayor, municipal officials, experts and social leaders and representatives of civil society in order to define priorities, make decisions about municipal budget, and control the communal development plan *PLADECO* (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal*). *PLADECO* is led by the Secretary of Communal Planning (SECPLAN) and constitutes a participatory process which defines strategic goals of the Municipality of Perquenco in coordination with Regional Development Strategy of La Araucania, for the period 2019-2024. Furthermore, this municipality also established Consejos de la Sociedad Civil or COSOC (Communal Council of Civil Society) for the period of 2016-2020. This Council organizes bi-montly meetings to analyze development problems and social needs and to

propose solutions based on people's opinions. However, this Council is not able to make decisions and to influence on local government (D. Yañez, p.c., March 18, 2019).

Citizen participation is promoted not only through workshops and meetings but also by Internet in order to receive proposals and suggestions from individuals and from groups and social organizations. Local government also encourages a participatory budget for rural and urban areas through the *Fondo de Desarrollo Vecinal* or *FONDEVE* (Neighbourhood Development Fund) which finances almost twenty projects related to the specific needs and problems of the municipality. These projects are funded by the municipal budget through the *FRIL* and people are able to vote by Internet. In addition, the mayor organizes cultural Cabildos and every infrastructure project requests citizen input, opinions and suggestions such as the *Programa de Acción Ciudadana*. Municipal Council sessions are broadcast by the community radio station *Mirador de Lautaro* (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019; M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; G. Sanhueza, p.c., March 15, 2019; Municipality of Perquenco, 2018; PLADECO, 2018). However, some councillors critize the PB process in Perquenco because only the projects that receive the most votes are the ones that are funded, while relevant projects for local development cannot reach the required votes to be approved. Therefore, another methodology of implementing PB could be more appropriate for collective interests, such as a PB by sectors or by organizations. Municipal councillors are not able to do an accountability process because of the lack of economic resources. Furthermore, municipal councillors are not able to participate in bi-monthly meetings between mayor and social leaders from the local community in Perquenco (G. Sanhueza, p.c., March 15, 2019; A. Sepulveda, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Urrutia, p.c., March 15, 2019).

Local development

The main development problems of this municipality are poverty that reaches almost 22% according to CASEN survey of 2018, the quality of public education, health attention and security (Focus group, March 21, 2019; SINIM, 2019). According to the mayor, the most important development issues are poverty; unemployment; education in terms of quality and accessibility; an aging population; small farmers most of whom belong to Mapuche communities; insecurity; adictions; and improper treatment of garbage and sewage (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019). For municipal councillors, the main problems of Perquenco are also unemployment; the environment, particularly the pollution of Perquenco River because of the lack of sanitation; the social conflict between residents and forestry companies; and the lack of a Regulatory Plan which is crucial for territorial planning and local development. In addition, the lack of resources, infrastructure and initiatives for rural area (M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; G. Sanhueza, p.c., March 15, 2019; A. Sepúlveda, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Urrutia, p.c., March 15, 2019; PLADECO, 2018).

Furthermore, according to social leaders and representatives of civil society and participating citizens, the most challenging development issues are pollution by plastics and the lack of recycling; unemployment or precarious work; insufficient public services, such as health centers and specialized staff; lack of safe and drinking water; the inadequate public transport; the lack of a regulatory plan; and the low self-organization capacity of neighbours (V. Cayul, p.c., March 15, 2019; E. Poo, p.c,, March 15, 2019; U. Ramírez, p.c., March 15, 2019; R. Lemonao, p.c., March 21, 2019; D. Yañez, p.c., March 18, 2019; PLADECO, 2018; Social & Resources Mapping, March 25, 2019; CH # 56-66, March 19-22, 2019). However, for Mapuche leaders and *lonkos* (the oldest and wisest chiefs of their communities), the main development problems are related to recovering

their tribal lands as well as the lack of economic resources and infrastructure to work and produce on their small farms to support their families. They also decry the lack of drinking water because of the process of privatization of Chilean lands and natural resources, as well as the systematic repression by police (*Carabineros*) from the dictatorship period until the present, because of this, they are promoting a Constitutional Reform (O. Liencheu-Lonco of La Laguna Mapuche Community, p.c., March 15, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, President of Mapuche Community in Perquenco, p.c., March 21, 2019).

The main strategic objectives of the Community Development Plan (*PLADECO*) for the 2019-2024 period are: to promote territorial development and infrastructure (particularly access to safe drinking water) through different programs and projects that include Mapuche communities and with the support of the Latin American Center for Rural Development or *RIMISP*. Additional objectives of the PLADECO are to promote access to knowledge and technology in order to reduce territorial inequalities; to foster environmental education; to improve public security; to improve social and economic development; and to enhance cultural and health centers (PLADECO, 2018).

Resources and capabilities

Regarding resources and capabilities, Perquenco has 110 municipal officials in total of whom 28 are permanent staff. However, most of these municipal officials who are professionals live in Temuco so local capabilities are not well developed in Perquenco (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019). According to municipal councillors, this municipality experiences many difficulties in terms of economic resources and capabilities for local government. Indeed, their political parties do not give them much support in completing their roles, nor are they able to participate in courses offered by the Chilean Association of Municipalities. In addition, they are not able to properly control the Mayor's

government since they do not receive enough economic resources, nor are they allowed to participate in the local management. Municipal councillors do not receive the benefits that the Mayor does, such as health insurance. In fact, municipal councillors only receive CAN $ 1,194 (called *la dieta*) while the mayor is considered a municipal official, receiving CAN $ 8,770 and multiple benefits (M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; G. Sanhueza, p.c., March 15, 2019; A. Sepúlveda, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Urrutia, p.c., March 15, 2019).

This municipality provides municipal education services (72%) through four institutions which include a high school, as well as municipal health services through two centers in urban and rural areas. These public services are provided thanks to a national government subsidy through ministries. In addition, there are other institutional resources such as the agricultural development program (PRODESAL), and municipal services such as water services in rural areas and, municipal library and cultural centers that promote Mapuche culture and language (*Mapudungún*) and the celebration of the new year, *We tripantu* (Focus group, March 21st, 2019; SINIM, 2018). This municipality receives around CAN $ 160,197 from the Incentive Fund for the improvement of municipal management (*FIGEM*) and CAN $ 577,473 from the National Municipal Regional Development Fund which is considered very useful by the mayor (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019). Perquenco receives a subsidy from the national government (Ministery of Education and Ministery of Health) in order to manage educational institutions and health centers at the local level. This municipality also manages around CAN $ 51,733 in total per year in income of which CAN $ 35,681 comes from the Municipal Common Fund, which represents 80% of its income (SINIM; 2018). In addition, Perquenco receives income from the *Fondos Regionales de Inversión Local* or *FRIL* (Regional Local Investment Funds) which is up to CAN $170,000. They won a competition between all municipalities

but there are no established criteria for the winners. Therefore, each municipality has to be prepared for a political lobby with regional government which is difficult and depends on political interests (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019).

Furthermore, this municipality promotes a systematic process of planning based on a participatory methodology such as a *Plan de Desarrollo Comunal or PLADECO* (Community Development Plan) and bi-monthly meetings between the mayor, municipal officials from different areas and departments, and social leaders and representatives of civil society in order to define priorities for local development and to do accountability of local government. However, Perquenco does not yet have a Community Regulatory Plan which could be an important tool for the planning process; furthermore the most relevant decisions related to local government and resources are made in the national capital Santiago or in the regional capital Temuco (SINIM, 2019; L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019; A. Sepúlveda, p.c., March 15, 2019; G. Sanhueza, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Urrutia, p.c., March 15; M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019). Perquenco also has a DIDECO, a Department of Municipal Health, a Department of Municipal Education, and the Municipal Agriculture Program; and has created new offices such as the Department of Citizen Security and the Department of Environment. In addition, social workers also promote the self-organization abilities of local organizations and groups as well as women's abilities to access employment opportunities (D. González, p.c., March 14, 2019; K. Sanhueza, p.c., March 14, 2019).

Social and community resources

Perquenco has more than 200 social organizations with legal status, more than 100 functional social organizations, of which 57% are rural. The largest organizations are sport clubs, workshops for women, indigenous communities (23) and seniors clubs

(around 16). Furthermore, there are housing committees; seven Neighbourhood Boards, most of them located in rural areas; a community radio and a TV channel that broadcast Municipal Council sessions; and cultural organizations that promote traditional dances such as *Huaso Club* (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019; M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; PLADECO, 2018). In terms of institutional resources, there are two primary schools, one high school, one kindergarten and three Gyms. Perquenco has also a Municipal Library, an Agricultural Development Program or *PRODESAL*, a Rural Drinking Water Service and a fire station (Focus group, March 21, 2019; Social & Resources Mapping, March 25, 2019). In terms of civil society capabilities for local government, some groups have learnt how to organize themselves and to apply for municipal projects, but others, like Mapuche women are still experiencing many barriers to participating in municipal spaces and accessing resources, knowledge and abilities (M. Yañez, p.c., March 18, 2019; R. Lemonao, p.c., March 21, 2019).

Cultural identity

Perquenco used to be Mapuche territory from the Bio Bio River to the Toltén River until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Chilean national state expanded its legal borders. Facing an economic crisis, the new national state needed to expand its control over Mapuche territory (*La Araucania*) and its cultural identity in order to exploit this land and to impose the national identity of the Chilean state. Therefore, Perquenco was created as a town in 1894 and became a municipality in 1904 through the establishment of public offices and services such as schools, a hospital, a police station and telephone and postal services. At the end of the nineteenth century, Perquenco became the capital of a failed national state called the Kingdom of Araucanía and Patagonia. The most important economic activity was and still is agriculture, primarily wheat production. In addition, Mapuche culture and the Catholic religion have influenced the cultural identity

of Perquenco, which means "healing water" (*perken ko*) in the Mapuche language, *Mapudungún* (Sandoval & González, 2010: 31-40; PLADECO, 2018).

Therefore, Perquenco socio-cultural identity is based on wheat production; cattle husbandry; Catholic feasts and processions such as San Sebastián on 20th January and 20th March, the Holy Virgin Mary Feast on 8th December and the Holy Week; and Mapuche traditions and ceremonies such as *We Tripantu*. There are 23 Mapuche communities in Perquenco, all of which practice traditional religious ceremonies such as Huachipato and speak Mapudungún. Each Mapuche community has its *Lonko* (the oldest and wisest man) and *Machi,* who is considered a doctor. During the fieldwork, the researcher participated in Mapuche ceremonies invited by Verónica Cayul, the leader of the Mapuche Community Luciano Cayul. Some Municipal and Regional Councillors were also invited to attend this ceremony, called *rogativas* (prayers) or *ngillatun* in *Mapudungun* (the Mapuche language) to ask for wellness and to give thanks for all benefits received during the year to *Chaw Ngünechen* (a Mapuche god) for two days.

According to their beliefs, the universe is like a vertical line where God and the good spirits live; and below them are the bad spirits; and bellow them is the earth as we can see it and where Mapuche meet all of them together. Nature is considered sacred to the Mapuche. This ceremony was performed in the Luciano Cayul community land, nine kilometres from Perquenco city. Tents are set up, one for each Mapuche community in Perquenco. Lonko prays and men, dressed in their traditional clothing, dance for the whole day around a pale laid in the center of the site, while women sing and play Mapuche instruments. Women display beautiful necklaces and ornaments during these days. At noon, Mapuche leaders invite their special visitors (like the researcher) with their typical food, prepared in enormous pots on a bonfire on the ground, and with their typical

alcoholic drink made of wheat called *muday*. This typical drink is also offered to their god during the ceremony.

The feast of San Sebastián was also observed during the fieldwork on March 20th in Perquenco. This traditional event has been held following the harvest period since the 1970s, organized by the local parish San Sebastián (Catholic Church), the Municipality, and local transport companies. The sanctuary of San Sebastián, named for a Roman soldier who was murdered by the Roman Emperor for confessing his faith in Jesus Christ, was built in 1927. About 20,000 pilgrims arrive in Perquenco by train or by bus from other cities such as Victoria, Lautaro and Temuco as well as from other regions. The parish priest, along with some members of this Catholic community, dress in yellow and red caps and walk around the city carrying the image of this saint, followed by the community members, in a religious procession. After that, they celebrate the Holy Mass in the San Sebastián sanctuary. This local event is not only a religious feast but also a social and economic activity which contributes to local development. A local merchant is installed around the main square of Perquenco to sell not only religious objects but also food, clothing, and playthings, among other objects. Residents look very excited before and during this religious and social activity which each year ends with a cultural festival at night. Furthermore, there are traditional activities organized by the municipality and civil society of Perquenco, such as horse races and "*Kuchen* Festival" every February in which residents compete to bake the largest blueberry cake (V. Cayul, p.c., March 15, 2019; CH # 56-66, March 19-22, 2019).

5.2.b <u>Municipality of Recoleta</u>

<u>Local government</u>

Local government was led by Mayor Daniel Jadue (Communist Party-*Nueva Mayoría*) and Municipal Councillors[31]. The mayor and municipal councillors are elected through separate voting lists in Chile. According to the current legal framework, the mayor's functions are much greater than municipal councillors, who only are able to represent the municipality, control the mayor's performance and deliberate and make decisions about municipal issues such as the Municipal Development Plan and the municipal budget. They can request the creation of particular commission in order to control health centers or municipal schools. However, the mayor is the most powerful political actor in the municipality because he or she is able to make the final decision about all municipal issues; for this reason, municipal councillors consider their own functions to be too limited. In addition, municipal councillors are not able to develop an independent relationship with local citizens. The number of councillors depends on the number of inhabitants of each municipality: a municipality with 6,000 to 100,000 inhabitants has six municipal councillors; a municipality with 100,000 to 150,000 inhabitants has eight municipal councillors (as in the case of Recoleta) and a municipality with 150,000 or more inhabitants has 10 municipal councillors (N. Cuevas, p.c., March 6, 2019; F. Manzur, p.c., March 7; F. Pacheco, p.c., March 5; D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; Dazarola, 2018).

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[31] The Municipal Councillors are: Natalia Cuevas (Communist Party), Ernesto Moreno (Christian Democratic Party), Luis González Brito (Communist Party), Fernando Pacheco Bustamente (Socialist Party), Mauricio Smok (UDI, Independent Democratic Union), Fernando Manzur (Communist Party), Cristian Weibel (Communist Party) and Alejandra Muñoz (UDI).

<u>Participatory mechanisms</u>

The local government of Recoleta not only promotes COSOCs, public accountability (*cuentas públicas*) by the end of each April, Municipal Council sessions, and Cabildos which are mandatory for all municipalities but also fosters citizen participation through open schools (*escuelas abiertas*), neighbourhood commissions at health centers and PLADECO (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal*). One of the most deeply rooted and well known participatory spaces is *Juntas de Vecinos* and Safety Committees (*Comités de Seguridad*) that work in neigbourhood units (*unidades vecinales*). The *Junta de Vecinos* board is formed by a President, a first Director, a second Director, a Treasurer and a Secretary, and has legal status. There are two delegates per street who are chosen by neighbours in an assembly. In addition, Mayor Jadue also created people's pharmacies and public optometrists to facilitate access to medication and glasses at a lower cost than in the rest of the country; people's libraries and bookstores for increasing access to culture. These initiatives were proposed by the mayor based on people's needs and social problems such as poverty and inequality, particularly among the elderly (D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; E. Lineski, p.c., March 12, 2019; L. Scudero, p.c., March 12, 2019; C. Yañez, p.c., March 7, 2019; SINIM, 2019).

Furthermore, as was mentioned before there is a specific office called DIDECO which manages departments and programs for improving civil society capacities for self-organization, planning and local development. Also, there is a participatory planning process through PLADECO (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal*) which allows neighbours to discuss and define their priorities to enhance their communities. In Recoleta, there are many thematic PLADECOs such as plans for women, youth, immigrants, sport and territory. Indeed, the municipality asks neighbours about their main development problems and their priorities to decide where to invest municipal capital (N. Cuevas, p.c.,

March 6, 2019). Citizens can also participate and make proposals to improving their communities through a national project called "*Quiero a mi barrio*" ("I love my neighbourhood"), but resources for this initiative come from the national government. However, this municipality does not implement participatory budget processes due the lack of economic resources. In addition, COSOCs are not able to attend Municipal Council sessions, nor are they able to ask for information without a previous request to municipal councillors and the mayor. Voting in municipal elections is not mandatory in Chile so political participation is very low (N. Cuevas, p.c., March 6, 2019; D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; F, Pacheco, p.c., March 5, 2019).

In 2017, the municipal government established an Office of Diversity, Non-Discrimination and Social Inclusion and a Program for Indigenous People of Recoleta, along with other social programs for refugees, immigrants, the LGBTQ community and people with disabilities at DIDECO with Resolution 1315 (Municipality of Recoleta, 2017). This program promotes the social inclusion of indigenous people in this urban area of Santiago, based on a decolonization and human rights framework to counteract historical socio-cultural discrimination. For that purpose, this program established the *Mesa Intercultural de Pueblos Originarios* (Intercultural Board of Indigenous People) in 2013 in order to work on different issues such as education, housing, sport, work and dances. This initiative had to overcome different challenges such as the lack of self-organization and cohesion among indigenous communities in Recoleta, the historical social exclusion of indigenous people in that urban area and the lack of coordination between them (Arancibia, 2017: 13).

In addition, these Mapuche communities settled in Recoleta in the context of a historical process of migration from rural areas (the traditional Mapuche territory or *Wallmapu*) to urban ones, a migration pattern driven by economic reasons (unemployment, lack of

drinking water, lack of land, difficulties to access public services) forming the so-called "*diaspora cultural*" or cultural diaspora (Arancibia, 2017: 17). This migration, which started in the first decades of the twentieth century and continues throughout this century because of economic and socio-cultural factors, impacted the cultural identity of Mapuche communities, which had to face discrimination, racism, exclusion and violence in the urban area. Mapuche had to recreate and protect their cultural traditions and spirituality in a new cultural environment (Chihuailaf, 2006). Although all these cultural activities and participatory spaces are important for promoting Mapuche social cohesion in this municipality, they do not impact PD outcomes such as their participation in municipal governance or decision-making processes in local government. Mapuche political participation is still very incipient in this local community and most of their engagement with the municipality is related to the promotion and recognition of their culture, language, ceremonies, traditions and their symbolic spaces such as cemeteries, but there is no evidence of an increase in political participation in local government (M. González, p.c., May 5, 2020). For that reason, while recognizing the substantial proportion of Mapuche and indigenous inhabitants in this urban municipality and the evolving political recognition of this fact, I have decided to not classify Recoleta as an indigenous municipality comparable to Perquenco. Further discussion of the critera used to classify municipalities in this study are available in Chapter 3.

Local development

According to the National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (CASEN) conducted by the Social Development Ministry in Chile, almost 7% of the population of Recoleta lives in poverty measured by household income (SINIM, 2019). This survey also measures the socio-economic conditions of households in terms of their access to health, education, employment and housing. The main development problems of this

municipality according to its residents are poverty, insecurity related to immigration, transport, infrastructure (roads, paving) and pollution (Focus group, March 30, 2019). As for the mayor the main problem is an inability to manage local problems because of the lack of economic resources and the unequal distribution of economic resources among municipalities. In addition, Recoleta has received immigrants from Peru, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Palestine in the last few years that may cause different conflicts with Chileans because of the lack of local employment and differing customs. Another important problem is the low quality of education in high schools and the insecurity caused by drug trafficking. Clientelism and corruption have been deeply rooted in this municipality for many years due to the right-wing party that impeded efficient and transparent municipal management (D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; N. Cuevas, p.c., March 6, 2019; F. Manzur, p.c., March 7, 2019; M. Smok, p.c., March 6, 2019).

According to social leaders and representatives of civil society, as well as participating citizens, the most challenging development problems in Recoleta are infrastructure; the lack of professionals at health centers and the insufficient hospitals; insecurity; poverty, particularly in the periphery of Recoleta; unemployment; drug trafficking; and immigration which causes conflicts with local residents because of differing customs and the lack of local employment. Migrants suffer from discrimination and xenophobia (E. Lineski, p.c., March 12, 2019; G. Espinoza, p.c., March 12, 2019; D. Troncoso, March 3, 2019; C. Yañez, March 7, 2019; CH #31-40, March 8-13, 2019). The main objectives of the Community Development Plan (PLADECO) for 2014-2018 are: to enhance the standard of life in Recoleta through strategies such as improving infrastructure and promoting cultural and sportive activities; to improve land planning; to protect the environment; to foster municipal management in terms of transparency, decentralization, efficiency and control mechanisms; and to promote economic production and small

businesses. The motto of the municipality is "*Vivir mejor es possible*" ("Living better is possible") and the municipal government proposes different plans and programs to achieve these goals, including citizen participation such as citizen participation schools, participatory planning process and a participatory budget program based on the idea that "*Recoleta somos todos*" ("Recoleta is all of us") and on prioritizing human development (PLADECO, 2018).

Resources and capabilities

Recoleta has 630 municipal officials in total of which 248 are permanent staff who run the municipal education system, which manages nineteen educational institutions (primary schools, high schools such Juanita Fernández, Valentín Leteier, kindergartens and vocational school "Pedro Donoso") and a municipal health system that manages five health centers (SINIM, 2019; SUBDERE, 2018; Focus group, March 30, 2019). This municipality receives around CAN $ 121,927 per year from the Incentive Fund for the Improvement of Municipal Management (*FIGEM*); CAN $ 1,920,323 from the National Municipal Regional Development Fund; CAN $1,254,560 from the National Regional Development for Education and CAN $ 41,055 from the National Regional Development for Health. This municipality manages around CAN $ 50,288,769 in total per year of income, of which CAN $ 6,907,999 comes from the Municipal Common Fund representing 14% of its income (SINIM, 2018).

Recoleta has several departments and offices which promote citizen participation, capabilities for self-organization, local governance and development, such as the Community Development Department or DIDECO, the Management and Planning Office, Department of Community Organizations and the Local Social and Economic Development Department (Municipality of Recoleta, 2020; L. Ahumada, p.c., March 6,

2019; G. Repetti, p.c., March 7, 2019; C. Manríquez, p.c., March 7, 2019; A. Pizarro, March 7, 2019). However, according to social leaders and representatives of civil society, municipal officials who are responsible for promoting citizen participation in *Unidades Vecinales* (Neighbourhood Units) are not enough or are not committed enough with their work in communities (F. Pinares, p.c., March 12, 2019). Furthermore, this municipality has designed a Community Regulatory Plan which allows them to plan and organize the use of land in a sustainable way. In addition, Recoleta has had a Territorial System of Information called IDE Chile (*Infraestructura de Datos Geoespaciales*) since 2013; the system is a strategic tool for planning and implementing municipal policies in the municipality (F. Chaves, p.c., March 4, 2019).

Social and community resources

This municipality has chosen its COSOC for the period 2019-2023, and it is constituted by 12 representatives from *Juntas de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Boards); eight representatives from functional community organizations (*organizaciones comunitarias funcionales*) such as Elders' Clubs, Mothers' Centers, sport and culture clubs, committees; one representative from public interest organizations; and two representatives from unions (Persian market and Patronato merchants). Recoleta has almost 2000 civil society organizations, 49 Neighbourhoods Boards, and unions of merchants related to cemetery services and historical markets. According to leaders and representatives of civil society, they have grown their capacities for self-organization and their commitment to community and solidarity. Indeed, Recoleta is a very participative community (L. Scudero, p.c., March 12, 2019; Focus group, March 30, 2019; Municipality of Recoleta, 2019).

Cultural identity

The cultural identity of Recoleta was formed around historic places and buildings such as catholic parishes and monasteries, established by Franciscan and Dominican orders during the eighteenth century in the colonia era; the influence of the foundation of the city of Santiago; trade development and neighbourhood markets; and Palestinian migration and commercial activities from the post-colonial era to the present. Recoleta and Independencia communes were located at *La Chimba* which means "on the other side" in Quecha language, because it is located to the north of Mapocho River where Incas communities built their cities and gardens. Recoleta comes from the Latin word "recollectus" which means retreated, because this place was used for prayer by Franciscan and Dominican monks. A socio-demographic transformation due to migration occurred between 1830 and 1870 in Recoleta, including an increase of the local population, particularly working-class people, and the establishment of irregular settlements throughout the territory. In addition, some indigenous communities settled in the White Hill (*Cerro Blanco*); and then, San Cristóbal Hill (*Tupahue* in Quechua language) and Metropolitan Park were founded. Recoleta is also characterized by historical places such as the Patronato neighbourhood where, the Palestinian community, which first settled in 1960, continue to be present. Palestinians immigrated to Chile in three waves, the largest of which was in 1890. They immigrated to Chile because of religious persecution they faced when Israel was established. They found some geographical similarities between Chile and Palestine, such as a desert climate. The first wave of Palestinian immigration arrived in the La Vega and Cemetery, in the south of Recoleta (F. Manzur, p.c., March 7, 2019).

Recoleta is also characterized by a social movement that claimed land (*tomas*) for the working-class population in the 1960s (F. Manzur, p.c., March 7, 2019). Therefore, the

socio-cultural identity of Recoleta was influenced by Palestinian immigration, working-class neighbourhoods, commercial activities, religious orders such as Franciscans and Dominicans, symbolic and historical buildings such as churches and cemeteries, and the Bohemian neighbourhoods like Bella Vista. Nowadays, Recoleta is like a bridge between the North and the South of the city of Santiago. Commerce is still the main economic activity in this municipality. Furthermore, the recent immigration from Venezuela, Haiti, Colombia and Peru has been changing social relations, cultural customs and traditions in many neighbourhoods of Recoleta. For some social leaders and representatives, it is considered a very participative community with a long history of political and social participation in the Communist Party and civil society organizations since the presidency of Allende (F. Pinares, p.c., March 12, 2019; Interview CH #39, March 13, 2019).

5.2.c <u>Municipality of Empedrado</u>

<u>Local government</u>

Local government[32] is led by Mayor Manuel Báez Fajardo, a nurse, currently serving his first term as mayor, but he was a municipal councillor in previous periods. He belongs to the *Unión Democrática Independiente or UDI-Vamos Chile* (Independent Democratic Union) and to the Regional Chapter of Mayors and Councillors of the Association of

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[32] The Municipal Councillors of Empedrado are Berta Bravo, who was elected as municipal councillor for the second time and who also belongs to *UDI*; Patricio Peñailillo, who belongs to the center-left political party Radical Social Democrat Party (*PRSD*). Peñailillo was the first Mayor of Empedrado during the period 1992-1996, after the dictatorship. Indeed, the current term is his 4th fourth period as municipal councillor and he was the chair of the staff of the Mayor in Constitución for seven years. He also worked in regional government as the chair of the staff of the Intendente of Maule Region. Currently, he is a consultant for the deputy Alexis Sepúlveda Soto and the Regional President of Councillors. Rosa Opazo Rojas has belonged to *UDI* for two years, and this is her first term as municipal councilor. She is currently the President of the Housing Commission and she used to participate in the *Junta de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Board). Other councillors include: Fernanda Arellano, who belongs to the right-wing political party *Renovación Nacional* (National Renovation); Mario Villanueva, who belongs to *IND*; and Ricardo Opazo, who also belongs to *IND* (M. Baéz, p.c., April 2, 2019; P. Peñailillo, p.c., April 4, 2019; R. Opazo, p.c., April 3, 2019; B. Bravo, p.c., April 9, 2019).

Chilean Municipalities. The Municipality of Empedrado belongs to the Association of Municipalities formed by almost 200 municipalities in the whole region.

Participatory mechanisms

In Empedrado there is no COSOC because of the requirements established in the current COSOC legal framework and regulations about these civil society organizations, and neighbours do not understand the importance of COSOCs for the whole community and local government (D. Orellana, p.c., April 5, 2019). However, the municipality promotes meetings and spaces along with civil society organizations in order to discuss priorities and define the main strategic goals for local government (M. Báez, p.c., April 2, 2019; P. Peiñailillo, April 4, 2019). A participatory budget is organized once a year, and a planning process, or PLADECO is conducted alongside local community members. The PLADECO is led by the Municipal Planning Secretary (SECPLAN). The PLADECO is considered the main space for citizen participation, particularly for territorial organizations, in local government (R. Opazo, p.c., April 3, 2019; D. Orellana, p.c., April 5, 2019).

This Community Development Plan (PLADECO) has to follow these steps: 1) Collect information within the community about the primary development issues such as health, culture, and education, without local authority participation; 2) Sistematize of all the information collected in order to design the annual plan for four years; 3) This plan is reviewed by the mayor and municipal councillors in order to bring up new issues and to complement the information provided by representatives of civil society. The priorities are defined and the plan is approved by the mayor and municipal council; 4) Once the plan is approved, mayor presents a report on PLADECO's progress to municipal councillors, municipal officials, representatives of civil society such as Presidents of

Neighbourhood Boards, community leaders, and to all community (B. Bravo, p.c., April 9, 2019; H. Barrera, p.c., April 4, 2019; D. Orellana, p.c., April 5, 2019; B. Retamar, p.c., April 9, 2019; C. Rojas, p.c., April 9, 2019; PLADECO, 2014).

Although Municipal Council sessions are open to citizen participation, neighbours are not aware of them and are furthermore not permitted to participate without previous permission from the Mayor. These Municipal Council sessions are organized in a small office, so it would be very difficult for open citizen participation (CH # 87, April 10, 2019). Furthermore, there are some spaces promoted by civil society, such as Communal Unions, that organize meetings with social organizations and neighbourhood boards in order to discuss their main development problems and social needs (M. Tejo, p.c., April 5, 2019). Finally, forestry companies such as Arauco and Mininco foster some participatory processes, called "forestry dialogues" among local, national and international actors in order to improve local development. These participatory processes promote cooperation and exchange of information among actors like the NGO *Reforestemos Chile*, academics from the University of Talca, the Municipality of Empedrado, CONAF, local producers, forest companies (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council-Chile) and International NGOs like the World Wildlife Found (A. Hormazábal, p.c., April 11, 2019).

Local development

The main development problems of Empedrado are the lack of employment after the last fire which destroyed almost 95% of pine forests, as well as the lack of firms interested in investing in this territory. Indeed, one of the most challenging problems is the lack of self-confidence and adaptability to find or create alternatives to the forestry industry after the devastating fire. Indeed, locals who are not able to become farmers or mushroom

producers emmigrate to urban areas such as Talca or Constitución. Other development problems are the lack of educational institutions; the low level of citizen participation, the limited self-organization capacity and lack of social cohesion; the lack of drinking water in rural and urban area since there is 60% of its shortage; addictions; pollution; and poverty (17%). In addition, Empedrado does not have enough connectivity with other cities; its current roads are too dangerous, and there is limited public transport, particularly in rural areas. Furthermore, the majority of services, commerce and businesses are located in Talca or Constitución (B. Bravo, p.c., April 9, 2019; M. Báez, p.c., April 2, 2019; P. Peiñailillo, p.c., April 4, 2019; R. Opazo, p.c., April 3, 2019; CH #80-89, April 4-11, 2019; Focus group, April 11, 2019; SINIM-CASEN, 2018).

According to the PLADECO (2014: 159) the main strategic goals for local development in Empedrado are: To strengthen the primary health system; to improve public infrastructure in the whole territory; to improve the quality of the education system; to improve sustainable territorial development; to contribute to cultural development; to contribute to territorial integration; to contribute to workforce qualifications and to strengthen the participation and autonomy of social organizations. Finally, the main strategic goals for regional development are: To reduce indigence, poverty and territorial inequalities in the region; to increase economic competitiveness through the forestry industry and the expansion of local tourism; to improve community health; to reduce illiteracy within the population under sixty years old; to improve income distribution taking into account territorial and gender inequalities; to improve housing policies and enhance public services; to foster employability; to strengthen social capital; to ensure sustainable development; to promote the local cultural identity recognition and to strengthen local government capabilities (PLADECO, 2014:11).

<u>Resources and capabilities</u>

In terms of resources and capabilities, this municipality has around 380 municipal officials in total, of whom 22 are stable staff; more than 30 officials work in health centers and around 220 work at municipal educational institutions. Most municipal officials live in Empedrado and Talca (M. Báez, p.c., April 2, 2019; SINIM, 2018). However, according to some municipal councillors, more education and training are required in order to manage local government properly and to avoid clientelism in the municipal administration. Empedrado designed its *PLADECO* for the period 2014-2018 but does not currently has a Regulatory Plan. This Municipal *PLADECO* is designed based on the Regional *PLADECO*, but the Regional *PLADECO* does not take into account the Municipal one (R. Opazo, p.c., April 3, 2019; P. Peiñailillo; p.c., April 4, 2019). Since 2015, there has been a department which depends on the *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario* or *DIDECO* (Community Development Direction). This department fosters self-organization capacities of civil society organizations, promotes social tourism, and supports Neighbourhood Boards and social programs managed by a social worker (D. Orellana, p.c., April 4, 2019; P. Ortega, p.c., April 11, 2019; SINIM, 2018).

This municipality does not receive economic resources from the Incentive Fund for the Improvement of Municipal Management (FIGEM), but it does receive CAN $ 367,696 from the National Municipal Regional Development Fund. Empedrado manages four educational institutions, which cover 87% of educational services in the community, and one health center (CESFAM: *Centro de Salud Familiar*) thanks to a subsidy from the national government (ministries). This municipality manages CAN $ 3,869,242 in total per year of income of which CAN $ 2,871,029 (74% percent of total income) comes from the Municipal Common Fund (SINIM; 2018). However, municipal councillors consider

that these economic resources are not enough in order to manage all social problems and needs of Empedrado (R. Opazo, p.c., April 3, 2019).

Social and community resources

In terms of social and community resources, there are some important organizations such as CONAF or *Corporación Nacional Forestal* (National Forestry Corporation), a central agency that enhance local capabilities in order to face challenging situations such as fires and climate catastrophes. Furthermore, the *Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario* or *INDAP* (Agricultural Development Institute) is an organization that works with agricultural organizations and coordinates with the Intendente (FOSSI) to apply for different projects (M. Báez, p.c., April 2, 2019). In addition, ARAUCO, a forest industry company, fosters self-organization capacities in Empedrado as well as management abilities in order to propose economic development projects through different workshops and networking processes for residents (A. Hormazabal, p.c., April 11, 2019).

Empedrado has seven social and cultural organizations such as a Football Club, three Elders Clubs and four Neighbourhood Boards which work in Neighbourhood Units and churches (Catholic and Evangelicals). Each Neighbourhood Board requires at least ten members in rural areas and fifteen members, who must be over the age of 14, in urban areas. Candidates for the presidency of this Neighbourhood Board require at least one year of membership (D. Orellana, p.c., April 4, 2019).

Solidarity, commitment, and capabilities of social networks and committees are the main community resources in Empedrado that have been useful in managing environmental catastrophes, such as the last forest fire in 2017 and the earthquake in 2010. Indeed, there are many housing and water committees in rural areas (Focus group, April 11, 2019; M. Tejos, p.c., April 5, 2019). However, civil society still requires support for self-

organization since there are many illiterate people, mostly the elderly because many members of that generation had to work rather than attending primary school. Neighbours must learn how to manage and organize *Juntas de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Boards) as well as to participate in municipality accountability processes (D. Orellana, p.c., April 4, 2019; P. Ortega, p.c., April 11, 2019).

Cultural identity

Empedrado was established as a municipality in 1891, but before that time, a small town called San José de Cuyuname was founded, where indigenous communities known as Picunches used to live; Incas had also historically settled in this territory. In 1639, the first religious order, Jesuits, arrived and began to evangelize indigenous communities not only by teaching religion but also by building shipyards, churches and houses (Arellano, 2003: 7-10). Therefore, the Catholic Church has influenced the socio-cultural identity of Empedrado since its origin. Indeed, the most popular festivals and traditions in the present are related with religious ceremonies and feasts such as the Immaculate Conception Feast on 8th December; the San Ignacio Feast on 31st July; the San Francisco de Asís, who is considered farmers protector on 4th October; Our Lady of the Rosary on 24th October; the night of San Juan and Santa Rosa (B. Retamar, p.c., April 4, 2019; M.Arellano, p.c., April 5, 2019; Arellano, 2003: 35-44).

Another important factor in cultural identity in Empedrado is the forestry industry, which is based on pine and eucalyptus forests and a native species of tree from the oak family, the *ruil* (Notofagus alessandri), which have contributed to the construction of local identity over decades. In fact, this municipality is known as the *La Comunidad del Oro Verde* (Green Gold Community) because of its green landscape. Popular boats known as *faruchos* which were made of *ruils,* the typical trees in this area (A. Hormazábal, p.c.,

April 11, 2019). Finally, there are some significant and tourist places which are still part of the current socio-cultural identity of Empedrado such as the temple of the San Ignacio Parish, which was built in 1884 and has resisted two earthquakes: in 1835 and in 2010; the local museum created by Manuel Arellano; the *ruiles* forest located 20 kilometres far from urban area; the rural traditions and customs; and the cobbled floor (Arellano, 2003: 30-34).

Chapter 6: <u>Comparing the Uruguayan and Chilean processes of decentralization</u>: *Territory as the main factor to explain PD outcomes.*

In this chapter, a comparison between experiences with decentralization in Uruguay and Chile at the municipal level over the course of a decade will be presented in order to investigate the effect of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization outcomes in both actors, local government and civil society.

This socio-cultural dimension of territory is understood to consist of four sub-components: 1) Social relations, 2) Power relations, 3) Identities and 4) Imaginaries. Regarding the effect on the state, this research studies participatory decentralization in terms of: 1) the existence of mechanisms for accountability; and 2) the quality of representation of political leaders and municipal officials. With regards to civil society, this study analyzes: 1) the existence of a relationship between local government and civil society in terms of co-governance, co-management and networking, so-called horizontal governance; 2) the appropriation of channels and spaces for accountability promoted by local government; and 3) the capabilities and skills for decision-making processes in the improvement of local development. These variables imply that civil society undergoes a learning process, internalizing skills and values; analyzing and proposing alternatives; and the existence of synergy, coordination and solidarity among different local actors.

The intervening variable is the political project and institutional arrangement of participatory decentralization in both countries. The political project of participatory decentralization in Uruguay has been centered on political and social decentralization through strengthening citizen capacities for decision-making processes and civic engagement in local government, increasing participatory planning processes, transparency of representativeness and autonomy.

The most widely applied institutional arrangements in Uruguay are the Municipal Annual Plan and Cabildos, which have been implemented in the three selected cases in the last several years. However, the Participatory Budget and Participatory Planning have been implemented only in Municipality A but in a very incipient way in the Municipality of Santa Rosa.

The political project of decentralization in Chile has been focused on reforms to the legal framework, institutional design, administrative decentralization, effectiveness and efficiency and the transfer of jurisdictions from the national level to the local level, such as education and health services, but without the required economic and human resources. The most widely applied institutional arrangements in Chile are the *PLADECO* or *Plan de Desarrollo Comunitario* (Community Development Plan) and Juntas de Vecinos (Neighbourhood Boards), which have been implemented in the three selected cases. However, other participatory spaces like COSOCs and Participatory Budget have not been implemented in all of them (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1

Political Project & Institutional Arrangements by municipalities.

National Political Project & Institutional Arrangement in each country		
Selected case studies in both countries	**Uruguay**	**Chile**
	Political Project: Focused on Political & Social Decentralization led by FA. **Institutional Arrangements:** Municipal Annual Plans, Cabildos, PB, participatory planning.	**Political Project:** Focused on Administrative Decentralization, Legal Framework, Efficiency and Effectiveness led by *Concertación* and *Renovación Nacional*. **Institutional Arrangements:** PLADECO, PB, COSOCs, *Juntas de Vecinos.*
Rural, low socio-economic level and ethnic group	**Municipality of Isidoro Noblía** (Municipal Annual Plan, Cabildos)	**Municipality of Perquenco** (PLADECO, COSOC, PB, Juntas de Vecinos)
Rural, low socio-economic level and non-ethnic group	**Municipality of Santa Rosa** (Municipal Annual Plan, Cabildos, consulting process)	**Municipality of Empedrado** (PLADECO, PB, Juntas de Vecinos)
Urban, low socio-economic level and non-ethnic group	**Municipality A** (Municipal Annual Plan, Cabildos, Participatory planning and budget)	**Municipality of Recoleta** (PLADECO, COSOC, Juntas de Vecinos, open schools)

Social relations influence PD outcomes in local civil society in terms of the existence of horizontal governance (e.g. social networks and co-management experiences) in a specific territory, since this style of governance requires high levels of communication between individuals, as well as high self-organization capacity in order to propose and to find solutions for the residents' particular social problems and needs (Castel, 2000: 5-24; Delamaza, 2012: 22-26; Weber, 2002: 3-47). In addition, social relations also impact the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, which suppose empowerment and informal learning processes in local civil society (Avritzer, 2002: 165-171). Therefore, social relations also contribute to capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of civil society in order to foster local development. Consequently, strong social relations foster horizontal governance, high appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for

accountability, and high capacity and skills for decision-making processes in local civil society. On the other hand, weak social relations impede horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and are correlated with low capacity and skills for decision-making processes in local civil society (Baiocchi & Silva, 2008; Veneziano, 1999: 2-28)**.**

Concerning power relations, the relationship between political leaders, institutional actors and citizens characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism has an influence on the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability (Auyero & Benzecry, 2016: 221-246; Avritzer, 2002: 165-171; De Souza, 2005; Falleti, 2010:15-20). More vertical relationships between political actors and representatives from civil society tend to reproduce clientelism and paternalism instead of promoting genuine processes for accountability through spaces such as *Cabildos*. On the other hand, more horizontal relationships tend to foster learning and empowerment processes in social leaders, to improve transparency in government, and to increase the legitimacy of political and institutional actors. In addition, strong relationships between social leaders and citizens foster citizens' capabilities to propose improvements for local development (Baiocchi & Silva, 2008; Veneziano, 1999: 2-28).

Traditional/disengaged identities based on isolation and conservative values and customs influence participatory outcomes in both actors: local government and civil society (Weber, 2002: 3-47; García & Baeza, 1996). In fact, traditional identity, which implies the historical exclusion and discrimination of ethnic groups (e.g. Afro-descendants in Uruguay and Mapuche community in Chile), can contribute to the insufficiency or lack of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; authoritarian leadership; the lack of or difficulties for self-organization and weaker skill and capability development for decision-making processes in civil society. On the other hand, a more modern and

cohesive identity, which integrates and includes ethnic and cultural diversity, produces a horizontal, transparent and qualified leadership of political leaders and promotes empowering spaces and mechanisms for accountability as well as capabilities for self-organization and decision-making processes of civil society.

Finally, strong connection with the land, trust between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity related to social problems and needs, impact civil society in terms of its engagement for building horizontal governance through synergy between local government and civil society and motivation for political participation (Escobar, 2008: 206-208; Anderson, 2006; Sartre, 2006: 4-16). Furthermore, these kinds of imaginaries influence the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by local government. However, weak connection with land, distrust between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics constitutes an issue very far from social problems and needs, or an activity related to corruption and clientelism, cause apathy, and reduce motivation to collaborate with local government, and to achieve a political charge such as mayors or municipal councillors; and to be engaged in community spaces.

Therefore, as previously explained, the three cases -two rural municipalities and one urban municipality in Uruguay- are compared with their corresponding cases in Chile, based on the method of difference or the most-similar design (George & Bennett, 2005). The main difference in the comparison of this study is the political project and institutional arrangements in Uruguay and Chile, and these are studied by comparing the paired cases in the two countries (e.g. rural case study # 1 in Uruguay and rural case study # 1 in Chile). The comparison between rural/ethnic group cases, holding the same political project, permitted the identification of an ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality effect on participatory outcomes within one country. The comparison between rural/non-ethnic group and urban/non-ethnic group, holding the same political project, permitted the

identification of the geographical residence effect within one country. If the three municipal cases in Uruguay evidenced national similarities, and the three municipal cases in Chile also revealed national similarities, but that the Uruguayan cases were different from the Chilean ones, then we may infer that political project is the most important factor to explain the PD outcomes. In more nationally similar cases, one could infer the political project effect on participatory outcomes within one country. However, if the cross-country comparisons between the matched municipal cases exhibited more important similarities than the three cases do within each country, then we may infer that the socio-cultural dimension of territory is more important factor to understand PD outcomes than the political project. Thus, the political project is not the key factor to explain the differences between the case studies, but territory results crucial to understanding the participatory decentralization outcomes.

This study examines the dependent variable (participatory decentralization outcomes or what degree of commitment with participation and what kind of participation) in all its possibilities: failure or success. Based on the hypothetical effect of the political project on participatory decentralization outcomes in both countries, this research expected to find more political power, autonomy and resources within the municipalities in Uruguay than in Chile. In addition, this investigation expected to discover more spaces, channels and mechanisms for political participation, decision-making, accountability process, horizontal governance networks and quality of representation promoted by the local government in Uruguay than in Chile. Finally, related to civil society, deeper empowerment, learning processes in terms of internalization of skills, values and abilities to analyze, decide and propose alternatives for improving local development as well as appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability were expected in Uruguay than in Chile. Furthermore, more synergy, coordination and solidarity among different

local actors through social networks, as well as the relationship between local government and civil society in terms of co-governance, were expected in Uruguay than in Chile.

Regarding comparisons within one country, less empowerment, capacities, learning, and skills for decision-making processes on the part of civil society were expected among municipalities with a higher percentage of ethnic groups than among municipalities without them since this population has been historically excluded from political participation in both countries. In addition, fewer experiences of horizontal governance were expected to be observed among local communities with ethnic groups in both countries. However, the study also explicitly considered the possibility that grass-roots alternatives to participation in the official decentralization project may exist and may be more attractive to citizens, especially among marginalized groups like Afro-descendants and Mapuche communities. Another expected difference in terms of capabilities, experiences and skills for political participation and for improving local development is that between rural and urban municipalities. Therefore, a comparison between rural/ ethnic group cases within Uruguay and Chile was analyzed in order to identify the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on participatory decentralization outcomes within each country.

However, the cross-country comparison between rural/ ethnic group cases permitted the observation that these similarities were stronger than those found within each country. Indeed, as had been expected, less experiences of horizontal governance, less empowerment and learning processes, capabilities and skills for decision-making processes on the part of civil society among rural municipalities with a higher percentage of ethnic groups than among municipalities without these groups were found in this study in both countries, regardless of which political project was being implemented. In addition, fewer spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and lower quality of

representation were observed among municipalities with ethnic groups in both case studies of Uruguay and Chile. Regarding the political project on decentralization (intervening variable), less devolution of political power, resources and autonomy were observed among municipalities with ethnic groups in both case studies of Uruguay and Chile, regardless of which political project (left-wing *FA,* in Uruguay or the right-center *UDI* in Chile) had being implemented in these countries in the last years.

On the subject of the effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes, the comparison between the rural/non-ethnic group and urban/non-ethnic group case studies, permitted the identification of the effect of geographical residence within one country. The lowest performances in terms of accountability, quality of representation and local development were found among rural municipalities. In addition, the lowest improvements in terms of devolution of political power, economic and human resources were also found among rural municipalities no matter which political project on decentralization had been implemented in the previous years. However, the cross-country comparison of similar municipal cases (rural; urban; rural and ethnic) revealed greater similarity in PD outcomes than seen across municipal cases within a single country. Consequently, the most important factor to explain participatory decentralization outcomes in terms of success or failure is the socio-cultural dimension of territory, not the political project of decentralization in each country.

6.1 The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes: *More cross-country similarities than national one.*

In this section of Chapter 6, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes within one country is analyzed in Uruguay and Chile, based on the main findings of this study. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between municipalities regarding the presence of a significant ethnic group (large percentage of Afro-descendant population in Uruguay; Mapuche communities in Chile), and keeping some control variables such as the socio-economic level (low), the geographical residence (rural), and the same intervening variable such as the national political project of decentralization within one country (Uruguay/Chile), constant. The comparison within a country (type two) between rural/ethnic group cases allow one to identify the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on participatory outcomes in each country. This comparison is graphically represented in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2
Comparison within a country: Effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD.

Type 2: Effect of the Ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD within a country (Uruguay)			Type 2: Effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD within a country (Chile)		
	Case studies			Case studies	
	Isidoro Noblia	**Santa Rosa**		**Perquenco**	**Empedrado**
Ethno-cultural dimension	**Yes**	**No**	**Ethno-cultural dimension**	**Yes**	**No**
Geographical residence (rural)	Yes	Yes	**Geographical residence (rural)**	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic level (Low)	Yes	Yes	**Socio-economic level (Low)**	Yes	Yes
Political Project (Uruguay)	Yes	Yes	**Political Project (Chile)**	Yes	Yes
Comparison of the Effect of the Ethno-Cultural Dimension while holding geog. residence, socio-economic level and political project constant			**Comparison of the Effect of the Ethno-Cultural Dimension while holding geog. residence, socio-economic level and political project constant**		

In addition, a cross-country comparison between the rural/ethnic group case studies in both countries is presented in order to understand the ethno-cultural effect of the territory versus the influence of the political project on the participatory decentralization outcomes in these countries. Although the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD proves evident in both countries, there are some differences between rural Afro-descendant communities of Uruguay and rural Mapuche communities of Chile in terms of their historical and current situation of discrimination and exclusion (Borucki, Chagas & Stalla, 2004:159-173; Sandoval & González, 2010: 31-40).

While it may not be surprising that rural municipalities having a significant disadvantaged population are less able to benefit from PD, the lack of impact of the national PD project results very surprising. In this context, the relevant questions are: Why does the PD project have such little impact on rural municipalities? Why do similarities in terms of PD outcomes between municipalities with ethnic groups remain, no matter which national political project (led by left-wing political party FA or by the center-right Renovación Nacional) was implemented in the recent years? Previous or pre-existing capabilities and socio-cultural dimensions embedded within a territory, such as weak social relations, vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identities—which include structural, rooted and historical racism against Afro-descendant population in Uruguay and Mapuche communities in Chile—and distrustful imaginaries seem to be the answer.

6.1.a The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Uruguay: *Comparison within one country*

In this section, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes within one country is analyzed based on the main research results. The case studies selected to compare the rural/ethnic group case study and the rural/non-ethnic group case study in Uruguay were the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía and the Municipality of Santa Rosa. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalities regarding the presence of a significant ethnic group (large percentage of Afro-descendant population), and keeping some control variables—the socio-economic level (low), the geographical residence (rural area)—and the same intervening variable—the national political project of decentralization within one country (Uruguay)—constant.

Firstly, regarding social relations, although both municipalities have developed some self-organization capacity through NGOs, neighbourhood committees, small social networks and social clubs in the recent years, both communities are characterized by weak social relations. Indeed, they do not have enough social cohesion or self-organization capacity to satisfy their social needs or to find solutions for their development problems. Therefore, citizen participation in spaces and mechanisms promoted by local government such as Cabildos is still characterized by the prevalence of individualism and particular claims. Furthermore, neighbours tend to advocate only for improving their particular situation and for receiving more benefits. Indeed, the interviews suggested that they are not committed enough to collective interests or the common good of their communities, nor are they able to collaborate and work together with municipal authorities in terms of co-governance (De León, M., p.c. November, 6, 2018; Cabrera, F., p.c. November, 6, 2018; G. Rodríguez, p.c. November 30, 2018). Weak social relations in both municipalities also

lead to a high dependence on political leaders and municipal officials in order to find solutions to their social needs and problems. Consequently, charismatic leadership tends to fill the gap to assist individuals who remain dependent and isolated from their community (A. Domínguez, p.c. September, 27, 2018; E. Gutiérrez, p.c., September 28, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September 28, 2018). For instance, the municipal councillor of Isidoro Noblía, E. Gutiérrez, explained that "the only person who talks during Cabildos is the mayor; people do not ask for information and do not control local government, they only advocate for/speak on behalf of their own benefit".

V. Ferreira, another municipal councillor in this municipality, expressed that "Cabildos are used for political interests by the Mayor". However, more skills and capabilities for decision-making processes by civil society have been developed in Santa Rosa than in Isidoro Noblía due to the promotion of spaces of citizen participation, social cohesion and engagement, such as social networks and socio-cultural activities to discuss and solve development problems. In addition, pre-existing social relations, which are stronger in Santa Rosa than in Isidoro Noblía, have facilitated more citizen participation and engagement in the official meetings and cultural activities promoted by the municipality in Santa Rosa. For instance, A. Lemus, a social leader of this community, expressed:

> In Santa Rosa, we have a social network in which many organizations and institutions participate, such as CAIF (*Centro de Atención a la Infancia*), the health center, the children's club and the Municipality. This social network organizes many social events for the community, such as the march on the 20th of November, International Children's Day. The health center always organizes workshops on different topics and coordinates with the Municipality.

Another social leader, W. García, stated: "In Santa Rosa, cultural festivals like Pan y Vino (Bread and Wine) are very popular and people participate to help migrants or to support people who suffered floods last year."

A participating citizen, the manager of the Windmill of Santa Rosa, explained:

> I was born in Santa Rosa, on a farm. I live in Empalme, Route 6 and 11. My grandfather emigrated from the Canary Islands (Spain) to Uruguay. My family used to work in cattle racing and they were members of the Rural Commission of Santa Rosa. I worked at the productive cooperative Windmill of Santa Rosa that was established in 1999. I supported this cooperative after the economic crisis in 2002. This windmill was founded in 1925 by Campomar, a company of Juan Lacaze. Its building is a historical heritage that used to be a pasta factory where almost 300 women worked. In 1960, the windmill started to produce flour and wheat and became a productive cooperative thanks the cooperativism tradition in Uruguay. I also belong to a FA committee (MPP) and work with a Baby Football commission of Santa Rosa. Nowadays, the cooperative has 80 members; 70 are partners, and others are employees.

Secondly, regarding power relations, the relationship between political leaders and citizens has been historically characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism in both municipalities. This kind of relationship has influenced the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos in both communities. However, Cabildos are more used for campaigning and deepening dependence instead of promoting autonomy and cooperation between local government and citizens in Isidoro Noblia than in Santa Rosa because political leaders are more influenced by caudillism and clientelism in this municipality than in Santa Rosa. Indeed, municipal councillors in Isidoro Noblía

do not know which issues will be presented in the Cabildos; P. Beck, a municipal councillor, explained that "we do not know much about Cabildos, what kind of issues will be discussed there." He concluded that "the mayor talks for around an hour and a half but people are bored." In addition, although there are some spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation in both municipalities (e.g. Cabildos, public audiences); the relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders and representatives from civil society tend to be more vertical in Isidoro Noblia than in Santa Rosa. This vertical power structure correlates with the insufficient genuine mechanisms and spaces for citizen participation, the difficulties to build horizontal governance based on dialogue, and the lack of collaboration and synergy between local state and civil society (e.g. planning processes), in both municipalities—but particularly in Isidoro Noblia where traditional identity, which implies the exclusion of ethnic groups (Afro-descendants), has influenced local government and civil society for decades.

Municipal Councillor V. Ferreira stated:

> The only space for citizen participation is the Cabildo, but it is used for political objectives by the Mayor. The few people who participate do not ask for information or to work together in the municipality. To me there is no genuine citizen participation. We as councillors would like to call for citizen participation but we do not know if we can do it. The mayor does not allow us to organize meetings with neighbours to promote citizen participation. Some people participate in social networks, NGOs, and spaces promoted by the national government but not by the Municipality.

A representative from civil society (A. Domínguez), the director of a rural high school, also explained: "The government does not want to lose power, control and resources.

People are afraid to be part of local government; they do not participate in local government. Decentralization is a very slow process here because people are accustomed to receiving assistance from the government".

However, in both municipalities, there are some alternative spaces for citizen participation that are not promoted by the local government. For example, the Rural Development Boards known as *Mesas de Desarrollo Rural* are promoted by the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía. This alternative space of citizen participation has fostered informal learning processes about governance, empowerment, autonomy and skills among small farmers, particularly among rural women, who have become able to improve their local development in recent years (P. Beck, p.c., September 29, 2018). Municipal Councillor P. Beck explained: "When people started to participate in *Mesa de Desarrollo Rural*, they felt that they could speak up for improving their lives; rural women requested information about enterprises. People met a national minister for the first time in their lives. They felt that their voices were heard." In addition, the production cooperative *Las Roseñas,* created by rural women, has improved not only the living conditions of these women but also has fostered their capabilities and skills for self-organization, decision-making, learning, empowerment and self-esteem in the last few years in *Puntas del Pantoso*, Santa Rosa. For instance: F. Reyes explained: "I think machismo is still rooted too deep in rural areas. Although women work hard in the countryside, only men manage the family's financial resources. I founded this women's group to change this situation, and to help women to improve their opportunities" (F. Reyes, p.c., January 21, 2019).

In Santa Rosa, there are more interesting experiences of co-management between municipality and civil society than in Isidoro Noblia such as the band Santas Latas, created by young people and supported by the municipality. In addition, neighbourhood

markets, cultural events and even economic entrepreneurship are co-organized by social organizations and the municipality in order to promote not only local development but also to integrate immigrants from Cuba and Venezuela in recent years: *Feria de las Culturas, Pan y Vino* and *Molino de Santa Rosa* Festivals (M. De León, p.c. November, 6, 2018; C. Reyes, p.c. January, 30, 2019). Furthermore, dependent and clientelistic power relationships influence the current quality of representation in terms of qualification, legitimacy and transparency in both case studies, particularly in Isidoro Noblia; in both municipalities, however, the leadership of mayors tends to be more charismatic and paternalistic than empowering and collaborative. The Municipal Councillor E. Gutiérrez explained that "the mayor is a populist; he likes helping people in order to receive people's approval and to get their votes for the next elections, not for the sake of helping people".

Municipal Councillor P. Beck concluded: "The mayor never explained the municipal budget to us. One day we realized that he had taken some money from the municipality for helping a woman who wanted to take some lessons in the capital Melo or something like that. He likes to be loved by people" (E. Gutiérrez, p.c., September 28, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September, 28, 2018; A. Lemus, p.c., November 30, 2018; A. Sorondo, p.c., September 28, 2018). Finally, the relationship between social leaders and citizens is still too weak in both municipalities to allow for sufficient capabilities for decision-making processes or for initiatives to improve living conditions in their communities. This weakness is deeper and more evident in Isidoro Noblia than in Santa Rosa because of the historical exclusion of this territory on the border with Brazil; the consequent isolation of its population; and the authoritarian and paternalistic leadership of political leaders (J. Marrero, p.c., November 30, 2018; A. Lemus, p.c., November 30, 2018).

Regarding some aspects of the political project—considered an intervening variable—an insufficient devolution of political power and resources from the departmental and national governments to the local government and a consequent lack of autonomy was observed in both municipalities. In fact, although national government as well as the Intendencia of Canelones and the Intendencia of Cerro Largo transfer economic resources to the Municipality of Santa Rosa and to the Municipality of Isidoro Noblia respectively, these local governments are not still able to define or implement their own local development policies nor to manage their own municipal staff. An incipient process of decentralization has started in the last ten years in Uruguay, but many difficulties are still evident in terms of autonomy, local management and planning processes in both municipalities.

Thirdly, these local communities are characterized by historical traditional and conservative values and customs; by rooted individualism; by isolation; and by dependence on political leaders called *caudillos,* who used to belong to traditional political parties such as *Partido Nacional*. This traditional, conservative and disengaged identity influences the current lack of spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation and accountability; the lack of or obstacles to self-organization; weaker skills and capabilities for decision-making processes in civil society; and the authoritarian, charismatic and paternalistic leadership style of political leaders. However, the most difficulties are observed in the municipality with the presence of an Afro-descendant population, such as that settled in the small town *Medio Luto* in Isidoro Noblía. These Afro-descendant rural communities have suffered doubly from historical isolation, political and cultural exclusion, and discrimination from the national government from the time of slavery to the present in Uruguay. For instance, one of the participating citizens of Isidoro Noblía (UY # 41) expressed: "Medio Luto used to be a refuge of

escaped slaves like the *quilombos* in Sertao (Brazil). The first population came from there".

Another participating citizen explained (UY # 43):

> In the past, there were two social clubs in Melo: one for Afro-descendants and the other for white people. White people were not allowed to enter the Afro-descendants' club and viceversa. Discrimination was very common in the whole country. I remember when I was a child my mother asked the teacher not to allow us to share the school bank with Afro-descendant children. Parents used to prohibit their kids from talking to or having Afro-descendants as friends. In rural areas, Afro-descendants couldn't enter to the houses of white people at all. They worked only for food and shelter but they did not receive a salary like the rest of the people did. When I was at school, my Afro-descendant classmate could not enter my house. It was prohibited for Afro-descendants to join military forces or to access some private schools so I think Uruguay is a racist country.

Another participating citizen (UY #42) stated: "Afro-descendants tend to be isolated, and I can understand why. In the past, they couldn't enter the Los Potros Club for example. Neither Afro-descendants nor prostitutes could enter there. Los Potros Club used to belong to the Partido Nacional."

From observations in the field, it was possible to verify the extreme poverty and isolation suffered by the last families who live in Medio Luto. This small village, located half an hour from Isidoro Noblía, is formed by about ten poor houses built in the middle of a ravine, made of wood and tin (*ranchitos*), named with the same names of the farmers where they used to work as rural workers (*peones*), without sanitation and only recently with drinking water and electricity. One of the most shocking things is to find a bull skull

in the entrance of this village with the sign: *"Este es el fin del mundo"* ("*This is the end of the world*"). Access to this village is very precarious, through unpaved roads. The researcher visited the place through two municipal councillors; one of them has a farm facing the village and the other knows the people very well, as a resident of Isidoro Noblía. Most of the families are formed of a woman as the head of household, with an average of five children; also a grandmother, who live all together in small rooms. Children only attend school N° 28 on Fridays, but if it is raining they are not able to move from their houses because there are no streets and their houses become surrounded by mud. This school is located near the small village; it is a very old building, where kids of various ages receive lessons and can access information and a world that it is very far from them. During the fieldwork, the teacher complained about their situation: the school and the village are too isolated, and public policies do not reach them. Walking around the village, an Afro-descendant woman of about 70 years agreed to be interviewed. She explained that she used to walk 50 kilometres per day to work in Aceguá as a housemaid. She also showed her kerosene cruet (*alcuza*), a tool that was very common in Medio Luto for lighting houses until electricity was installed by the national government some years ago. Some of the houses are painted in a very colourful way. Chickens are always around; children do not have toys, but they have dogs and are accustomed to playing outdoors.

In addition, during the fieldwork, the mayor of Isidoro Noblía invited the researcher to visit some of the poorest families of this town, who receive economic assistance or benefits, such as tickets for travelling to Melo; for example, some children who are suffering from diseases and require medical assistance which is not provided in Isidoro Noblía must travel to Melo. All these families demonstrated admiration and thankfulness toward him. The mayor walked around the town like a charismatic leader, greating everyone with great sympathy.

This territory has been historically marginalized by the central political power, so its population has not had access to public policies and services such as education, health and housing for decades; consequently, these communities are still extremely poor and vulnerable. Caudillism and clientelism have also influenced this political and cultural exclusion of rural Afro-descendant communities, as local leaders have been much more interested in getting votes and political power than in promoting empowerment and equity within these local communities. This situation has had an impact on the current weak institutional capacities and difficulties for improving co-governance capabilities and legitimacy of local political leaders like mayors and councillors. According to the Director of High School of Isidoro Noblía, A. Domínguez, "people do not participate in Cabildos because they are accustomed to receiving assistance from the government. People do not believe in collective actions or in engagement with local government".

Finally, both communities are characterized by weak interaction and trust between neighbours and groups, and by the belief that politics is an activity very far from their social problems and needs, or an issue only related to corruption and clientelism. These imaginaries negatively impact engagement in civil society, implementing horizontal governance as well as the current motivation of political leaders like mayors and councillors. For instance, political leaders in Isidoro Noblía do not have political motivation for playing their roles as they are not affiliated with political parties, but they do have social and even religious motivations to work to improve social conditions of municipal residents. For instance, Municipal Councillor A. Sorondo explained: "I don't want to be a politician, I just want to serve and help people. I have no political interest." (F. Freire, p.c., September, 27, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September 28, 2018; G. Gutiérrez, p.c., September, 28, 2018; A. Sorondo, p.c. September 28, 2018).

V. Ferreira concluded: "I love working for my community, but not to get a political position. This is more about personal achievement, to feel better and help people. I don't like politics." G. Gutiérrez clarified: "I have never been in a political meeting of the Partido Nacional. I don't follow political advice" (F. Freire, p.c., September, 27, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September 28, 2018; G. Gutiérrez, p.c., September, 28, 2018; A. Sorondo, p.c. September 28, 2018). Politics is understood by neighbours as an activity frequently associated with corruption which only aims power and status—not as an activity related to people's everyday lives or one capable of improving their communities. Therefore, neighbours are not interested in politics and they are not well informed about municipality structure or the roles of municipal councillors and mayor (W. García, p.c., December 15, 2018; Interviews UY # 63-72, December 2018-February 2019).

To summarize, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Uruguay is observed through the comparison between two case studies: the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía and the Municipality of Santa Rosa. The social and political exclusion of ethnic groups like Afro-descendants in Isidoro Noblía, particularly in *Medio Luto*, influences PD outcomes in both actors: local civil society and government.

In terms of local civil society, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality was evidenced by deeper difficulties in building horizontal governance; by more challenging obstacles to the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and by the lower capacity and skills for decision-making processes and local development in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblia than in Santa Rosa. Indeed, Afro-descendant rural communities have suffered doubly from historical isolation and exclusion since the time of slavery to present in Uruguay. This territory has been historically marginalized by the central political power, so its population had no access to public policies for decades; these communities are still extremely poor and vulnerable.

In addition, Isidoro Noblía is characterized by a traditional, conservative and disengaged identity which contributes to a more fragile and dependent civil society than that in Santa Rosa. Afro-descendants are still not able to participate in spaces and mechanisms promoted by local government or in self-organization. They remain dependent on political leaders who tend to be like *caudillos* in this rural area (P. Beck, p.c., September 29, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September 28, 2018).

Regarding local government, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality was observed in the greater insufficiency spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by the municipality, and by the lower quality of representation in Isidoro Noblía than in Santa Rosa. In fact, caudillism and clientelism have influenced the local government in Isidoro Noblía much more than in Santa Rosa since local leaders have been much more interested in getting votes and political power than in promoting empowerment and equity within these local communities (P. Beck, p.c., September 29, 2018; E. Gutiérrez, p.c., September 28, 2018; V. Ferreira, p.c., September 28, 2018).

6.1.b The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Chile: *Comparison within one country*

In this section, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes within Chile is analyzed based on the main research findings. The comparison between the rural/ethnic group case study and the rural/non-ethnic group case study in Chile was made by studying the Municipality of Perquenco and the Municipality of Empedrado respectively. To better analyze the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality in Chile, it is important to study how the socio-cultural dimension of territory, measured in social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries, influences PD outcomes in the local state in terms of accountability and quality of representation; as well as in civil society in terms of horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and capabilities for decision-making processes in both municipalities. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalities regarding the presence of a significant ethnic group (a large percentage of Mapuche population), and keeping some control variables such as the socio-economic level (low), the geographical residence (rural area), and the same intervening variable such as the national political project of decentralization within one country (Chile), constant.

Firstly, although both municipalities have many social organizations, social relations are still very weak, influencing the lack of horizontal governance, insufficient appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and low evidence of skills for decision-making processes needed to solve development problems in civil society. However, the Municipality of Perquenco suffers from more isolation and less communication between groups than the Municipality of Empedrado, because of the historical socio-economic and political exclusion of Mapuche communities in its territory; Mapuche communities

remain highly isolated and have the lowest socio-economic levels in the whole *La Araucania* region. For instance, the President of the *Junta de Vecinos* and Luciano Cayul Mapuche community member, V. Cayul, explained: "I think these meetings between the mayor and representatives from the community are not useful. There is no participation, just listening to municipal officials. I used to participate in them, but now I am not going anymore". Furthermore, Municipal Councillor Miguel Lara Valdevenito stated:

The Mapuche are not included in political life; they do not have any political representation. They aspire to access the national Parliament, but there is no minimum quota for indigenous people in Chile. They advocate for their autonomy and land to create their own municipality. In Perquenco there are about 23 Mapuche communities that were known as "reducciones" (indigenous settlements) in the past. The Mapuche population has been disminishing for years. Nowadays, they are named as La Laguna, Pitriqueo, Cayul, and so on. Their exclusion is historical in Chile. They mostly work on farms, in cattle raising. They are in conflict with the national and regional government, so they organize many demonstrations to advocate for their lands and drinking water. We have many forestry companies in Perquenco such as Arauco. They pushed families to sell their lands. The eucalyptus trees damage the land because this kind of tree absorbs too much water. These territories used to belong to the Mapuche who were deceived by the settlers (*colonos*) because Mapuche were illiterate. Thus, the Mapuche exchanged their lands for alcohol and goods. There is a movement which is led by a Mapuche mayor from La Araucanía. This movement uses the Internet to organize Mapuche demonstrations in the region. Mapuche communities rejected the last consultation process led by the national government.

Furthermore, O. Liencheo, the Lonko of La Laguna Mapuche community in Perquenco explained:

> There is not a good representation system of Mapuche in the national government. Each president starts from zero and does not take into account our historical struggle. Unfortunately, there is no political representation of Mapuche. We should have a Mapuche political party at the national level. One of the reasons is that Mapuche leaders are corrupted by others, even Mapuche lawyers. The national history was written by powerful men without taking into account our situation. For us, as the Mapuche community, it does no matter if we live a democratic government or not, because all governments are the same. Currently, the government represses the Mapuche in different regions: VIII, IX and in Los Ríos. The worst enemy of the Mapuche is the national state because it blames us for the fires in La Araucanía. Also, the landowners blame Mapuche and call them "terrorists." Mapuche leaders are persecuted by *Carabineros*, who spy on them. There is no dialogue. The government distorts Mapuche actions, so we are criminalized by police. We do not have enough economic resources to defend our rights.We would like a space to dialogue and to advocate for our basic rights: education, health, housing and jobs. I proposed many ideas during the indigenous consultation but nobody listened to us. The regional government offers CAN $ 500 through the social plan namely "*Plan Impulso*" to the Mapuche communities that do not cause conflicts with the national government. However, this plan seeks to control the Mapuche. The national government is the same, no matter which political party is in power (UDI or Concertación, Piñera or Bachelet). Mapuche people receive a subsidy of CAN $154 per month—this is nothing. Transnational companies do not promote local development in our territories.

During the fieldwork, the researcher observed many fires along the train route from Victoria to Perquenco. The flames and thick smoke in the fields seemed dangerous in some parts of that route. However, people appeared not surprised for that emergency situation. Each day, some passengers discussed and complained about them and the persistent conflict between some Mapuche communities, particularly in Ercilla, and the regional government during that trip. Staying in Victoria, sirens alerted local firefighters. Local neighbours in Victoria are accustomed to sirens during the afternoon *siesta* period.

There are some participatory planning processes, such as *PLADECO* (Development Community Plan), which allows leaders and representatives of civil society to advocate for their needs and expose development problems in both municipalities, and some initiatives of participatory budgeting in rural and urban areas such as *FONDEVE* (Neighbourhood Development Fund) in Perquenco. There is not, however, horizontal governance in terms of collaboration and synergy between local government and civil society, nor a genuine decision-making process. Difficulties in and obstacles to horizontal governance are more structural and more deeply rooted in Perquenco than in Empedrado because of the historical exclusion of Mapuche communities in its territory (V. Cayul, p.c. March 15, 2019; M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; O. Liencheu, p.c., March 15, 2019; G. Sanhueza, p.c. March 15, 2019; A. Sepúlveda, p.c., March 15, 2019). For instance, Municipal Councillor G. Sanhueza explained: "I don't like our Participatory Budgeting because resources go for the biggest social organizations; it's like a competition. The local high school always wins the PB elections but smaller organizations do not have the opportunity to win. PB should be organized by sectors or issues. Also, people are not accustomed to participating and thinking about their community as a whole. More civic education is needed." In addition, G. Sanhueza, also stated:

The Mapuche never could get a political position in the Municipality. The rural population is the most excluded from the political and social life in Perquenco. Half of the total population is located in a rural area. People are scattered. There were some rural schools, but now there is only one, because the mayor decided to close them for economic reasons. In this rural area, people usually work on local farms called "*fundos*." Other people have to move to Temuco city or to Lautaro to get a job. In Perquenco there are about 23 Mapuche communities. Their conflict with the state was caused because of Mapuche advocacy for lands. The Mapuche lost their lands because they were illiterate and were cheated. New generations are now trying to recover their lands. There are many fires in this area but I am not sure who is causing them.

Furthermore, the Municipal Councillor Claudia Urrutia argued:

People do not participate because they are accustomed to receiving help from political leaders. On the other hand, I think Municipal Councillors should be able to participate in the bi-monthly meetings between the mayor and social leaders of Perquenco. Councillors should be able to contact them and work all together. In other municipalities they participate in these kinds of meetings. The mayor wants to limit Councillors' actions. We are only able to control the mayor but not to implement any projects. The problem is the redistribution of political power, because we as Councillors can be candidates for deputation. Mayors seek a political career, so they impede Councillors to get more political power.

Throughout the two focus groups applied in Perquenco, Municipal Councillors (MC) and social leaders/representatives from civil society in Perquenco discussed the most significant obstacles and difficulties to promote citizen participation in this community.

Participants discussed bi-monthly meetings between members of local government (mostly the mayor and some officials) and social leaders from civil society promoted by the mayor. However, social leaders did not know that MCs were prohibited from participating in these meetings. MCs opined that their role in the municipal government has been too restricted so the PD implementation became too difficult. Also, some of them explained that the mayor's leadership does not contribute to improving PD. In the course of this discussion, social leaders were able to dialogue and exchange information with MCs, particularly regarding the current local government performance and their roles in this process. MCs also explained that they are not able to promote spaces for accountability because of the lack of resources. The mayor does not allow MCs to transmit complete municipal sessions to all the community, only their speeches by radio (Radio Lautarísima), by TV (Channel Lautaro Visión) or on Facebook. The necessity of interaction between these local actors was evident and reflected the lack spaces and mechanisms for building and deepening co-governance in Perquenco.

Weak social relations also lead to high dependence on political leaders and municipal officials by neighbours in both municipalities. Indeed, neighbours tend to depend on charismatic leaders (e.g. *caudillos*) in order to solve their problems, while remaining isolated from their community. Although there are some institutionalized spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation, such as the Communal Council of Civil Society or *COSOC* and Neighbourhood Boards (*Juntas de Vecinos*), individuals do not sufficiently participate in them or are not able to make decisions or become empowered citizens through their participation in these spaces. In addition, according to interviews, neighbours tend to think about their individual problems and needs instead of thinking about the collective good. For instance: C. Espinoza, the secretary of the water committee in the Municipality of Empedrado concluded that "very few people like participating;

people are waiting for solutions from local government but do not want to spend time on meetings. Neighbours complain about the municipality and the mayor because they expected more solutions from them". M. Tejos, the president of the communal union in Empedrado, explained that "people do not belive in local government and even though we call them at our assembly at Junta de Vecinos, very few people come" (V. Cayul, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Espinoza, p.c. April 4, 2019; P. Peiñailillo, p.c., April 4, 2019; CH # 56 & 60, March, 2019).

Concerning power relations, the relationship between political leaders, institutional actors and citizens has been characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism in both municipalities and this relationship has influenced the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos, *PLADECO* meetings and *COSOCs.* These *COSOCs* are not well appropriated by social leaders and representatives from civil society, so they are not able to influence local government policies. In addition, although *Juntas de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Boards) are the most common spaces of citizen participation in both municipalities, according to interviews, neighbours are not sufficiently engaged in them, as they expect solutions from local authorities but do not want spend time working for their communities. Participatory budgeting has been implemented in Perquenco in the last years but these experiences do not promote a genuine collective empowerment process of neighbours who are principally interested in their particular projects. Consequently, individualism remains prevalent in these local societies. The Vice-President of COSOC in Perquenco, M. Yañez, stated that "COSOC is not taken into account by the municipality and we do not have enough power to influence government. Citizen participation is too low in Perquenco and people expect the government to solve all their problems" (V. Cayul, p.c. March 15, 2019; D. Yañez, p.c. March 18, 2019; C. Espinoza, p.c., April 4, 2019; A. Sepúlveda, p.c. March 15, 2019).

The Mapuche are organized in communities based on their traditions, beliefs and relationship to land in Perquenco. They also have their own community leaders, or *lonkos*. Although most of these leaders are not interested in participating in local or regional government and in fact question the legitimacy of these institutions, some are making claims for better access to political representation within the Chilean political system as mayors, councillors and deputies. A group of Mapuche leaders are leading an alternative social movement which has been in conflict with the national and regional governments for decades. This social movement denounces the historical and continued violation of human rights of their communities, such as the repression and criminalization of their protests by the regional and national governments, the lack of freedom of speech, the lack of access to land and the lack of access to basic services like drinking water (O. Liencheau, p.c., March 15, 2019; R. Lemonao, p.c., March 21, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, March 21, 2019).

G. Pitriqueo, the representative of Mapuche communities in Chile, and the leader of Ignacio Pitriqueo community, located in the Municipality of Perquenco, explained:

> The municipality does not promote any space for the Mapuche community, and it is not aware their problems. The municipality imposes their own agenda. Thus, the Mapuche have organized themselves to promote their rights because they do not trust politicians. They are independent. They are concerned about the earth (air, plants, water, ecosystem) but from their own perspective, one which is very different from the huinca.

The historical vertical relationship between political actors and social leaders from civil society (including Mapuche leaders) has reproduced clientelism and paternalism instead of promoting genuine processes of empowerment of citizenry in both municipalities.

Therefore, the transparency and legitimacy of mayors and other local politicians are questioned by social leaders in these rural municipalities. Indeed, R. Lemonao, the leader of the Mapuche women's organization Newen Domo Mapu, in Perquenco, stated that "the Mapuche do not have any political parties because we feel politicians use us for their own interests. Municipal councillors have information about projects but they do not visit our organization. I think we are politically excluded as Mapuche in our community. I still need more training to become a political leader. I never talk about politics in my organization; we promote our Mapuche culture and customs" (R. Lemonao, p.c., March 21, 2019). Furthermore, the relationship between social leaders and citizens is not developed enough for citizens to be able to advocate for themselves and propose improvements in their communities.

Concerning the devolution of political power, a component of the political project (intervening variable): even though the national government has transferred significant jurisdiction such as education and health to the Chilean municipalities, Perquenco and Empedrado do not receive enough human and economic resources to manage these services. In addition, the municipalities do not have enough autonomy or qualified professionals to implement local programs that would combat unemployment caused by natural disasters such as fires and earthquakes. Although the process of decentralization started many decades ago in Chile, significant challenges and difficulties are still observed in terms of local autonomy for managing and planning at the local level as well as of the lack of economic and human resources (L. Muñoz, p.c., March 14, 2019; M. Lara, p.c., March 14, 2019; G. Sanhueza, p.c., March 15, 2019; M. Báez, p.c., April 2, 2019; B. Bravo, p.c., April 9, 2019; P. Peiñailillo, p.c., April 4, 2019).

Traditional identities based on conservative values and customs, disengagement and dependency on authoritarian leaders and isolation influence participatory outcomes in

both local government and civil society. In fact, traditional identity drives the tendency of political leaders to be authoritarian and charismatic. In addition, this kind of representation is questioned by councillors and social leaders, since mayors tend to be individualistic and do not develop team working. Indeed, Chilean presidentialism is strongly reproduced at local level. Furthermore, traditional and disengaged identity is partly responsible for the current obstacles to the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, the lack of self-organization capacity, and weak skills and capabilities for decision-making processes of civil society. This disengaged and conservative identity affects skills, self-esteem and social cohesion more in Perquenco than in Empedrado, because of the historical social exclusion and discrimination against Mapuche communities by the national and regional governments in its territory (V. Cayoul, p.c., March 15, 2019; O. Liencheo, p.c., March 15, 2019; R. Lemonao, p.c., March 21, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, p.c., March 21, 2019).

Although the Mapuche community in Perquenco is characterized by a strong connection with land as part of their identity as indigenous people, they have not sufficiently developed self-organization capacities in order to advocate for their rights, because of the lack of trust in their own Mapuche leaders; because of internal conflicts; and because of lack of skills and strategies to address the Chilean political system. V. Cayul, a Mapuche leader from the Luciano Cayul community explained: "Mapuche do not vote for Mapuche. Mapuche do not trust Mapuche leaders. They do not have enough self-esteem. Chileans may vote for me, but not Mapuche people; and this situation is worst among Mapuche women". Some of their leaders do not believe in politics as a way to improve their communities. Also, although national government, through CONADI (*Coorporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena*), implemented a consultation process to design social programs for the Mapuche community to address its problems in recent

years, they have rejected this process because of the lack of trust in government and in this participatory mechanism. Mapuche communities, based on their recent experiences of criminalization and repression by national and regional governments, do not believe in politics nor do they trust Chilean politicians. However, some Mapuche leaders have created indigenous social movements to denounce and draw attention to the historical violation of human rights, to push for recovery of lands and natural resources, and to be recognized as a vital component of a multicultural nation. These alternative movements are considered by some Mapuche leaders to be more participatory and horizontal spaces than the official meetings promoted by local or national governments (R. Lemonao, March 21, 2019; O. Liencheo, March 15, 2019).

These kinds of imaginaries negatively impact the appropriation of the official spaces and mechanisms for accountability by the Mapuche community and reduces civil society capabilities and skills for official decision-making processes in Perquenco. Finally, the insufficient interaction between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity very far from their social problems and needs, or an issue related with corruption and clientelism, reduces civil society engagement, hindering implementation of horizontal governance and motivation of potential or new political leaders in both municipalities. Indeed, people tend to be apathetic about spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation that are promoted by the municipality, or expect the government to solve all their problems in Perquenco (V. Cayul, p.c., March 15, 2019; C. Espinoza, p.c., April 4, 2019; M. Tejos, p.c., April 5, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, p.c., March 21, 2019; M. Yañez, p.c., March 18, 2019; CH # 58, March 20, 2019).

To summarize, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Chile is observed through the comparison between these two case studies: the Municipality of Perquenco and the Municipality of Empedrado. The social and political

exclusion of ethnic groups like Mapuche communities in Perquenco influences PD outcomes in both actors: local civil society and government. When compared with the Municipality of Empedrado, the study observed that civil society in the Municipality of Perquenco faced greater challenges in building horizontal governance and in appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability, as well as lower capabilities and skills for decision-making processes and local development. In the arena of local government, the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality was evidenced by fewer spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by the municipality and by the lower quality of representation in Perquenco than in Empedrado. Furthermore, the Municipality of Perquenco is characterized by a traditional, conservative and disengaged identity which leads to a more isolated, fragile and dependent civil society than Empedrado. This community suffers from insufficient communication and trust between groups and organizations because of the historical socio-economic and political exclusion of Mapuche communities in its territory (V. Cayul, p.c., March 15, 2019; R. Lemonao, March 21, 2019; O. Liencheo, p.c. March 15, 2019; G. Pitriqueo, p.c., March 21, 2019).

6.1.c The effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes versus political project: *Cross-country comparison between Uruguay and Chile*

In this section, a cross-country comparison between the rural/ethnic group case studies in both countries is presented in order to understand the ethno-cultural effect of the territory versus the influence of the political project on the participatory decentralization outcomes in these countries. Although the effect of the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality on PD proved evident in both countries, there are some differences between rural Afro-descendant communities of Uruguay and rural Mapuche communities of Chile in terms of their historical and current situation of discrimination and socio-economic and political exclusion. While Afro-descendants were discriminated against and excluded from economic, political and cultural life—not to mention exploited by white bourgeoisie in Uruguay from slavery up to the middle of the nineteenth century, which has lasting impacts due to persistent exclusion through systematic and structural socio-economic and cultural inequalities—, the Mapuche were murdered or manipulated by colonizers and the Chilean state in the past, and criminalized and repressed by national and regional governments in the present (Borucki, Chagas & Stalla, 2004:159-173; Sandoval & González, 2010: 31-40).

As was explained earlier, there are two possibilities: 1) more national similarity between case studies allows one to observe a strong political project effect on participatory outcomes within one country. 2) However, a more cross-country similarity between case studies allows one to observe that the political project is not the key factor to explain the differences between PD outcomes; rather, territory proves crucial to explain the success

or failure of participatory decentralization in the selected municipalities. This analysis could be graphically represented as follows:

Table 6.3

Cross-country comparison. Effect of ethno-cultural dimension of territory on PD versus Political Project.

Political Project	Ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality (Rural + Low socio-economic level municipalities)		Comparison of the effect of Pol. Project while holding Ethno-cultural dimension constant
	Yes	No	
Uruguay (Pol. Project)	Isidoro Noblía	Santa Rosa	
Chile (Pol. Project)	Perquenco	Empedrado	
Comparison of the effect of ethno-cultural dimension while holding political project constant			

In relation to the cross-country comparison between the rural/ethnic group municipalities in Uruguay and in Chile, more similarities in terms of participatory decentralization outcomes are observed between them than within each country. Indeed, although very different political projects of decentralization have been implemented in these countries in the last decade, many similarities between the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Uruguay) and the Municipality of Perquenco (Chile) have been observed during this study. For instance, while the Chilean national political project of decentralization has been focused on reforms to the legal framework, institutional design, administrative deconcentration, effectiveness, efficiency, and transfer of jurisdictions such as education and health to the local level, the Uruguayan one has been centered on strengthening citizen capacities for decision-making processes and civic engagement in local government (social decentralization), and on increasing participatory planning processes and transparency of representativeness (political decentralization). However, both municipalities have experienced very similar participatory decentralization outcomes in

terms of the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and in terms of the quality of representation by the local government as well as in terms of horizontal governance, the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and capacity for decision-making processes by local civil society.

Concerning the devolution of political power—a factor related to the political project (intervening variable)—both municipalities suffer from limited autonomy and high dependence on regional departmental or national governments for economic and human resources (capabilities and training) and to make decisions about their territories. These municipalities do not have enough autonomy, nor do they have enough qualified professionals to implement local programs that would combat unemployment, poverty, pollution and homelessness. Indeed, although the political project of decentralization in Chile established the transfer of jurisdictions such as health and education policies to municipal governments, the delivery of these services is difficult because of the lack of infrastructure and economic and human resources.

In addition, these local governments face many difficulties to promote genuine spaces and mechanisms for accountability—such as Cabildos, public audiences, *COSOCs*, (Comunal Council of Civil Society), and community development plan meetings or *PLADECOs*—considering mayors, as political leaders, tend to use these mechanisms only for political fronting and for deepening dependence on them instead of promoting autonomy and cooperation between civil society and municipalities. The relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders and representatives from civil society tends to be more vertical than horizontal in both municipalities. Regarding quality of representation, the power relationship between political leaders and citizens is characterized by high levels of dependency, as citizens experience many difficulties to propose and seek their own solutions for development problems. Consequently, local civil

society tends to expect solutions from local government. The leadership of mayors tends to be more charismatic and paternalistic than empowering, motivating and collaborative in both municipalities. Too much political power tends to be concentrated in the office of the mayor while, according to the current legal framework in Chile, municipal councillors are not allowed to participate in municipal management or to promote citizen participation. Therefore, municipal councillors are very restricted in their roles by the legal framework, and sometimes also by mayors, since councillors do not receive enough economic resources to fulfill their roles nor sufficient training to participate in municipal government.

With regard to local civil society, both municipalities face similar challenges in terms of the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Uruguay) and public audiences and community development plans or *PLADECOs* in the Municipality of Perquenco (Chile). Indeed, these spaces and mechanisms are characterized by low citizen participation and the prevalence of individualism and self-serving requests by representatives from civil society and neighbours. In addition, these spaces neither sufficiently promote a sustainable and genuine engagement, nor permit a decision-making learning process related to participatory planning by participating citizens. Concerning horizontal governance, the relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders from civil society tends to be vertical in both municipalities. Therefore, there are not enough mechanisms and spaces for citizen participation nor participatory planning processes based on dialogue, collaboration and synergy between local government and civil society. Furthermore, there are not enough capabilities for decision-making processes or for initiatives to improve the quality of life of their communities since empowerment and informal learning processes are still too weak in both municipalities.

Both municipalities are characterized by traditional and conservative values and customs; by rooted individualism; isolation and dependence on political leaders that we may consider *caudillos*. This traditional, conservative and disengaged identity influences both actors: local government and civil society. Indeed, it impacts on the current lack of spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation and accountability, and on authoritarian leadership in local government as well as on the current difficulties for the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; on the lack or difficulties for self-organization and on the weak skills and capabilities for decision-making process of civil society. Furthermore, ethnic groups and communities like Afro-descendents in Uruguay and the Mapuche in Chile have suffered from historical discrimination, isolation, political and cultural exclusion by their respectively national and departmental/regional governments for decades up until the present. This historical exclusion also affected the observed challenges for civil society in improving self-organization, self-esteem and empowerment in order to participate and propose solutions at spaces and mechanisms for accountability at local level. These territories have been marginalized by central political power so their population had limited access to basic services such as education, health, housing and drinking water for decades and in some territories until recently. Consequently, these communities are still suffering from poverty and extreme poverty. Caudillism and clientelism have also influenced on political and cultural exclusion of these ethnic communities as well as on the current weak institutional capacities and difficulties for building co-governance capabilities and legitimacy of local political leaders like mayors and councillors.

However, there are some differences between rural Afro-descendent communities of Uruguay and rural Mapuche communities of Chile related to their situation of discrimination and the socio-economic and political exclusion suffered by these ethnic

groups historically and until the present: While Afro-descendants in Uruguay have been invisible to the national state and society over centuries and have had little influence on public policies in order to improve their living conditions until recent years, Mapuche communities have developed some capabilities to negotiate with the national authorities and to make their issues more visible to the broader society. Furthermore, Mapuche communities have been harshly repressed and criminalized by the Chilean state in the last decades, even during the democratic period, while Afro-descendants have been silently and subtly discriminated against and excluded from the socio-economic, cultural and political life in Uruguay, even though they have been important to the national economy since colonial times because of their labour before and after abolition (Borucki, Chagas & Stalla, 2004:159-173; Sandoval & González, 2010: 31-40).

While Mapuche communities have been the subject of specific policies and institutions to promote their capabilities for local development and to foster their culture in the last decades, social policies, laws to promote representation of Afro-descendants in governing bodies, and affirmative action for Afro-descendants in Uruguay are too recent and still insufficient to overcome past discrimination and social exclusion. Finally, Mapuche leaders have managed to obtain political appointments in the national and municipal government, and have developed some capabilities for self-organization to promote political participation within their communities. However, Afro-descendants have only managed to obtain some political appointments in the national government and very few in the municipal government, except for some positions in municipalities in the north of the country—mostly through clientelism. Their self-organization capacity, with some exceptions, has been more focused on civil society and Afro-descendant international networks than on the state.

On the other hand, there are some similarities: both ethnic groups have suffered from historical exploitation, discrimination and exclusion by Europeans since colonialism occurred in the Latin American region. This situation was also reproduced by the national state which was built based on Western values ('whitening,' the primacy of men over women, cultural homogenization) during the Independence period, and the influence of the conservative wing of the Catholic Church. Therefore, both ethnic groups and communities, particularly in some regions or departments of their countries, have suffered and still suffer from extreme poverty caused by unemployment, high illiteracy rates, fewer public services in their territories and rooted processes of marginalization and stigmatization.

In both countries, society has tended to normalize racism, discrimination and exclusion regarding Afro-descendants and indigenous people while national governments pretended to respect diversity through cultural programs, legal framework, and institutions that recognized and promoted ethnic expressions. For instance, Uruguay officially recognizes *Candombe,* recognized by Law N° 18.059; Carnival; customs; religious ceremonies (e.g. *Umbanda, Iemanja*); popular festivals; language (*Portuñol*); food; and football performances. However, all these actions have been insufficient to achieve political and socio-economic inclusion of these ethnic groups and communities. Although the approved legal framework and the institutions created in both countries, Mapuche and Afro-descendants still face many obstacles to citizen and political participation as well as to access to political power in the national and local government. They require genuine empowering spaces and mechanisms in order to develop their capabilities for leadership, for decision-making processes and for self-organization to improve their living conditions.

Finally, both municipalities are characterized by weak interaction and trust between groups and the belief that politics is an activity very far from their social problems and needs, or an issue related with corruption and clientelism. This imaginary negatively affects the ability of civil society to build horizontal governance and to negotiate with political parties or pursue political careers. This imaginary, which increases and reproduces structural racism, particularly influences ethnic groups like Afro-descendent and Mapuche communities, no matter which political project is leading the decentralization process in each country.

6.2 Effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes: *More cross-country similarities than national ones.*

In this section of Chapter 6, the effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes is analyzed in Uruguay and Chile. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between municipalities regarding geographical residence (urban or rural) in each country, keeping some control variables relatively constant such as the socio-economic level (low), no significant ethnic group (Afro-descendant population or Mapuche communities), and the same intervening variable such as the national political project of decentralization within one country (Uruguay or Chile), constant. This comparison could be represented graphically as follows:

Table 6.4
Effect of Geographical Residence on PD. Comparison within one country.

Type 2: The Effect of the Geographical Residence on PD within Uruguay			Type 2: The Effect of the Geographic Residence on PD within Chile		
Case studies characteristics	Municipality A	Santa Rosa	**Case studies characteristics**	Recoleta	Empedrado
Geographic residence (Urban/Rural)	Urban	Rural	**Geographic residence (Urban/Rural)**	Urban	Rural
Ethno-cultural dimension (Afro)	No	No	**Ethno-cultural dimension (Mapuche)**	No*	No
Low socio-economic level	Yes	Yes	**Low socio-economic level**	Yes	Yes
Political Project (Uruguay)	Yes	Yes	**Political Project (Uruguay)**	Yes	Yes
Comparison of the Effect of the Geographical Residence on PD, while holding Political Project, Ethno-cultural dimension and Socio-economic level constant			**Comparison of the Effect of the Geographical Residence on PD, while holding Political Project, Ethno-cultural dimension and Socio-economic level constant**		

*Although Recoleta does have an important Mapuche population, for the purpose of this research it was classified as non-ethnic case because its political relationship with the municipality differs from Perquenco, as discussed in the Methodology section of this thesis.

Furthermore, a cross-country comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group case studies in Uruguay (Municipality A) and Chile (Municipality of Recoleta); and a cross-country comparison between the rural/non-ethnic group case studies in Uruguay (Municipality of Santa Rosa) and in Chile (Municipality of Empedrado) are discussed in order to analyze the cross-country geographical residence effect versus the influence of the national political project on the PD outcomes in these countries. More similarities in the cross-country comparison were observed than within each country (regardless of which political project had been leading the process of decentralization). Moreover, as was expected, better PD outcomes in terms of building horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of civil society, as well as increasing promotion of spaces for accountability and quality of representation were found among urban municipalities with non-ethnic groups (low percentage of Afro-descendants or Mapuche communities) in both countries. Why do these differences between urban and rural municipalities exist no matter which political project is being implemented? Previous or pre-existing capabilities or socio-cultural dimensions embedded within territory, such as strong social relations, horizontal power relations, engaged identities and reliant imaginaries seem to be the answer.

6.2.a <u>The effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes in Uruguay</u>: *Comparison between urban and rural municipalities without a high percentage of ethnic groups.*

In this section, the effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes within one country is analyzed in Uruguay based on the main findings of this study. Regarding the comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group case study and the rural/non-ethnic group case study in Uruguay, the selected cases are Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa respectively. To better analyze the geographical effect in Uruguay, it is important to study how the socio-cultural dimension of territory—measured by social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries—influences PD outcomes in local states, in terms of accountability and quality of representation, and outcomes in local civil society, in terms of horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and capabilities for decision-making process in both municipalities. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalities with reference to the geographical residence (urban or rural), keeping some control variables relatively similar such as the socio-economic level (low), no significant ethnic group (Afro-descendant population), and a common national political project of decentralization.

Firstly, according to the findings, there are significant differences in social relations between Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa. Indeed, while social relations are very strong in Municipality A—in terms of interaction and communication between individuals, groups and organizations, and in terms of self-organization capacity to find solutions for communities' development problems through neighbourhood committees, social networks, civil society associations and social clubs—they are still weak in Municipality of Santa Rosa. High communication and interaction between

individuals, groups and organizations characterize the territory of working-class neighbourhoods such as *El Cerro, La Teja, Paso Molino* and *Prado* which are located in Municipality A. These strong social relations stimulate and facilitate the existence of horizontal governance, promoted by local government through systematic municipal sessions with neighbourhood councillors who represent three *CCZs* (Zonal Community Centers 14, 17 & 18) based on dialogue, synergy and collaboration in order to design, implement and evaluate municipal development plans. In addition, this municipality also promotes participatory budgeting, participatory planning processes (*PLAEDEZ*) and Cabildos, which imply high levels of civil society engagement with local government to foster local development (G. Otero, p.c., September 16, 2018; N. Moreira, p.c., November 9, 2018; M. Villasante, p.c., October 9, 2018; M. Ramírez, p.c., November 21, 2018; H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 2018; M. Pereyra, p.c., October 17, 2018).

For instance, the municipal councillor of CCZ 18, H. Coitinho, states:

> *Concejales vecinales* (neighbourhood councillors) created different commissions and work together with municipal councillors. A zonal planning team formed by professionals, local authorities and *concejales vecinales* work together in each CCZ. In this municipality, there are many social networks that work with local government. The municipality provides infrastructure, professionals, resources, money and transport. There is a strong relationship between the *Concejos Vecinales* of the three CCZs.

In addition, high levels of empowerment, informal learning, and self-esteem, which are required to achieve skills and capabilities for decision-making in civil society, are evident in this municipality. Indeed, Municipality A promotes different thematic social organizations (elders, health disabilities, addictions, and childhood), social associations

(*Quelavi*), cultural centers (*Centro Julia Arévalo*), community radios (*El Tejano*), social and sports clubs (*Club Progreso Club* and *Arbolito Club*) and around 24 neighbourhood commissions in *Paurú, La Vía*, and *Gori.* In fact, this municipality has around 60 social organizations in total (G. Otero, p.c., September 26, 2018; S. Silva, p.c., January 10, 2019; H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 2018; Focus group, December 12, 2018; Social and Resources Mapping, December 19, 2018).

Furthermore, strong social relations impact the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by local civil society in Municipality A, such as Cabildos and meetings between municipal councillors and neighbourhood councillors in which neighbours are able to experience informal learning about decision-making processes as well as a process to increase empowerment. Therefore, local civil society tends to be committed to collective issues such as social problems and needs and tends to cooperate with municipal authorities in terms of co-governance and co-management through different social networks and initiatives to improve their neighbourhoods. Mayor G. Otero explained that "Cabildos are mostly led by civil society, not by the mayor in order to achieve a kind of recognition within the community. Almost 700 people and 23 neighbourhood commissions participate in Cabildos in this municipality. Each one who wants is able to participate and talk about their needs and actions" (B. Bagnado, p.c., November 21, 2018; M. Ramírez, p.c., November 21, 2018; H. Coitinho, p.c., November 8, 2018; M. Pereyra, p.c., October 17, 2018).

A participating citizen of the CCZ 17 stated that "the mayor and councillors have developed good relationships with people; usually they present a report about how they fulfilled the people's needs. Neighbours can gain information about the whole Municipality. Cabildos are organized in different places so they are closer to people". However, the prevalence of individualism and self-interests characterize these

mechanisms for accountability in the Municipality of Santa Rosa. Weak social relations in Santa Rosa also contribute to a high dependence on political leaders and municipal officials by civil society for finding solutions to social problems and needs (De León, M., p.c. November, 6, 2018; Cabrera, F., p.c. November, 6, 2018; A. Lemus, p.c. November 30, 2018; W. García, p.c. December 15, 2018).

Secondly, regarding power relations—the relationship between political leaders and citizens—there are many differences between Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa. For instance, power relations in Santa Rosa have been historically characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism. This vertical relationship has influenced the current appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by local civil society such as Cabildos in this rural municipality. However, horizontal power relations between political actors and social leaders or representatives from civil society distinguishes Municipality A. Indeed, spaces and mechanisms for accountability and citizen participation such as Cabildos, participatory budgeting elections, meetings between municipal and neighbourhood councillors and participatory planning processes (e.g. *PLAEDEZ*) are not only well appropriated by social leaders (e.g. neighbourhood councillors, representatives of NGOs, unions, social networks, social clubs and neighbourhood commissions) and neighbours but also are used by local government for promoting autonomy, proposals and cooperation with Municipality A in terms of horizontal governance. Indeed, the CV M. Ramírez stated that "the municipal government organizes monthly meetings between CVs and municipal councillors in which we are consulted about development problems, such as infrastructure and environmental impacts of transnational forestry companies in this territory, like UPM." This horizontal power structure influences the quality of representation in this municipality, where political and social leaders are very well known and respected by neighbours—not because of their

authoritarian and paternalistic leadership, but because of their transparent, qualified, committed and empowering leadership. Indeed, relationships between social leaders and citizens is very strong in this municipality.

During fieldwork, observation was conducted in a meeting between municipal councillors and CVs led by Mayor Otero, at the headquarters of Municipality A located in La Teja. At least two CVs from each CCZ (14, 17 and 18) participated in this meeting, as did almost all municipal councillors. The mayor explained the objective of this meeting and promoted the exchange of information and discussion among participants. Each CV reported on their zone and presented the main issues and development problems of their residents, proposing some possible solutions in terms of coordination between different levels of government. Mayor and municipal councillors listened to CVs' concerns, analyzed possible solutions and agreed on their proposals. The meeting lasted about two hours and had a very friendly climate.

Furthermore, Neighbourhood Councils and Participatory Budget elections were observed in Municipality A throughout the whole process in November 2018. This observation was conducted mostly in CCZ 18, thanks to the collaboration of social workers. This research activity was focused on the engagement and participation of neighbours responsible for the voting process, as well as on citizen participation during the process. The training of those responsible for the voting process was conducted by social workers. Some voting circuits were visited, along with social workers in the CCZ 18 (Paso de la Arena, Rincón del Cerro, Paurú, Punta Espinillo, Santiago Vázquez and Gori), and in the CCZ 17 (Cerro) and interviews were applied to some participating citizens at random. Neighbours were engaged in these participatory mechanisms and well organized to support the elections. Most of the circuits were installed in very public and well known places to facilitate neighbors' access to voting. Indeed, some circuits were set up in particular homes. Citizen

participation was constant through the whole day, particularly in some neighbourhoods such as Cerro and Paso de la Arena.

There are also differences between Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa in the intervening variable (political project), such as devolution of political power and transfer of economic and human resources by departmental and national government to local government. While the Intendencia of Montevideo has been devolving political power and transferring economic and human resources to local government since the CCZs were established by the decade of 1990, the Intendencia of Canelones has experienced many obstacles to the devolution of political power and to the transfer of resources to its local governments. Therefore, Municipality A has had more autonomy in designing and implementing its own local development policies—through participatory planning processes, participatory budget elections and economic resources—than the Municipality of Santa Rosa, where an incipient process of administrative deconcentration and political decentralization have started in the last ten years.

Thirdly, identity in Municipality A is characterized by more modern values and customs, a collective mindset, and strong social cohesion and autonomy. This modern and collective identity positively influences the existence of spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by local government; horizontal, transparent and empowering leadership; and self-organization capacity and skills for decision-making processes of civil society. However, the Municipality of Santa Rosa is distinguished by more traditional and conservative values and customs, by disengagement, isolation and dependence on *caudillos* or authoritarian leaders. This traditional and disengaged identity contributes to the lack of spaces for accountability; the tendency toward charismatic and paternalistic leadership; and the obstacles and difficulties for self-organization and for decision-making processes of local civil society. Regarding imaginaries, Municipality A

is characterized by strong interaction and trust between individuals, groups and organizations in working-class neighbourhoods like *La Teja, El Cerro, Paso de la Arena* and *Prado*; the belief that politics is an activity very related to their social problems and needs, and a channel to improve their lives as individuals and as community. However, Santa Rosa's imaginaries could be distinguished by weak interaction and trust between individuals and groups; and the belief that politics is an activity very far from their social needs and problems, or an issue related to corruption and clientelism, which negatively affects civil society engagement to promote horizontal governance as well as political participation at local level.

To summarize, the observed differences between Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa could be explained by the incidence or the effect of geographical residence (urban or rural municipality) on the PD outcomes in these case studies. Indeed, although there are some similar control variables such as low socio-economic level, no significant ethnic group (Afro-descendent population), the same intervening variable such as the current national political project of participatory decentralization led by left wing political party *Frente Amplio* and the same political party at departmental and municipal government in both municipalities (*Frente Amplio-MPP*), the PD outcomes in Municipality A and the Municipality of Santa Rosa present remarkable differences. These differences could be explained by the geographical residence effect on PD outcomes such as the existence of horizontal governance, the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and the capabalities and skills for decision-making processes of civil society as well as the promotion of spaces for accountability and the quality of representation of local government. Municipality A is characterized by a tendency toward strong social relations, horizontal power relations, a cohesive identity and committed and reliant imaginaries. Strong social relations positively influence the existence of horizontal

governance, the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and the capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of civil society in this municipality. Horizontal power relations between political actors and social leaders and representatives of civil society, characterized by autonomy and cooperation between them, are observed in Municipality A.

In addition, horizontal power relations between political actors and citizens, which suppose an increasing empowerment as well as an informal learning about decision-making processes by local civil society, are also evident in this municipality. This kind of relationship facilitates the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by local government, and their appropriation by local civil society—such as Cabildos, participatory budgeting and planning process in order to foster local development. This horizontal relationship between political leaders and civil society has a positive impact on the quality of representation in terms of transparency, legitimacy and horizontal leadership of political and social leaders. Indeed, neighbourhood councillors promote civic engagement through different thematic commissions. Neighbourhood councillors are voted by residents during the participatory budget elections. They are responsible for promoting civic engagement in local development as well as advising departmental and municipal government regarding the main problems of their territories (*CCZs*).

Municipality A is also distinguished by a modern identity based on a collective mindset, strong social cohesion, and autonomy. This identity positively influences horizontal leadership of political leaders, which promotes empowering spaces and mechanisms for accountability as well as capabilities for self-organization and decision-making processes of civil society. Finally, committed and reliant imaginaries are observed more in Municipality A than in the Municipality of Santa Rosa. Indeed, interaction between individuals, groups and organizations; the trust between them; and the belief that politics

is an activity closely related to social problems and a powerful channel to improve people's everyday lives impacts civil society of Municipality A, in terms of building horizontal governance through synergy and networking with local government. Furthermore, these imaginaries also influences the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by neighbours of Municipality A. For instance: a participating citizen of CCZ 18 concluded "I learnt about social problems in all neighbourhoods, not only in mine; I learnt how municipality works, everything is about politics" (UY# 93, p.c., December 18, 2018).

The Municipality of Santa Rosa is characterized by a tendency toward weak social relations, vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identity, and distrustful imaginaries. Weak social relations imply low levels of communication between individuals, groups and organizations, and low self-organization capacity, that is, the ability to propose solutions to their own development problems. Therefore, weak social relations restrict the possibility of building horizontal governance and networking in terms of cooperation between local government and civil society. In addition, low levels of empowerment and informal learning impede the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and low levels of self-esteem and informal learning restrain capabalities and skills for decision-making processes in Santa Rosa. For instance, there are very few social organizations, neighbourhood commissions and social networks in Santa Rosa. In addition, citizen participation is still low in Cabildos and other spaces such as public audiences, Municipal Council sessions and participatory projects promoted by municipal government (M. De León, p.c., November 6, 2018; V. Fernández, p.c., November 16, 2018).

The tendency toward vertical power relations between political actors and social leaders/ representatives of civil society—characterized by dependence and by the reproduction of

caudillism, clientelism and paternalism—impede the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos by local government and their appropriation by civil society in this municipality. In addition, the tendency toward vertical power relations between political actors and citizens hinders empowerment and informal learning by local civil society in the Municipality of Santa Rosa. This kind of relationship between political leaders and civil society impacts the quality of representation in terms of transparency, legitimacy and leadership of political and social leaders; political leaders tend to be more charismatic and paternalistic than empowering.

Municipality of Santa Rosa is also distinguished by a tendency toward traditional and disengaged identity based on conservative values and customs, isolation, and dependence on authoritarian leaders; these factors have an impact on the lack of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, on the difficulties for self-organization, and on weaker skills and capabilities for decision-making process of civil society. Finally, distrustful imaginaries are observed more in the Municipality of Santa Rosa than in Municipality A. Indeed, insufficient interaction between individuals, groups and organizations, distrust between them, and the belief that politics is an activity very far removed from their social problems, or an issue related with corruption and clientelism, decreases civil society engagement in the implementation of horizontal governance as well as the motivation of potential or new political leaders.

6.2.b <u>Geographical effect on PD outcomes in Chile</u>: *Comparison between urban and rural municipalities without a high percentage of ethnic groups.*

In this section, the effect of geographical residence on PD outcomes within one country is analyzed in Chile. Regarding the comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group, and the rural/non-ethnic group in Chile, the selected cases are the Municipality of Recoleta (Metropolitan Region) and the Municipality of Empedrado (Maule Region), respectively. To better analyze the geographical effect in Chile, it is important to study how the socio-cultural dimension of territory—measured by social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries—influences PD outcomes in the local state, in terms of accountability and quality of representation; as well as outcomes in local civil society, in terms of horizontal governance, appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and capabilities for decision-making processes in both municipalities. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalities regarding the geographical residence (urban or rural); keeping some control variables such as the socio-economic level (low), no significant indigenous people (Mapuche communities), and the same intervening variable such as the national political project of decentralization within one country (Chile), constant. In this comparison, political affiliation at local government may influence PD outcomes. While the Municipality of Recoleta was led by left political party (Communist party), the Municipality of Empedrado was led by the center-right political party (UDI).

Firstly, according to findings, there are remarkable differences in social relations between the Municipality of Recoleta and the Municipality of Empedrado; social relations are stronger in the former than in the latter. For instance, interaction and communication between individuals, groups and organizations and capabilities to self-organize to find solutions to development problems through neighbourhood boards (*Juntas de Vecinos*),

social networks, civil society associations, neighbourhood centers (*Centro de Madres*) and elders' clubs (*Club del Adulto Mayor*) are higher in the Municipality of Recoleta than in the Municipality of Empedrado. High interaction between individuals, groups and organizations has characterized Recoleta since the colonial period, because of the influence of the Catholic Church and the immigration from Palestine to the territory during the twentieth century. These stronger social relations stimulate the dialogue and collaboration between social leaders from civil society (*Juntas de Vecinos*) and the mayor of Recoleta. Indeed, some of the initiatives to promote equal access to medication (particularly for elderly people) through people's pharmacies (*farmacias populares*), to eyeglasses through people's eye clinics (*ópticas populares*) and to culture through people's bookstore (*librerías populares*) in different neighbourhoods of Recoleta were proposed by neighbours to the mayor. Municipal Councillor F. Manzur explained: "Mayor Jadue participated in many neighbourhood assemblies in Recoleta where the elderly requested financial help to pay for their medication. Thus, the mayor created people's pharmacies based on a political plan."

Furthermore, strong social relations impact the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by local civil society, mechanisms such as Cabildos, COSOC, public accountability (*cuentas públicas*), *PLADECO* (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal*) meetings, where neighbours learn about decision-making processes and increase empowerment in the Municipality of Recoleta (D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; E. Lineski, p.c., March 12, 2019; F. Manzur, p.c., March 7, 2019; L. Scudero, p.c., March 12, 2019; C. Yañez, p.c., March 7, 2019). For instance, E. Lineski, the President of the Cemetery of Recoleta Florists' Union, explained: "There are many initiatives that emerged from neighbours, like people's pharmacies requested by elderly people because medicine is extremely expensive for them in Chile. Also, the local government created people's eye clinics and

libraries. But the most important participatory experience to me is the *escuelas abiertas* (open schools). I am the President of the Parents' Center at the primary school Paraguay". In addition, C. Yañez, who has been a COSOC member for several years, stated:

> Normally, the COSOC receives the Municipal Development Plan as well as the Municipal Budget. Then, we as COSOC have 45 days to analyze these documents and propose some suggestions or any observations to the mayor. COSOC is formed by social leaders who belong to different political parties. I think the budget we have is very well invested. Recoleta receives many immigrants from different Latin American countries, but the budget continues to be the same. We have developed a kind of co-governance or co-management regarding local commerce, municipal squares and other public spaces. People collaborate to manage all these spaces and activities. The mayor has good communication and a positive relationship with people. Thanks to people's pharmacies, people can access affordable medicine and improve their health.

However, communication and interaction between individuals and groups, self-organization capacity, empowerment, informal learning processes and self-esteem are still very low in the Municipality of Empedrado. Therefore, civil society is not able to develop horizontal governance, participate in spaces and mechanisms for accountability, or make decisions in this local community (M. Tejos, p.c. April 5, 2019; C. Rojas, p.c., April 9, 2019).

Secondly, regarding power relations, many differences are observed between the two municipalities. For instance, power relations in Empedrado have been historically characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism. This vertical relationship has influenced the current low appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by

local civil society, such as Cabildos, public audiences and *PLADECO (Plan de Desarrollo Comunitario)* meetings in this rural municipality. In addition, *COSOC* has not been established yet in Empedrado, and power relations tend to be characterized by dependence on political leaders and tend to reproduce paternalism and caudillism (C. Espinoza, p.c., April 4, 2019; M. Tejos, p.c., April 5, 2019; C. Rojas, p.c., April 9, 2019; D. Orellana, p.c., April5, 2019). However, more horizontal power relations between political actors and social leaders from civil society distinguishes the Municipality of Recoleta. Indeed, spaces and mechanisms for accountability and citizen participation such as Cabildos, *COSOC*, open schools (*escuelas abiertas*), and neighbourhood commissions at health centers are promoted by the Municipality of Recoleta. L. Scudero, the president of the Junta de Vecinos Lo Aranguiz Sur explained that "the mayor and councillors visit our neighbourhoods and organize public meetings there" (D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; E. Lineski, p.c., March 12, 2019; L. Scudero, p.c., March 12, 2019; C. Yañez, p.c., March 7, 2019).

Furthermore, a specific office, called *DIDECO* (*Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario),* manages different departments and programs with the aim of improving civil society capabilities for self-organization, planning and local development. In addition, a participatory planning process called *PLADECO* allows neighbours to discuss and define their priorities in order to improve their communities. In Recoleta, there are also many thematic *PLADECOs* related to women, youth, migrants, sport and territory. Neighbours are able to participate and make proposals to foster their communities' growth through the national project called *I love my neighbourhood* (*Quiero a mi barrio*). However, Recoleta does not implement any type of participatory budget process, due to a lack of economic resources. In addition, *COSOC* is not able to attend Municipal Council meetings without a previous request to municipal councillors and the mayor. Municipal

elections are not mandatory in Chile, so political participation is still very low (N. Cuevas, p.c., March 6, 2019; D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; F, Pacheco, p.c., March 5, 2019). Despite the current legal framework of decentralization, which restricts the jurisdiction of municipal councillors related to the promotion of citizen participation and accountability, some municipal councillors promote meetings and public accountability with social leaders and representatives from civil society in Recoleta (N. Cuevas, p.c., March 6, 2019; F. Manzur, p.c., March 7, 2019; L. González, p.c., March 4, 2019).

The tendency of horizontal power relations in Recoleta influences the high quality of representation in this municipality, evidenced by the qualified, committed and empowering leadership of most of its political leaders. However, a subtle tendency to clientelism and paternalism is observed among some political leaders. Regarding social leaders, strong relationships between them and citizens foster their capabilities for promoting local development (C. Yañez, p.c. March 3, 2019; F. Pinares, p.c., March 12, 2019; L. Escudero, p.c., March 12, 2019). However, a more vertical power relation tends to affect the quality of representation in Empedrado, characterized by a more charismatic and paternalistic leadership. M. Tejos, the president of communal union in Empedrado, explained that "the current mayor does not call us, social leaders, to discuss community development problems, nor to participate in our own meetings" (C. Espinoza, p.c., April 4, 2019; M. Tejos, p.c., April 5, 2019; C. Rojas, p.c., April 9, 2019).

Concerning devolution of political power and resources from the national and regional governments to the local government, considered within the intervening variable, namely political project: although both municipalities suffer from dependency on central government, and insufficient economic resources to implement their own municipal policies, this dependency affects Empedrado more than Recoleta. Indeed, both local governments receive limited economic resources from regional and national governments

to develop municipal education policy and health services in their local communities. However, this economic and political dependency affects Empedrado's local government more than Recoleta's. In fact, while almost 73% of economic resources of Empedrado come from the *Fondo Común Municipal* (Municipal Commmon Fund), managed by *SUBDERE,* only 14% come from that Fund in Recoleta. In addition, Empedrado manages significant development challenges—for example, environmental catastrophes like fires and earthquakes—with poorly trained staff and low capabilities due to its isolation, insufficient infrastructure, and insufficient technical assistance. Nevertheless, the Municipality of Recoleta has implemented some innovative municipal policies in the last few years—such as open schools, people's pharmacies, people's libraries and accessible eyeglasses—that constitute a strategy to foster equality and social cohesion at the local community level and point to a kind of autonomy, or an alternative to dependency (M. Báez, p.c., April 2, 2019; B. Bravo, p.c., April 9, 2019; N. Cuevas, p.c., March 6, 2019; D. Jadue, p.c., March 4, 2019; P. Peiñailillo, p.c., April 4, 2019).

Thirdly, identity in the Municipality of Recoleta is characterized by a tendency toward modern values and customs, a cohesive mindset, and autonomy. This modern and cohesive identity influences the existence of spaces and mechanisms for accountability promoted by local government; empowering leadership; and self-organization capacity and skills for decision-making processes of civil society. However, the Municipality of Empedrado is more distinguished by traditional and conservative values and customs, by a tendency toward individualism, isolation and dependence on *caudillos* or authoritarian leaders than the Municipality of Recoleta. This traditional and disengaged identity influences the lack of spaces for accountability; the tendency of charismatic and paternalistic leadership; and the current obstacles to self-organization and decision-making processes of local civil society.

Regarding imaginaries, the Municipality of Recoleta is characterized by interaction and trust between individuals, groups and organizations in working-class neighbourhoods like *Barrio Bellavista, Patronato, Barrio La Vega, Escritores de Chile*, *Lo Aranguiz Sur*, among others; and by the belief that politics is a matter closely related to their social problems and needs, and a channel to improve their lives. However, Empedrado's imaginaries tend to be distinguished by weak interactions and trust between individuals and groups and by the belief that politics is an activity very far from their social problems, or an issue related to corruption and clientelism. These imaginaries impede civil society engagement and political participation at the local level. However, civil society organizations such as *Juntas de Vecinos* and neighbourhood committees (e.g. *Comité del Agua*) are more frequent in rural areas than in the urban areas of Empedrado because rural populations have to manage more urgent social needs and problems than does the urban population of this municipality.

To summarize, the differences observed between the Municipality of Recoleta and the Municipality of Empedrado could be explained by the effect of geographical residence on the PD outcomes in these case studies. Indeed, although there are some similar control variables—low socio-economic level, a lower percentage of indigenous people, and the same intervening variable (the current national political project of decentralization led by the center-right wing political party *Renovación Nacional*)—the PD outcomes in the Municipality of Recoleta and the Municipality of Empedrado present significant differences. Futhermore, political affiliation of local government also seems to influence PD outcomes variation between both municipalities. While the Municipality of Recoleta was led locally by a left political party (Communist Party) achieved better PD outcomes in terms of accountability and quality of representation, the Municipality of Empedrado led by center-right political party (UDI) still faced many difficulties in promoting spaces

and mechanisms for citizen participation and accountability as well as lowest legitimacy and representativeness of its local government.

The Municipality of Recoleta is characterized by a tendency toward strong social relations, a tendency toward horizontal power relations, a modern and cohesive identity, and committed and reliant imaginaries. Strong social relations have a positive impact on the growing dialogue and collaboration between local government and social leaders from civil society (*Juntas de Vecinos*); on the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and on the capabilities and skills for decision-making processes of civil society in Recoleta.

A tendency toward horizontal power relations between some political actors and social leaders / representatives from civil society, characterized by cooperation between them, are observed in this municipality. In addition, a tendency toward horizontal power relations between some political actors and citizens—which implies greater empowerment as well as informal learning about decision making processes by local civil society—are evident in Recoleta. This kind of relationship influences the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by local government as well as the appropriation of them by local civil society. Spaces and mechanisms such as Cabildos, public account, the participatory planning process *PLADECO*, Municipal Council sessions, *COSOC*, open schools (*escuelas abiertas*), and neighbourhood commissions at health centers are promoted by the Municipality of Recoleta to foster local development. Finally, although clientelism and paternalism are still observed in some political leaders, the increasingly horizontal relationship between political leaders and civil society leads to a higher quality of representation in terms of transparency, legitimacy and horizontal leadership of political and social leaders than in Empedrado.

The Municipality of Recoleta is also distinguished by a modern identity based on a cohesive mindset and autonomy. This identity contributes to a more horizontal leadership which promotes spaces and mechanisms for accountability as well as capabilities for self-organization. Finally, committed and reliant imaginaries are observed more in the Municipality of Recoleta than in the Municipality of Empedrado. Indeed, interaction between individuals, groups and organizations, trust between them, and the belief that politics is activity closely related to resolving social problems impact the civil society of Recoleta by improving synergy and networking with local government.

The Municipality of Empedrado is characterized by a tendency toward weak social relations, vertical power relations, a traditional and disengaged identity, and distrustful imaginaries. Weak social relations imply low levels of communication between individuals, groups and organizations, and low capacity to self-organize for proposing solutions to development problems. Therefore, weak social relations hinder the possibility of building horizontal governance and networking in terms of cooperation between local government and civil society. In addition, low levels of empowerment and informal learning impede the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and low levels of self-esteem and informal learning reduce capabilities and skills for decision-making processes in Empedrado. For instance, there are very few social organizations or social networks in this municipality. In addition, citizen participation is still low in Cabildos and other spaces such as public audiences, Municipal Council sessions and *PLADECO* meetings. The historical tendency of vertical power relations between political actors and social leaders / representatives of civil society, characterized by dependence, and the reproduction of caudillism, clientelism and paternalism obstruct the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos by local government and their appropriation by civil society in this municipality. In addition, the

tendency of vertical power relations between political actors and citizens hinder empowerment and an informal learning by local civil society in Empedrado. This kind of relationship between political leaders and civil society impacts the quality of representation in terms of transparency, legitimacy and leadership of political and social leaders. Indeed, political leaders tend to be more charismatic and paternalistic than empowering.

The Municipality of Empedrado is also distinguished by a tendency toward a traditional identity based on conservative values and customs, disengagement and dependence on authoritarian leaders, and isolation that influences the lack of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; the difficulties for self-organization; and on weaker skills and capabilities for decision-making processes of civil society. Finally, distrustful imaginaries are observed more in the Municipality of Empedrado than in the Municipality of Recoleta. Indeed, insufficient interaction between individuals, groups and organizations, distrust between them, and the belief that politics an activity very far from their needs and social problems, or an issue related with corruption and clientelism, impact civil society engagement in the implementation of horizontal governance and motivation of potential or new political leaders.

6.2.c <u>The effect of geographical residence versus Political Project on PD outcomes</u>: *Cross-country comparison between Uruguay and Chile*

In this section, a cross-country comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group case studies in Uruguay (Municipality A) and Chile (Municipality of Recoleta); and a cross-country comparison between the rural/non-ethnic group case studies in Uruguay (Municipality of Santa Rosa) and in Chile (Municipality of Empedrado) are discussed in order to analyze the cross-country geographical residence effect versus the influence of national political project on the PD outcomes in these countries. In order to explore geographical residence effect on PD outcomes, it is important to study how the socio-cultural dimension of territory, measured by social relations, power relations, identities and imaginaries, influences on PD outcomes in local state and civil society. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalties, regarding to the geographical residence (urban or rural), and keeping some control variables such as the socio-economic level (low), the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality (no presence of high percentage of Afro-descendants or Mapuche community) constant versus the effect of the national political project in these countries.

As was explained earlier, there are two possibilities: 1) more nationally similarity between case studies allows one to observe a strong political project effect on participatory outcomes within one country; 2) however, more cross-country similarity between case studies suggests that the political project is not the key factor explaining the differences between PD outcomes, but instead territory is more important to explaining the success or failure of participatory decentralization in the selected municipalities. This analysis could be graphically represented as follows:

Table 6.5

Cross country comparison. Effect of geographical residence (urban & rural) on PD versus Political Project.

	Effect of geographical residence on PD		
Political project	**Urban**	**Rural**	
Uruguay	Municipality A	Santa Rosa	
Chile	Recoleta	Empedrado	
Comparison of the effect of geographical residence on PD, while holding political project, ethno-cultural dimension and socio-economic level constant			Comparison of effect of political project effect on PD, while holding geographical residence, ethno-cultural dimension and socio-economic level constant

The comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group case studies in both countries: Municipality A (Uruguay) and Municipality of Recoleta (Chile) allowed the analysis of the cross-country urban geographical residence effect versus the effect of the national political project on the PD outcomes in these countries. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalties, regarding geographical residence (urban), while keeping some control variables relatively constant such as the socio-economic level (low), the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality (no significant percentage of Afro-descendants or Mapuche community) versus the effect of the national political project in these countries.

In this cross-country comparison between the urban/non-ethnic group municipalities in Uruguay and in Chile; more similarities, in terms of PD outcomes between them than within each country, were observed. Although different national political projects of decentralization have been implemented in these countries in the last decade; many similarities between Municipality A (Uruguay) and Municipality of Recoleta (Chile) were observed during this research. Therefore, both municipalities present similar PD outcomes regarding local government in terms the promotion of spaces and mechanisms

for accountability and the quality of representation. In addition, both municipalities achieve similar PD outcomes concerning local civil society, in terms of building horizontal governance, the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and the capacity and skills for decision-making processes. However, it is important to highlight that, despite criticism by researchers, experts and professionals, and the weaknesses and challenges observed by political leaders, the political project on participatory decentralization implemented by the FA over almost 30 years in the Intendencia of Montevideo has strengthened local government and civil society capabilities for horizontal governance, accountability, transparent and qualified leadership, and decision-making processes, through the creation of CCZs in 1990 and the first municipalities in Montevideo in 2010 (Goldfrank, 2002: 51-83; Intendencia of Montevideo, 2016; Martínez, p.c., October 4, 2018; Masdeu, p.c., May 3, 2018; UY # 13; Veneziano, 1999: 2-28).

Concerning to the influence of political project, there is an increasing process of devolution of political power from national, and departmental (Intendencia of Montevideo) or regional government (Metropolitan Region) to both municipalities in terms of autonomy and capabilities for planning and implementing their policies to manage their local communities. Although the transferred economic resources are not still enough, both municipalities receive and manage a significant amount of income to face challenging development problems such as poverty, unemployment, infrastructure, illiteracy, pollution, housing, inequality and social exclusion. Futhermore, both municipalities are located in the capital of their countries which ensure the access not only to more economic resources but also to public services because of the historical centralism that characterize their respectively countries.

Secondly, both local governments promote genuine spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos, public audiences, *COSOCs*, community development plan meetings called *PLADECO* that foster autonomy and cooperation between civil society and municipalities. The relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders and representatives from civil society tend to be more horizontal than vertical in both municipalities.

Thirdly, regarding to quality of representation, although there are some exceptions, most of political leaders in both municipalities are characterized by their qualification, transparency and commitment as well as by their empowering leadership for their local communities. The relationship between political leaders and citizens is also distinguished by the autonomy and systematic citizen participation not only in the institutionalized spaces and mechanisms such as Cabildos, public accounts or participatory budget but also in some innovative spaces such as open schools, social networks and community radios. Consequently, local civil society collaborates and proposes solutions to overcome the main social problems and needs of their neighbourhoods and communities. Nevertheless, there is a notable difference between the Municipality A and the Municipality of Recoleta in terms of the distribution of political power within the municipal government. Indeed, the Chilean mayor tends to play his role like the national president, while municipal councillors are not allowed to participate in local government. However, the Uruguayan mayor tends to play his role in a collaborative and horizontal way with municipal councillors. This variation could be explained by their different legal framework regarding municipal government and/or the retained centralism and presidentialism in the Chilean political culture.

During fieldwork, the municipal session in the Municipality of Recoleta was observed. The mayor, municipal councillors and some municipal officials required for

administrative tasks or for specific issues were allowed to participate in this session, which lasted only 30 minutes. The whole session was led by Mayor Jadue who presented a report of the main issues to be discussed; Communist and leftist party municipal councillors agreed with or supported the mayor's speech, but few municipal councillors from the opposition (UDI) requested more information. Discussion was very short and the climate was respectful but more formal than friendly.

In regard to local civil society, an increasing appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by neighbours are observed in both municipalities. Indeed, these spaces and mechanisms are characterized by informal learning process, empowerment and the prevalence of a collective mentality to proposing solutions to local government. Concerning to horizontal governance, the relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders from civil society tend to be horizontal in both municipalities. Therefore, there are spaces and mechanisms which promote a sustainable and genuine engagement of citizens in order to participate in planning processes based on dialogue, collaboration and synergy between local government and local civil society (e.g. *PLAEDEZ* in Municipality A and *PLADECO* in Municipality of Recoleta). Furthermore, capabilities and skills for decision-making processes through an increasing informal learning process are observed in both municipalities.

Both municipalities are characterized by modern and cohesive identity based on a collectively-oriented mindset and autonomy. This modern and collective identity influences on local government in terms of the existence of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability and on a more horizontal and empowering leadership of political leaders. Furthermore, this identity also impacts on the increasing horizontal governance through networks between local government and civil society; on the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and on an increasing skills and capabilities for

decision-making process of civil society. Finally, both municipalities are characterized by strong interaction and trust between individuals, groups and organizations and the belief that politics is a channel to improve their lives as individuals and a community. These imaginaries affect civil society engagement for building horizontal governance as well as participation in political parties in order to play a political role for the future.

The comparison between the rural/non-ethnic group case studies in both countries: Municipality of Santa Rosa (Uruguay) and Municipality of Empedrado (Chile) is also studied in order to explore the cross-country geographical residence effect versus the influence of political project on the PD outcomes in these countries. This analysis takes into account the similarities and differences between these municipalties, regarding to the geographical residence (rural), and holding some control variables relatively constant such as the socio-economic level (low), the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality (no presence of high percentage of Afro-descendants or Mapuche community) versus the effect of the national political project in these countries.

Although different national political projects of decentralization have been implemented in these countries in the last decade; many similarities between the Municipality of Santa Rosa (Uruguay) and the Municipality of Empedrado (Chile) were observed during this research. In fact, both municipalities present similar PD outcomes with respect to local government in terms of the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and the quality of representation. In addition, both municipalities achieve similar PD outcomes concerning local civil society, in terms of building horizontal governance, the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and the capabilities and skills for decision-making processes.

Firstly, concerning to local government, the devolution of political power from national, and departmental or regional government to municipal ones, is still very limited in terms of autonomy and capabilities for planning and implementing policies and programs to manage their local communities in both municipalities. Indeed, these local governments depend on the transfer of economic and human resources from national and departmental/regional governments to manage many challenging development problems such as poverty, unemployment, infrastructure, illiteracy, pollution, migration, insufficient educational institutions, insufficient local development, inequality and social exclusion. Although the political project of decentralization in Chile established the transfer of jurisdictions, there are challenges in deliverying these services because of the lack of infrastructure, economic and human resources.

Secondly, although the political project of decentralization established the importance of promoting citizen participation in the last decade in these countries, both local governments face many difficulties to promote genuine spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos, public audiences (Santa Rosa-Uruguay), community development plan meetings such as *PLADECO* (Empedrado-Chile). The relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders from civil society tend to be more vertical than horizontal in both municipalities.

Thirdly, regarding to quality of representation, even though there are some exceptions, most of political leaders are characterized by their low qualification and experience, their difficulties for communicating with community which could be perceived as corruption or negligence and by a more paternalistic and charismatic leadership than an empowering one. Furthermore, political power tend to be too concentrated on mayors. This kind of leadership reproduces the historical caudillism and paternalism typical of many rural communities in both countries. The relationship between political leaders and citizens is

also distinguished by high dependency. In addition, there are few spaces for citizen participation which tends to be very low and unstable. Consequently, local civil society has many difficulties in engaging with local government to overcome the main social problems and needs of these communities.

In regard to local civil society, an insufficient appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by neighbours is observed in both municipalities. Furthermore, the prevalence of individualistic claims and the lack of proposals to local government in order to overcome their problems are observed in both muncipalities. Concerning horizontal governance through social networks, there are challenges in building horizontal relationships between municipal authorities and social leaders from civil society. Therefore, although there are some spaces and mechanisms which promote a participatory planning process such as *PLADECO* in Municipality of Empedrado, citizen participation is not systematic so dialogue, collaboration and synergy between local government and local civil society are still too weak. In addition, capabilities and skills for decision-making processes through an informal learning process are also fragile in both municipalities.

Both municipalities are characterized by a more traditional and conservative values and customs, disengagement, dependence on charismatic and paternalistic leaders and isolation. This more traditional and disengaged identity impacts on the lack of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and on a more vertical and depending leadership of political leaders. Furthermore, this identity also affects the current difficulties for building horizontal governance through networks between local government and civil society; the insufficient appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and the weak skills and capabilities for decision-making process of civil society because of low self-esteem, empowerment and informal learning. Finally, both municipalities are

characterized by weak connection with land, insufficient interaction and trust between individuals, groups and organizations and the belief that politics is an activity very far from people's everyday life, or an issue related with corruption or clientelism. These imaginaries affect negatively civil society engagement for building horizontal governance as well as participation at political parties in order to play a politic role and charge in the next future.

Finally, it is important to analyze the influence of political party affiliation and party alignment on PD outcomes in both countries. Political party affiliation constitutes an important dimension of the intervening variable, namely the national political project, so it has an impact on PD outcomes. For instance, local government led by a leftist party such as the Communist Party-Nueva Mayoría in the Municipality of Recoleta seems to contribute to better PD outcomes, showing greater accountability and higher quality of representation than a municipality led by a right-center party such as UDI in Chile (e.g. the Municipality of Empedrado). In the same way, in Uruguay, local governments led by a leftist party such as FA-MPP in Municipality A also positively affects PD outcomes in comparison with a municipality led by a right-center party such as Partido Nacional in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía in Uruguay. However, party affiliation is not sufficient to explain PD outcomes as it was proven throughout this chapter. Indeed, party alignment between national, departmental and municipal government is relevant and necessary, but not sufficient to explain the PD in Uruguay and Chile (Table 6.6).

Regarding party alignment in Uruguay, it is important to mention that some local communities, historically led and influenced by center-right political party Partido Nacional (e.g. Nueva Helvecia) or recently by the leftist political party Frente Amplio (e.g. Chuy) have experienced better PD outcomes in the last years. The competition between political parties at a local level and a strong civil society have stimulated the

redistribution of political power and the tendency to promote citizen participation and accountability in these communities. In addition, the national government has transferred financial resources and has implemented different projects that improved PD outcomes in the last years. However, one of the most important factors for achieving better PD outcomes seems to be the previous civil society capacities to be engaged with local government (Freigedo, 2015:190-194).

Furthermore, there are some cases where party alignment does not guarantee a successful implementation of PD. For instance, even in cases where the three levels of government are led by the same political party—such as the Municipality of Santa Rosa (FA-MPP), located in Canelones Department (FA-MPP) during the last FA's national administration 2015-2020—many obstacles related to local capabilities for decision-making processes and quality of representation and accountability negatively impacted PD outcomes in this municipality. Therefore, local capabilities and socio-cultural dimensions of territory prove to be crucial in analyzing and explaining PD outcomes.

In addition, the lack of party alignment between the national government during the last two consecutive administrations (Frente Amplio) and the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Partido Nacional) does not seem to have negatively affected PD outcomes in terms of financial resources transferred by the national government, or the implementation of projects for the promotion of local development and citizen participation in this municipality—this is due to the fact that the decentralization policy is implemented by the presidency through the *Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto* or OPP (Budget and Planning Office) throughout the country, no matter which political parties are involved in departmental or local governments. However, difficulties of coordination between the national level of government and the municipal level are still evident in Uruguay. They are not exclusively related to party rivalry between these levels of government but also to

the historical and rooted centralism in Uruguay. Furthermore, insufficient coordination between departmental and municipal governments is not related to party rivalry either, but rather to the *Intendentes*' fear of losing political power (Freigedo, 2015: 194-198).

In Chile, party alignment alone does not guarantee better PD outcomes. For instance, the party alignment between local government in the Municipality of Empedrado (UDI-Vamos Chile), the regional and national governments did not appear to influence PD outcomes in this municipality. However, party rivalry between municipal and regional government such as in the La Araucanía region might cause difficulties in accessing different projects and financial resources in the Municipality of Perquenco. In addition, leftist political affiliation (Communist Party) could impact local capabilities to promote participatory mechanisms and social development in the poorest neighborhoods.

Table 6.6

Party alignment in the selected case studies

National Project on PD	Case studies			Which factor is more determinant?
Uruguay (2015-2020): National government (FA)	Montevideo Department (FA-PS)	Canelones Department (FA-MPP)	Cerro Largo Department (Partido Nacional-Alianza Nacional)	**Local capabilities**: government (institutional) & civil society.
	Municipality A (FA-MPP): **Yes**	Municipality of Santa Rosa (FA-MPP): **Yes**	Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Partido Nacional-Herrerismo): **Partially No**	
Chile (2015-2020): National government Concertación & Renovación Nacional	Metropolitan Region (PDC-Nueva Mayoría)	Maule Region (UDI-Evópoli)	La Araucanía Region (Renovación Nacional)	**Local capabilities**: government (institutional) & civil society.
	Municipality of Recoleta (Communist Party-Nueva Mayoría): **Partially No**	Municipality of Empedrado (UDI-Vamos Chile): **Yes**	Municipality of Perquenco (Nueva Mayoría-Independent): **No**	

Political parties at national, regional/departmental and municipal government in Uruguay and Chile (2015-2020).

Chapter 7: <u>Conclusions</u>

In this last chapter, the most notable conclusions are presented in order to contribute to the discussion of the main objective of this study: the ways in which territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) influences the participatory decentralization initiatives of the state in Uruguay and Chile. To achieve this objective, this project analyzed experiences at the municipal level within the national context of political decentralization processes over the last decade in Uruguay and Chile. The comparisons looked at one main difference between them, namely the ideology and model of decentralization policy, in order to understand the influence of territory on outcomes of decentralization in both countries.

In order to understand the influence of the socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization outcomes, a certain variable was kept stable within the three municipal cases selected in each country and others were varied depending on which effect on PD outcomes was analyzed. The presence of ethnic groups or indigenous people was varied to study the ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality, while geographical residence was varied to analyze the geographical residence effect. The socio-economic level (low or middle), the geographical residence (rural or urban), and the ethno-cultural dimension are variables that characterize a specific territory.

From the perspective of this project, territory is not only conceived of as a physical reality but also as a socio-cultural construction based on social relations, power relations, identities, and imaginaries. Territories imply a constructed reality built by people through their political actions toward collective goals in order to improve their communities (Agnew, 2013: 1-4; Antonsich, 2010: 422-425). Although this concept proved to be crucial for analyzing participatory decentralization, and this research project aimed to

contribute to the explanatory potential of the concept of territory in this academic topic, it is important to acknowledge that it still constitutes a very complex and challenging concept to be operationalized and measured by researchers.

Participatory decentralization implies a well-functioning representative democracy as well as a specific institutional arrangement which promotes empowerment processes in daily life. This kind of decentralization assumes redistributive efficiency, accountability and a high quality of representation. Redistributive efficiency requires devolution of political power in terms of the transfer of authority and autonomy, economic and human resources by the national and/or regional/departmental governments to the municipal ones. In addition, devolution of political power also implies the transfer of responsibilities within municipal governments through different institutional arrangements and practices that engage civil society. However, devolution of political power depends more on the national political project for decentralization and institutional arrangements, which include regional (Chile) o departmental government (Uruguay) capabilities for participatory decentralization than on the municipal government. The intervening variable is the political project and institutional arrangement of participatory decentralization in both countries.

Therefore, field research looked at how the socio-cultural dimension of territory influences participatory decentralization experiences in both the state and civil society actors, in both countries. For the state, research attended to participatory decentralization in terms of the existence of mechanisms for accountability and the quality of representation, and the capacity to transform historical caudillism, paternalism and clientelism within local government. Therefore, spaces and channels for political participation, empowerment and learning (political capital) promoted by local government, were observed. For civil society, analysis included the appropriation of these

channels and spaces for citizen participation, as well as the learning process in terms of the internalization of skills, values and competences to analyze, decide and propose alternatives for improving local development. Furthermore, the existence of synergy, coordination and solidarity among different local actors through social networks, as well as the relationship between local government and civil society in terms of co-governance, were studied.

Firstly, regarding to ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality effect within one country, taking into account the potential political project effect on PD outcomes in each country; the main findings show that weak social relations, vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identity, and distrustful imaginaries impact negatively on the capabilities for building horizontal governance, on the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability, as well as on the capabilities and skills for decision-making process of civil society – in the municipalities with higher percentage of ethnic groups such as Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Uruguay) and Municipality of Perquenco (Chile). Furthermore, vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identity, and distrusful imaginaries also influence on lower promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and lower quality of representation in the mentioned municipalities within each country.

Ethno-cultural effect dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes within one country in Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Uruguay) and Municipality of Perquenco (Chile) could be explained by the historical exclusion and discrimination of Afrodescendant population and Mapuche community, respectively, in these territories. Ethno-cultural effect on PD outcomes in Uruguay is observed through the comparison between two case studies: Municipality of Isidoro Noblía and Municipality of Santa Rosa. Afro-descendant rural communities have suffered doubly from historical isolation, political and cultural

exclusion and discrimination from the departmental and national governments. This territory has been historically marginalized by the national state and central political power for decades, so its population could not access properly to public services such as education, health and housing and consequently these communities are still extremely poor. Caudillism and clientelism have also influenced on this political and cultural exclusion of rural Afro-descendant communities since political leaders have been only interested in getting votes during elections but not in promoting empowering and equity within these local communities. This situation has influenced on the current weak institutional capabilities and difficulties for building co-governance and legitimacy of local political leaders like mayors and councillors in the context of the last participatory decentralization process in Uruguay.

The social and political exclusion of ethnic groups like Afro-descendants in Isidoro Noblía that particularly affect the small village known as *Medio Luto*, influences on PD outcomes in both actors: local civil society and government. Regarding to some aspects of political project, considered as intervening variable, an insufficient devolution of political power and resources from national and departmental government to local one, and the consequent lack of autonomy was observed in both municipalities.

Ethno-cultural effect dimension of territoriality on PD outcomes in Chile is observed through the comparison between two case studies: Municipality of Perquenco and Municipality of Empedrado. Although the Mapuche community in Perquenco is characterized by a strong connection with their land as part of their identity as indigenous people; they have not developed sufficiently their self-organization capacity in order to claim for their rights because of their internal divisions, the mistrust on their own Mapuche leaders, and the weak skills and strategies for communicating and interacting

with the Chilean political system. In addition, some of their leaders do not believe in politics as a way to improve their lives and to solve their development problems.

Most of Mapuche communities do not believe in either politics or the Chilean politicians based on their last experiences of criminalization and repression by national and regional governments. These kinds of imaginaries influence on the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability by Mapuche communities as well as by local civil society in Perquenco. Furthermore, the insufficient interaction between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity very far from their daily lifes, or an issue related with corruption and clientelism impact on civil society engagement in terms of building horizontal governance, as well as on motivation of potential political leaders like mayors and councillors. Indeed, people tend to not be engaged with spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation promoted by municipality or expect that government solve all their problems.

Secondly, concerning the cross-country ethno-cultural dimension of territoriality effect, the comparison between rural/ ethnic group cases allowed one to find that there are more similarities between these cases studies than within each country. Indeed, according to reaserch findings, no matter which national political project of decentralization and institutional arrangements have being implemented in each country; municipalities show cross-country similarities in terms of PD outcomes which could be understand as ethno-cultural effect. For instance, while the Uruguayan political project on decentralization, led by *Frente Amplio*, has been centered on strengthening citizen capabilities for decision making processes and civil engagement (social decentralization), increasing autonomy, participatory planning processes and transpareny of representativeness of local government (political decentralization); the Chilean one, led by *Concertación* and *Renovación Nacional*, has been focused on legal framework reforms, institutional design,

administrative deconcentration, efficiency and effectiveness, and transfer of national competences to local level of local government.

However, the rural/ ethnic group municipalities in both countries: Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Uruguay) and Municipality of Perquenco (Chile) accomplished similar PD outcomes in the last decade. As it had been expected, these both local governments suffer from a rooted centralism and limited devolution of political power in order to make decisions about their territories because of structural dependence on departmental or regional governments in terms of economic and human resources. In fact, these municipalities do not have enough autonomy neither not have qualified professionals in their municipal staff in order to design and implement social programs, to overcome their main development problems such as an increasing unemployment, poverty, pollution and the insufficient housing for vulnerable population. Furthermore, political power tends to be too concentrated on mayors but it is not distributed among municipal councillors who are very restricted in their roles at municipal government.

Both municipalities are characterized by traditional and conservative values and customs; by rooted individualism; by isolation and dependence on political leaders like *Caudillos*. This traditional, conservative and disengaged identity influences on both actors: local government and civil society. Indeed, this identity impacts on the current lack of spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation and accountability and on authoritarian leadership in local government as well as on the current difficulties for the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; on the lack or difficulties for self-organization and on the weak skills and capabilities for decision-making process of civil society. Furthermore, ethnic groups like Afro-descendent population in Uruguay and Mapuche communities in Chile have suffered from historical discrimination, isolation, political and cultural exclusion from national and departmental/regional governments for

decades until the present. This historical exclusion affected the current weaknesses and difficulties of civil society for improving self-organization, self-esteem and empowerment in order to participate and propose solutions at spaces and mechanisms for accountability at local level. These territories have been historically marginalized by the central political power so their population could not access to basic services such as education, health, housing and drinking water so these communities suffer from extreme poverty.

Historical caudillism and clientelism have also influenced on political and cultural exclusion of these ethnic communities as well as on the current weak institutional capacities and difficulties for building co-governance capabilities and legitimacy of local political leaders like mayors and councillors. Thus, as it was expected in this research, lowest performances in terms of local development were found among rural municipalities with ethnic groups in their territories. However, there are some differences between rural Afro-descendent communities of Uruguay and rural Mapuche communities of Chile related to their situation of discrimination and social exclusion. In Uruguay, enslaved Africans were exploited and abused by the white bourgeoisie since the colonial time until the middle of the nineteenth century; and Afro-descendants have been excluded and discriminated from economic, political and cultural life thanks the systematic and structural socio-economic and cultural inequalities that particularly have affected Afro-descendent rural population until the present (Borucki et al, 2004: 174-198). However, Mapuche communities were murdered or manipulated by colonizers and the Chilean state in the past and criminalized and repressed by national and regional government in the present, disregarding their capacities and violating their human rights (Sandoval & González, 2010: 31-40).

In addition, while Afro-descendants in Uruguay have been invisible to the national state and society over centuries so they had little influence on public policies to improve their living conditions until recent years; Mapuche communities have developed some capabilities to negotiate with the national authorities and to make more visible their claims to the whole society. While Afro-descendants, whose labour resulted crucial to the national economy and wealth during the slavery time and continued after the abolitionism, they have been silently and sublty discriminated from the socio-economic, cultural and political life in Uruguay; Mapuche communities have been harsly repressed and criminalized by the Chilean state in the last decades, even during democratic regime (Borucki et al, 2004:159-173; Sandoval & González, 2010: 31-40).

Mapuche communities have been subject of specific policies and institutions to promote their capabilities for local development and to foster their culture in the last decades. However, social policies and affirmative actions regarding Afro-descendants in Uruguay are too recent and still insufficient to overcome their discriminating and social exclusion situation. Mapuche leaders have obtained political appointments at the national and municipal government, and have developed some capabilities for self-organization to promote political participation within their communities. However, Afro-descendants have only obtained some political appointments at national government but very few ones at municipal level, except from some positions as municipal officials, mostly through clientelism, in the north of the country. Their self-organization capacity, except from some exceptions, has been more focused on civil society and Afro-descendant international networks than to the national state. Finally, both municipalities are characterized by weak interaction and trust between groups and the belief that politics is an activity very far from their needs and problems or an issue related with corruption and clientelism. These imaginaries, particularly affect ethnic groups like Afro-descendent and

Mapuche communities which reproduce structural racism in both cases no matter which political project is leading the decentralization process in each country.

Thirdly, on the subject of geographical residence effect within one country, taking into account the potential political project effect on PD outcomes in each country; the main findings show that strong social relations, the tendency to horizontal power relations, modern and cohesive identity, and committed/reliant imaginaries impact on the more capabilities for building horizontal governance, on deeper appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability, as well as on more capabilities and skills for decision-making process of civil society in the urban, low socio-economic level and non-ethnic group municipalities such as Municipality A (Uruguay) and Municipality of Recoleta (Chile). Furthermore, the tendency of horizontal power relations, modern and cohesive identity, and committed/reliant imaginaries also influence on the promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and higher quality of representation in the mentioned municipalities within each country. However, weak social relations, the tendency to vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identity, and distrustful imaginaries, influence on less capabilities for horizontal governance, on less appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for decision-making process of civil society in the rural, low socio-economic level and non-ethnic group municipalities such as Municipality of Santa Rosa (Uruguay) and Municipality of Empedrado (Chile). In addition, the tendency of vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identity, and distrustful imaginaries impact on the lack of promotion of spaces and mechanisms for accountability, and the low quality of representation in the mentioned municipalities within each country.

Geographical residence effect on PD outcomes within one country in Municipality A (Uruguay) and Municipality of Recoleta (Chile) could be explained by the differences between the socio-cultural dimension of territory in urban and rural areas in a country.

The socio-cultural dimension of rural area is mostly characterized by weak social relations, the tendency of vertical power relations, traditional and disengaged identity, and distrustful imaginaries. However, the socio-cultural dimension of urban area is mainly distinguished by strong social relations, the tendency of horizontal power relations, modern and cohesive identity and committed/reliant imaginaries.

Concerning to the cross-country geographical residence effect, the comparison between the rural/ non-ethnic group municipalities as well as the comparison between urban/ non-ethnic group allowed one to find more similarities than the comparison within one country. Indeed, according to research findings, no matter which national political project of decentralization and institutional arrangements have being implemented in each country; municipalities show cross-country similarities in terms of PD outcomes, which could be understand as geographical residence effect. In fact, the rural/ non-ethnic group municipalities in both countries: Municipality of Santa Rosa (Uruguay) and Municipality of Empedrado (Chile) accomplished similar PD outcomes in the last decade.

Although the political project of decentralization established the importance of promoting citizen participation in the last decade in both countries, both local governments face many difficulties to promote genuine spaces and mechanisms for accountability in order to foster citizen capabilities for building cooperation between civil society and municipalities. The relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders and representatives from civil society tend to be more vertical than horizontal in both municipalities. Regarding the quality of representation, even though there are some exceptions, most political leaders are characterized by their low qualification and experience, by their difficulties in communicating with the community and by a more paternalistic and charismatic leadership than an empowering one. This kind of leadership reproduces the historical caudillism and paternalism of most of rural communities in both

countries. The relationship between political leaders and citizens is also distinguished by high dependency. Consequently, local civil society present many difficulties for engagement with local government to overcome the main social problems and needs of their communities.

In regard to local civil society, an insufficient appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by neighbours is observed in both municipalities. Indeed, these spaces and mechanisms are characterized by the lack of empowering and learning process to make decisions about their main problems as communities. Furthermore, the prevalence of individualistic claims and the lack of proposals to local government in order to overcome their problems are observed in both muncipalities. Concerning to horizontal governance through social networks, there are many difficulties to build horizontal relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders from civil society.

Both municipalities are characterized by a more traditional and conservative values and customs and dependence on charismatic and paternalistic leaders and isolation. This more traditional and disengaged identity influences on both actors: local government and civil society in terms of accountability, horizontal governance and skills and capabilities for decision-making process of civil society. Finally, both municipalities are characterized by weak connection with land, insufficient interaction and trust between individuals, groups and organizations and the belief that politics is a matter very far from their needs and problems, or an issue related with corruption or clientelism. These imaginaries negatively affect civil society engagement for building horizontal governance as well as political participation.

Relating to the cross-country comparison between the urban/ non-ethnic group municipalities, the selected case studies are the Municipality A (Uruguay) and the

Municipality of Recoleta (Chile). Although more experiences of horizontal governance and even higher devolution of political power and transfer of economic resources are observed in Municipality A (Uruguay) than in Municipality of Recoleta (Chile); other PD outcomes present many similarities in both municipalities no matter which national political project has been implemented in these countries in the last decades. Indeed, about local government, there is an increasing process of devolution of political power from national and departmental/regional government to both municipalities in terms of autonomy and capabilities for planning and implementing their own policies to manage their local communities. Even though the transferred economic resources from departmental/regional and national governments are not still enough, both municipalities receive a significant amount of income in order to face challenging development problems such as poverty, unemployment, infrastructure, illiteracy, pollution, housing, inequality and social exclusion. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable difference between Municipality A and Municipality of Recoleta in terms of the distribution of political power within municipal government. This variation could be explained by a combination of factors such as their different legal framework regarding to municipal government, the remained centralism and presidentialism in the Chilean political culture, and power relations embedded within territory.

Furthermore, both local governments promote genuine spaces and mechanisms for accountability such as Cabildos, public audiences, *COSOCs*, (Comunal Council of Civil Society), community development plan meetings called *PLADECO* that foster autonomy and cooperation between civil society and municipalities. The relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders and representatives from civil society tend to be more horizontal than vertical in both municipalities. Regarding to quality of representation, although there are some exceptions, most of political leaders in both

municipalities are characterized by their qualification, transparency and commitment as well as by their empowering leadership for their local communities. The relationship between political leaders and citizens is also distinguished by the autonomy and systematic citizen participation. Consequently, local civil society collaborate and propose solutions to overcome the main social problems.

In regard to local civil society, an increasing appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by neighbours are observed in both municipalities. Indeed, these spaces and mechanisms are characterized by informal learning process, empowerment and the prevalence of collective mentality in order to propose solutions for their problems to local government. Concerning to horizontal governance, the relationship between municipal authorities and social leaders from civil society tend to be horizontal in both municipalities. Therefore, there are spaces and mechanisms which promote a sustainable and genuine civic engagement in order to participate in planning processes based on dialogue, collaboration and synergy between local government and local civil society (e.g. *PLAEDEZ* in Municipality A and *PLADECO* in Municipality of Recoleta). Furthermore, capabilities and skills for decision-making processes through an increasing informal learning process are observed in these urban municipalities.

Both local communities are characterized by modern and cohesive identity based on collective mindset, strong social cohesion and autonomy. This modern and collective identity impacts on local government in terms of the existence of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability and on a more horizontal and empowering leadership of political leaders. Furthermore, this identity also influences on local civil society in terms of the increasing horizontal governance through networks between local government and civil society; on the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; and on an increasing skills and capabilities for decision-making process of civil society. Finally,

both local communities are characterized by strong interaction and trust between individuals, groups and organizations and the belief that politics is a matter very related to their needs and problems, a channel to improve their lives as individuals and community. These imaginaries affect civil society engagement for building horizontal governance as well as participation at political parties in order to play a politic role and charge.

To summarize, although there are significant differences between political projects of decentralization in Uruguay and in Chile; many similarities in terms of PD outcomes are observed through the cross-country comparision between rural/ ethnic group municipalities in both countries considered as ethno-cultural effect; between rural/ non-ethnic group municipalities as well as between urban/ non-ethnic group municipalities named geographical residence effect. Therefore, these research findings confirm the proposed hypothesis which stated that the socio-cultural dimension of territory, which supposes a subjective and symbolic construction based on power relations, social relations, identities and imaginaries, influences citizen and local government capabilities for participatory decentralization. In addition, this socio-cultural dimension could generate participative processes at the local level in order to transform the current centralist and sectoral political culture by promoting local development in the Latin American countries. Indeed, strengthening social relations at rural communities, promoting genuinely horizontal governance networks based on self-organization capacity, dialogue, collaboration and synergy between local civil society and political actors, better political representativeness in terms of transparency, legitimacy and accountability would integrate local perspectives not only regarding decentralization policy but also in regard to social and economic policies.

Regarding the main research questions, the findings allow one to conclude that although the intervening variable, namely the national political project affect participatory decentralization outcomes in both countries in terms of devolution of political power and transfer of economic resources, the socio-cultural dimension of territory strongly influences the success or failure of PD experiences in Uruguay and in Chile. Indeed, power and social relations, identities and imaginaries within territories facilitate or inhibit democractic forms of participation in building civil society capabilities and create opportunities to improve local development in the selected case studies, no matter which political project is being implemented. Concerning power relations, the relationship between political leaders, institutional actors and citizens characterized by caudillism, clientelism and paternalism influence the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability by citizens, such as *Cabildos*, which may be used for deepening dependence on political leaders instead of promoting autonomy and cooperation between local government and citizens. Vertical relationships between political actors and social leaders and representatives from civil society tend to reproduce clientelism and paternalism instead of promoting genuine processes for accountability. However, more horizontal relationships tend to foster learning and empowerment processes in social leaders, horizontal governance as well as transparency and legitimacy of political and institutional actors. Strong relationships between social leaders and citizens tend to foster their capabilities to propose improvements for local development. In addition, social relations influence on PD outcomes of local civil society in terms of the existence of horizontal governance (e.g. social networks and co-management processes) in a specific territory since this governance requires high levels of communication between individuals as well as high self-organization capacity in order to propose and find solutions for their particular social needs and problems. Social relations also impact on the appropriation of

spaces and mechanisms for accountability which supposes empowerment and informal learning processes by local civil society. Therefore, social relations also affects capacity and skills for decision-making process of civil society in order to foster local development. Consequently, strong social relations foster horizontal governance, high appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for accountability and high capacity and skills for decision-making process of local civil society. For instance, Mapuche and Afro-descendant communities in rural municipalities could develop self-organization capacity in order to participate in and influence local government with the aim of improving their life conditions.

Traditional/disengaged identities based on conservative values and customs, and dependence on authoritarian leader influence on participatory decentralization outcomes in both actors: local government and civil society. Indeed, traditional identity, and particularly within communities where ethnic groups have been historically excluded from political and social participation, impacts on the lack of spaces and mechanisms for accountability; on authoritarian leadership and the lack or difficulties for self-organization. However, a more modern and cohesive identity facilitates the building of horizontal leadership that promotes empowering spaces and capabilities for self-organization. Finally, strong connection with land, sense of belonging, interaction and trust between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity related with people's needs and problems and a channel to improve daily life, impact on civil society capabilities for building horizontal governance through synergy and networking between local government and civil society. Furthermore, these imaginaries would influence on the appropriation of the spaces and mechanisms for accountability by local civil society. Nevertheless, weak connection with land, insufficient interaction and trust between individuals and groups, and the belief that politics is an activity very far from their daily

life, or an issue related with corruption and clientelism would impact on civil society engagement to implement horizontal governance as well as on motivation of new political leaders like mayors and councillors.

Concerning to political project of decentralization, significant differences between Uruguay and Chile in terms of citizen participation were discovered through this research that were not previously expected. Indeed, Chile has implemented a more equal and nationally spread policy of decentralization, focused on efficiency and effectiveness of local government through institutionalized spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation. For instance, the *PLADECO* or *Plan de Desarrollo Comunitario* (Community Development Plan) created by the Law N°18.695, requires citizen participation and accountability; and *Juntas de Vecinos* (Neighbourhood Boards) established during Eduardo Frei presidency, in the decade of 1960, which are still properly functioning, in the whole country (Delamaza, 2018: 27-53). In addition, the COSOCs or *Consejo de la Sociedad Civil* (Communal Council of Civil Society) created during the second Bachelet's presidency in 2011.

However, Uruguay has implemented a more territorialized policy of decentralization focused on political and social participation, which takes advantage of the lessons learned in the previous participatory decentralization experience in the capital Montevideo but it is still in its initial stages and weak in the rest of the country, particularly rural areas. Another important difference between Uruguay and Chile in terms of citizen participation is the degree of institutionalization of spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation and for accountability. On the one hand, Uruguay faces a decreasing process of legitimacy and representativeness of the institutionalized spaces that promote citizen participation such as *Concejo Vecinal* (Neighbourhood Council) elections, participatory budget, and participatory planning processes named *PLAEDEZ* (*Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo*

Zonal), created by FA at the Intendencia of Montevideo in the decade of 1990's; in the new political context of the creation of municipalities in Montevideo since 2010. However, more spontaneous and no institutionalized spaces such as social networks, non governmental organizations, neighbourhood development commissions and unions have emerged and accomplished success in terms of citizen participation in the last years in Montevideo. These experiences challenge the existent institutionalized participatory mechanisms promoted by the Intendencia of Montevideo in terms of redistribution of power, decision-making processes and representativeness (Intendencia de Montevideo, 2009). On the other hand, Chile created and established institutionalized spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation such as *Juntas de Vecinos* that still constitute one of the most rooted and popular spaces, and contribute to other programs and processes such as *PLADECO* (Delamaza, 2018: 27-53).

Although there are many differences between Uruguay and Chile in terms of their political projects and historical process of decentralization; both countries still face many structural obstacles and challenges for implementing participatory decentralization such as the historical and rooted centralism which impede an equitable distribution of political power and economic resources from the national and regional/departmental government to local one, particularly among rural municipalities. In this context, the socio-cultural dimension of territory not only allows one to explain these difficulties and obstacles but also constitutes a strategy to transform centralism through socio-educational process that takes into account power relations, social relations, identities and imaginaries in order to improve the redistribution of political power, civic engagement and education of potential political leaders. The socio-cultural dimension of territory defines the effectiveness and efficiency of participatory decentralization policies.

The analysis of municipalities facilitates not only a cross-country comparison between the selected case studies but also an understanding of how decentralization works in Latin American countries. Indeed, it permits the study of intergovernmental relations; participatory budgeting processes; the consequences of new legal framework; and electoral reforms. Furthermore, the local level offers crucial insight into the socio-cultural dimension of territory and the cultural patterns of daily life related to new governance (Delamaza et al, 2012). Even though rural municipalities suffer from caudillism, paternalism and clientelism that affect horizontal governance, accountability, quality of representation and capabilities and skills for decision making processes; they have potential advantages in order to implement participatory decentralization because of their scale which facilitates everyday social relationships and self-organization capacity.

However, one of the main observed risks of municipal government is that mayors may become like small feudal lords (mostly males) who concentrate political power to keep themselves in power; and local communities may become their small fielfdoms. Some politicians recognize that they and their political parties are not well prepared to deepen participatory decentralization because of their fear of losing power. Local civil society still calls for improving their capabilities for decision-making processes and empowerment. Both local actors require deep learning about governance through socio-political education or informal learning through emancipatory practices (Freire, 1970:71-86).

Although national governments through different programs and offices (e.g. Budget and Planning Office-Uruguay Integra in Uruguay, and SUBDERE in Chile) as well as departmental/regional governments have designed strategies to improve local capacities within rural municipalities, they still suffer from insufficient human and economic resources to implement PD as well as from significant weaknesses of their political

representatives. In fact, political leaders (mayors and municipal councillors) request for accessing to specific training, political power, autonomy and resources to properly play their roles in local communities.

As Delamaza (2012) states, a new model of government supposes interrelated actors which are connected by collaborative networks. Political projects or models of decentralization which include institutional arrangements, and the transfer of economic and human resources, are necessary but not sufficient for participatory decentralization. PD also requires the corresponding devolution of political power and changes to the previous conditions which are embedded within the socio-cultural dimension of territory.

Therefore, research on territory, particularly on its socio-cultural dimension at the local level (municipalities), could complement and enrich other relevant approaches to PD outcomes such as the ones focused on political project and institutional designs (Avritzer, 2010; De Souza Santos, 2005; Falleti, 2010; Goldfrank, 2011). Indeed, as was explained in this project, PD outcomes are conditioned by pre-existing state-civil society relations which occur and are embedded within territory (Baiochi & Silva, 2008). The most successful experiences with PD were observed within urban municipalities since their communities have developed self-organization capacity, strong social relations, horizontal relationships, modern and cohesive identity, and reliant/committed imaginaries. However, the most unsuccessful experiences with PD were found within rural municipalities where local communities still face difficulties in terms of self-organization capacity, weak social relations, vertical relationships, and a traditional and disengaged identity and distrustful imaginaries. These findings invite deeper analysis and investigation in order to explain and offer possible answers. Although the concept of social capital (Putnam, 1995) stresses the importance of social networks, which implies the flow of information, social trust and reciprocity between individuals and groups to

explain civic engagement, it cannot enlighten us with regard to other relevant aspects - such as vertical relationships, authoritarian or charismatic leadership, conservative behaviour, disengaged practices and distrust on politics- explained by power relations and identity that are included in the concept of territory. Therefore, the socio-cultural dimension of territory seems to be an alternative to better understanding these aspects and obstacles to successfully implement PD.

Even though defining and operationalizing territory poses a challenge to researchers, this category permits us to explore potential alternatives or to complement the existing comparative studies on PD. Specifically, this thesis applyed a structured analysis, based on the mainstream comparative method of Mill's, to a post-development concept of territory which allows us to assses the potential explanatory power of territory against a counterfactual variable, namely the intervening variable: the political project on PD. Indeed, the combination of a post-colonial approach to the key concept of territory with a research design from comparative political studies of PD and participatory field method (P. Freire: 71-86) constitutes an innovative method to studying this academic topic. Although the operationalization of the socio-cultural dimension of territory presents some methodological limits, especially regarding causal inference in a very complex concept, this theoretical approach integrates notions which are not usually considered in PD studies or which are considered in a separate way, such as social relations, power relations, identity and imaginaries. This approach emphasizes the importance of everyday life, particularly in rural areas, not frequently assessed, in expanding governance at a local level. Pre-conditions or informal learning processes embedded in territory are considered crucial for achieving PD. This educative effect of participation is especially relevant for groups that are underrepresented. Therefore, this study is focused on historically excluded and disadvantaged populations in both countries. Cultural identities and imaginaries,

linked to land and meaningful spaces and based on long-standing inequalities and social exclusion such as that experienced by indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, affect PD outcomes more than political project/model of decentralization. However, these cultural identities and imaginaries also permit identification of local (bottom-up) alternatives to the centralist project, such as NGOs, social networks, neighbourhood development commissions, *Juntas de Vecinos* and Mapuche social movements.

Finally, this research also opens other possible investigations related to PD outcomes at the municipal level, such as: How is political power built and distributed within local communities from an intersectional perspective, especially from a gender equality analysis? What is the role of political parties in PD implementation? How and why do social movements and social networks seem to replace the institutionalized spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation and accountability within urban municipalities? What the relationship is between the new phenomenon of the Evangelical churches in Latin American countries and the politics of decentralization? How could PD foster emancipatory processes of the most marginalized and discriminated subjects, like indigenous communities and Afro-descendant populations, from a human rights perspective? How could it improve social equality in the rural communities of developing countries?

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Appendix A

List of subjects interviewed

Uruguay	Name	Position
National & Central Officials	Santiago Soto	Sub Director of Budget and Planning Office (OPP)
	Pedro Apezteguía	Director of Decentralization and Public Investment (OPP)
	María De Barbieri	Director of "Uruguay Integra" Program (OPP)
	Orlando Rivero	Consultant on Afrodescendant Population and Decentralization (OPP)
	Valentina Cancela	Consultant in Observatory on Territory
	Ricardo Cordero	Subnational Management & Development Office II (adviser)
	Fernando Isabella	Director of Planning (OPP)
	Ana Olivera	Vice-Minister of Social Development
	Beatriz Ramírez	Director of Human Rights-Ministry of Social Development. Expert & activist.
	Mónica Correa	Director of Territorial Management-Ministry of Social Development
Scholars and Experts	William (Tato) Masdeu	Consultant on Decentralization (Intendencia of Montevideo)
	Mireia Villar	Representative of the United Nations in Uruguay
	Tania Ramírez	NGO Mizangas (Coordinator of *Horizontes de Libertad* Project)
	Raquel Alvarado	University of the Republic/Faculty of Sciences/Geographer
	Abel Oroño	Intendencia of Canelones/*Congreso de*

		*Intendentes/*Political Scientist
	Ma. Elena Laurnaga	University of the Republic/Faculty of Social Sciences/Political Scientist
	Antonio Cardarello	Univesity of the Republic/Faculty of Social Sciences/Political Scientist
	Niki Johnson	University of the Republic/Faculty of Social Sciences/Political Scientist
	Alicia Veneziano	University of the Republic/Faculty of Social Sciences/Political Scientist
	Natalia Stalla	University of the Republic/Faculty of Humanities and Educational Sciences/Historian
	Juan Pablo Luna	Catholic University of Chile/Political Scientist
Central officials (Intendencia)	**Intendencia of Cerro Largo**	
	Sergio Botana	Intendente of Cerro Largo
	Aline Muria	*Mirada Ciudadana* Program. Legal consultant on Municipalities (Intendencia of Cerro Largo)
	Virginia Costa	Coordinator of Municipalities (Intendencia of Cerro Largo)
	Lucy Larrosa	Coodinator at *Mirada Ciudadana* Program (Intendencia of Cerro Largo)
Municipality of Isidoro Noblía		
Municipal officials	Pablo Freire	Mayor of Isidoro Noblía
	Virginia Ferreira	Municipal Councillor
	Alejandro Sorondo	Municipal Councillor
	Eduardo Gutiérrez	Municipal Councillor
	Pablo Beck	Municipal Councillor
	Graciela Benítez	Treasurer Administrative at

		Municipality of Isidoro Noblía
	Laura Pérez	Administrative official
Leaders/representatives of civil society	Alejandra Domínguez	Rural High School Director (Municipality of Isidoro Noblía)
	Hilda Cruz	Primary School Director at School N°99
	Sandra Sosa	Teacher and founder of Ballet Folkloric Troupe *Arte y Coraje*
	Sandra Bandera	Representant of Lion's Club of Isidoro Noblía
	Tony Posebon	Horse Racing Club *Los Potros*
Participating citizens	Marcelino Clavijo	Public employee of *OSE (Obras Sanitarias del Estado)* office
	Sergio Sosa	Instructor of Karate in Municipality of Isidoro Noblía
	Danubio Fabrica	Comissar of Isidoro Noblía
	Maribel Rodríguez	Children's Club/Employee at Rural High School/Partisan of *MPP-FA*
	Marlene Guzmán	Gym Teacher/Partisan of *FA*
	Teresita Cabrera	Nuestra Señora de Fátima Parish representative
	Leonardo Pastorino	Rural Development Board-Ministry of Agriculture, MGAP (Mesa de Desarrollo Rural)
	Julio César Díaz	Minister of Evangelical Church (Isidoro Noblía)
	Florencio Martínez	Founder and neighbour of Isidoro Noblía
	Viviana Cardozo	Professor at Children's Club *Charrúa*
	Valentina Iriarte Hernández	Neighbour of Isidoro Noblía (*Placita La Alegría*)
	A resident (woman)	*Medio Luto* Village
Central officials (Intendencia)	**Intendencia of Montevideo**	
	Daniel Martínez	Intendente of Montevideo
	Jorge Buriani	Director of Municipal Advise & Development Office-Intendencia of Montevideo

	Cecile Regent	Consultant on Decentralization (Intendencia of Montevideo)
	Francisco Fleitas	President of the Plenary of Montevideo
	Elizabeth Suárez	Executive coordinator of the Secretariat for Ethnic Racial Equality and Migrant Populations (Intendencia of Montevideo)
Municipality A		
Municipal Officials	Gabriel Otero	Mayor
	Luis Gorriarán	Municipal Councillor
	Mirtha Villasante	Municipal Councillor
	Nelson Moreira	Municipal Councillor
	Fabio Balsa	Municipal Councillor
	Nancy Villa	Municipal Councillor
	Diego Jauregui	Director
	Marieal Scasso	Head of Administration
	Silvana García	Administrative official
	Camila Silva	Administrative official
	Jimena Blanco	Social Worker at CCZ 18
	Virginia Mercader	Social Worker at CCZ 18
Leaders/Representatives of civil society	María Luisa Pereyra	Neighbourhood Councillor (CCZ 18)
	Tania Ocampo	Neighbourhood Councillor (CCZ 18)
	Hugo Coitiño	Neighbourhood Councillor (CCZ 18)
	Jorge Rodríguez	Neighbourhood Councillor (CCZ 17)
	Mirta Ramírez	Neighbourhood Councillor (CCZ 14)
	Beatriz Bagnado	Neighbourhood Councillor (CCZ 14)
Participating citizens	Graciela Garin	Neighbour (CCZ 17)
	Ana Nikicer	Neighbour (CCZ 17)
	Alberto Carmelo	Neighbour (CCZ 18-Subzone 5, Gori)
	René Santiago	Neighbour of Santiago Vázquez (CCZ 18)
	Gricel Barboza	Neighbour CCZ 18-Subzone 6-Playa Colorada
	Regino Muñoz	Neighbour Rincón del Cerro (CCZ 18)
	Julio Trincabelli	Neighbour Nuevo París (CCZ 14)
	Líber Solsona	Neighbour La Teja (CCZ 14)
	Miguel Barrio	Neighbour (CCZ 17)

	Susy Silva	Neighbour (Club Arbolito-La Teja- CCZ 14)
	Andrés Monin	Neighbour CCZ 14 (Community Radio *El Puente*)
	Rómulo Guerrini	Neighbour CCZ 18. QUELAVI. Development Commission.
Central officials (Intendencia)	**Intendencia of Canelones**	
	Yamandú Orsi	Intendente of Canelones
	Juan Tons	Director of Citizen Participation and Local Development (Intendencia of Canelones)
Municipality of Santa Rosa		
Municipal officials	Margot De León	Mayor of Santa Rosa
	Federico Cabrera	Municipal Councillor
	Gladys Rodríguez	Municipal Councillor
	Verónica Fernández	Municipal Councillor
	Rubén Darío Martínez	Municipal Councillor
	Mario Cabrera	Municipal official
Leaders/Representatives of civil society	Ana Lemus	Retired teacher. *CAIF*. Member of Board at *Hogar Aniceto Sevieri*
	Jorge Marrero	Ex syndicalist. Representative of FA in Santa Rosa. Ex Aedile. Member of Board at *Hogar Aniceto Sevieri*
	Daniel Pirotto	Secretary of Red Cross in Santa Rosa
	Hernán David Suárez	Priest of Santa Rosa Parish (Catholic Church)
	William García	Gym teacher. Neighbourhood Commission in *MEVIR*. FA's partisan (List 90, Socialism)
Participating citizens	Carlos Reyes Álvarez	Agricultural engineer. Manager of Mill of Santa Rosa. Manager in INACOOP. Rural Development Commission of Santa Rosa.
	Nahir Ferreira	Treasurer at *Socidad Criolla Avelino Miranda*
	Fabiana Reyes	Development Commission at the Atletic Club *Ideal*.

		Cooperative *Las Roseñas.*
	Gabriela Caraballo	Psychologist in Children's Club (*CAIF*)
	José Luis Pérez Guido	Teacher (Literature, History, Philosphy). Principal at High School Loreto Daniel Vidart.
	José Pedro Simois	Merchant in Santa Rosa. Candidate for Mayor (*Partido Colorado*)
	Mary Ubal	Merchant. Teacher at High School of Santa Rosa.
	Laura Carro	Police officer in Santa Rosa
	Maxi Rosada	Youth Group *Santas Latas*
	Esteban Hernández	Minister at Evangelical Church of Santa Rosa

Chile	Name	Position
National & Central Officials	Osvaldo Henríquez	Chief of Department of Competences' Transfers (SUBDERE)
	Pilar Cuevas	Chief of Division of Municipalities (SUBDERE)
	Ivan Borkoski	Executive Secretary of the Chilean Association of Municipalities (AChM)
	Patricio Olguin	Consultant in the Chilean Association of Municipalities (AChM)
	Mario Rosales	Coordinator at Observatory of Decentralization (AChM)
Scholars and experts	Gonzalo Delamaza	Sociologist. Regional Development Studies Center at Universidad de los Lagos
	Danae Mlylnarz Puig	Social Worker. Pontificia Universidad Católica. Manager in Institutionality of Territorial Dialogue in *Valor Minero* Project. Chief at Citizen Participation Department-Social Development Ministry.

	Egon Montecinos	Director of Territorial Studies Center. Former Mayor (Intendente) in Los Ríos
	Ignacia Fernández	Executive Director of RIMISP. Sociologist.
	Juan Fernández	Universidad Católica Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez. Researcher in RIMISP. Sociologist.
	Mario González	Consultant on Mapuche communities of Chile. National Parliament. Inter-American Development Bank.
IX Region of La Araucania Region. Province of Maule		
Central officials (Province)	Mauricio Ojeda	Governor of Cautin Province
Municipality of Perquenco		
Municipal officials	Luis Alberto Muñoz Pérez	Mayor
	Miguel Lara Baldebenito	Municipal Councillor
	Alejandro Sepúlveda	Municipal Councillor
	Gerardo Sanhueza	Municipal Councillor
	Claudia Urrutia	Municipal Councillor
	Juan Luis Opazo	Municipal Councillor
	Daniela González	Labor Information Office. Chief of Local Economic Development Unity
	Katherine Sanhueza	Social Worker (Organizational Strengthening Program)
	Patricia Miller	Chief of Municipal Library
Leaders/Representatives of Civil Society	Uberlinda Ramírez	President of *Junta de Vecinos* N° 1 El Progreso. Elderly Club's treasurer.
	Verónica Cayul	Leader of the Mapuche Community Luciano Cayul. President of *Junta de Vecinos.* Parents Center's member.
	Orosman Liencheu	Leader (*Lonko*) of Mapuche Community *La Laguna* (Quillén)
	María Delia Yañez	Vice-President of COSOC. Housing Committee representative.
	Rosa Isabel Lemonao	President of Mapuche Women Group *Nemundamu*
	Eliana Poo	COSOC's member. President of *Junta de Vecinos Los Aromos* and President of Communal

		Union of Elders. President of Elders' Club *Renacer.*
Participating citizens	Aurora Luengo	Elders' Club *El Progreso*. *Huaso's* Club.
	Nancy Purruel	Member of Mapuche Women Group Nemundamu
	Luz Arabena Peña	Member of Mapuche Women Group Nemundamu
	Isabel Córdoba	Elders' Group *Renacer*
	Gustavo Pitriqueo	President of Mapuche Communal Union
	Karen Pacheco	Municipal Library's user
	Christian Guzmán	Security Committee
	Emilia Cipao	Parishioner in *Nuestra Señora de los Dolores* Parish
	Josheep Huillipan	Community Project of Libraries. High School's teacher.
	Marina Figueroa	Mapuche Community Luciano Cayul's member
	Manuel Millacoy	Mapuche Community Luciano Cayul's member
Metropolitan Region-Santiago Province		
Municipality of Recoleta		
Municipal Officials	Daniel Jadue	Mayor (Communist Party)
	Luis González Britos	Municipal Councillor
	Fernando Pacheco	Municipal Councillor
	Ernesto Moreno	Municipal Councillor
	Natalia Cuevas	Municipal Councillor
	Mauricio Smok	Municipal Councillor
	Fernando Manzur	Municipal Councillor
	Fiona Chavez	Geographer
	Paula Muñoz	Chile Cuida Program-Psychologist
	Leandro Ahumada	Director of DIDECO
	Giannina Repetti	Chief of Administration Office
	Caterine Manríquez	Consultant on urban planning
	Alberto Pizarro	Executive Director of Recoleta Corporation
Leaders/Representatives of civil society	Carol Yañez	COSOC's member
	Dora Troncoso	President of COSOC
	Marcela Melej	President of *Junta de Vecinos Bella Vista*
	Graciela Espinoza	President of Elders's Club
	Ethel Libetzk	President of Florests Union
	Loreto Escudero	President of *Junta de Vecinos* Neighbourhood Unit N° 7

	Felix Pinales	Director of *Junta de Vecinos* Neighbourhood Unit N° 7
Participating citizens	Eneida David	Neighbour of Santos Dumont neighbourhood
	Marisol Benavídez	*Junta de Vecinos* Chungará Neighbourhood Unit N° 8
	Paula Azolas	*Junta de Vecinos* Chungará Nieghbourhood Unit N° 8
	Silvina Quintanilla	Neighbourhood Unit N° 7
	Angelina Quintana	Neighborhood Unit N° 4 *Escritores de Chile*
	María del Carmen Cufré	Neighbourhood Unit N° 24
	María Ibacache	Neighbourhood Unit N° 45. Santa Ana dwellers. Elders' Club.
	Norma Correa Troncoso	Neighbourhood Unit N° 14. Elders' Club. President of Communal Union of Neighbourhood Boards (*Juntas de Vecinos*)
	Norma Dicandia	Neighbourhood Unit N° 10.
	Immigrant from Haiti	User of municipality social programs
VII Region of Maule-Province of Talca		
Municipality of Empedrado		
Municipal officials	Manuel Báez	Mayor
	Patricio Peiñailillo	Municipal Councillor
	Rosa Opazo	Municipal Councillor
	Berta Bravo	Municipal Councillor
	Pablo Ortega	Director of DIDECO
	Juan Muñoz	Head of PRODESAL
	Dahianth Orellana	Social worker. Head of Community Development Office (DIDECO)
Leaders/Representatives of civil society	Berta Retamar	President of Elders' Club
	Fran Tejos	President of Communal Union
	Héctor Barrera	President of Housing Committee *Esperanza*
	Romilio Guajardo	Minister in Pentecostal Methodist Evangelical Church
	Carolina Espinoza	President of Water Committee
	Cristina Rojas	President of *Junta de Vecinos La Quebrada*
Participating citizens	Brunilda Retamar	Treasurer in Elders' Club
	Alejandro Hormazábal	Head of *Acerca Redes* Center. ARAUCO Forestry Company
	Manuel Arellano	Founder of Local Museum

	Olga Quintana	Treasurer in Water Committee
	Cecilia Ortega	Secretary in *Junta de Vecinos El Aroma*
	Jaqueline Figueroa	Treasurer in *Junta de Vecinos El Aroma*
	Nevada Parra	Neighbour of Empedrado (Parents' committee in primary school)
	Viviana Valdéz	Merchant. NGO *Apoyo a Redes*
	Gerardo Retamar	Prinicipal of High School San Ignacio
	Ida Carrasco Quiroz	Elders' Club

Appendix B

Université d'Ottawa
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa
Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

CERTIFICAT D'APPROBATION ÉTHIQUE | CERTIFICATE OF ETHICS APPROVAL

Numéro du dossier / Ethics File Number	S-06-18-567
Titre du projet / Project Title	The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America
Type de projet / Project Type	Thèse de doctorat / Doctoral thesis
Statut du projet / Project Status	Approuvé / Approved
Date d'approbation (jj/mm/aaaa) / Approval Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	30/07/2018
Date d'expiration (jj/mm/aaaa) / Expiry Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	29/07/2019

Équipe de recherche / Research Team

Chercheur / Researcher	Affiliation	Role
Claudia KUZMA	École de développement international et mondialisation / School of International Development and Global Studies	Chercheur Principal / Principal Investigator
Paul HASLAM	École de développement international et mondialisation / School of International Development and Global Studies	Superviseur / Supervisor

Conditions spéciales ou commentaires / Special conditions or comments

550, rue Cumberland, pièce 154   550 Cumberland Street, Room 154
Ottawa (Ontario) K1N 6N5 Canada   Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5 Canada

613-562-5387 ·   613-562-5338 ·   ethique@uOttawa.ca / ethics@uOttawa.ca
www.recherche.uottawa.ca/deontologie | www.recherche.uottawa.ca/ethics

30/07/2018

Université d'Ottawa

Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa

Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

Le Comité d'éthique de la recherche (CÉR) de l'Université d'Ottawa, opérant conformément à l'*Énoncé de politique des Trois conseils* (2014) et toutes autres lois et tous règlements applicables, a examiné et approuvé la demande d'éthique du projet de recherche ci-nommé.

L'approbation est valide pour la durée indiquée plus haut et est sujette aux conditions énumérées dans la section intitulée "Conditions Spéciales ou Commentaires". Le formulaire « Renouvellement ou Fermeture de Projet » doit être complété quatre semaines avant la date d'échéance indiquée ci-haut afin de demander un renouvellement de cette approbation éthique ou afin de fermer le dossier.

Toutes modifications apportées au projet doivent être approuvées par le CÉR avant leur mise en place, sauf si le participant doit être retiré en raison d'un danger immédiat ou s'il s'agit d'un changement ayant trait à des éléments administratifs ou logistiques du projet. Les chercheurs doivent aviser le CÉR dans les plus brefs délais de tout changement pouvant augmenter le niveau de risque aux participants ou pouvant affecter considérablement le déroulement du projet, rapporter tout évènement imprévu ou indésirable et soumettre toute nouvelle information pouvant nuire à la conduite du projet ou à la sécurité des participants.

The University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board, which operates in accordance with the *Tri-Council Policy Statement* (2014) and other applicable laws and regulations, has examined and approved the ethics application for the above-named research project.

Ethics approval is valid for the period indicated above and is subject to the conditions listed in the section entitled "Special Conditions or Comments". The "Renewal/Project Closure" form must be completedfour weeks before the above-referenced expiry date to request a renewal of this ethics approval or closure of the file.

Any changes made to the project must be approved by the REB before being implemented, except when necessary to remove participants from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) only pertain to administrative or logistical components of the project. Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes that increase the risk to participant(s), any changes that considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project or the safety of the participant(s).

Kim THOMPSON
Responsable d'éthique en recherche / Protocol Officer
Pour/For **Barbara GRAVES** Président(e) du/ Chair of the **Comité d'éthique de la recherche en sciences sociales et humanités / Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board**

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www.recherche.uottawa.ca/deontologie | www.recherche.uottawa.ca/ethics

16/07/2019

Université d'Ottawa

Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa

Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

CERTIFICAT D'APPROBATION ÉTHIQUE | CERTIFICATE OF ETHICS APPROVAL

Numéro du dossier / Ethics File Number	S-06-18-567
Titre du projet / Project Title	The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America
Type de projet / Project Type	Thèse de doctorat / Doctoral thesis
Statut du projet / Project Status	Renouvelé / Renewed
Date d'approbation (jj/mm/aaaa) / Approval Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	16/07/2019
Date d'expiration (jj/mm/aaaa) / Expiry Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	29/07/2020

Équipe de recherche / Research Team

Chercheur / Researcher	Affiliation	Role
Claudia KUZMA	École de développement international et mondialisation / School of International Development and Global Studies	Chercheur Principal / Principal Investigator
Paul HASLAM	École de développement international et mondialisation / School of International Development and Global Studies	Superviseur / Supervisor

Conditions spéciales ou commentaires / Special conditions or comments

16/07/2019

Université d'Ottawa

Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa

Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

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L'approbation est valide pour la durée indiquée plus haut et est sujette aux conditions énumérées dans la section intitulée "Conditions Spéciales ou Commentaires". Le formulaire « Renouvellement ou Fermeture de Projet » doit être complété quatre semaines avant la date d'échéance indiquée ci-haut afin de demander un renouvellement de cette approbation éthique ou afin de fermer le dossier.

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Any changes made to the project must be approved by the REB before being implemented, except when necessary to remove participants from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) only pertain to administrative or logistical components of the project. Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes that increase the risk to participant(s), any changes that considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project or the safety of the participant(s).

Marc Alain BONENFANT
Coordonnateur de l'éthique / Ethics Coordinator
Pour/For **Barbara GRAVES** Président(e) du/ Chair of the **Comité d'éthique de la recherche en sciences sociales et humanités / Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board**

<u>Consent Form</u> (Central and national officials)

<u>Research project</u>: "The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for a participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America"

<u>Researchers</u>: Claudia Kuzma (PhD candidate) and Paul Haslam (supervisor).

School of International Development and Global Studies

 120 University Avenue (8039), University of Ottawa

 Ontario K1N 6N5

 Canadá

The aim of this research project is to study the incidence of territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) on the participatory decentralization experience of the state and its impact on human development in developing countries from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. To achieve this aim, this project will analyze the decentralization experiences at municipal level within the national context of an increasing decentralization process since the decade of the 90's in two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Chile. This project is being conducted as part of Ms. Kuzma's doctoral thesis and it is funded by the National Agency of Research and Innovation (Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, *ANII*) of Uruguay.

The project will require interviews (around 1 hour and ½). During the interviews the participants will be asked about participatory decentralization process in their country. Interviews will be audio-recorded in order to ensure that all information will be well registered. This research activity will be carried out at public offices and they will be scheduled during working hours.

This study will benefit the participants since it will allow to reflect and discuss about the main learning, challenges, difficulties and resistances to achieve a true participatory decentralization not only in terms of the efficiency and quality of the municipal services but also in terms of the potential synergy and co-governance between local government and civil society. This virtuous relationship and mutual engagement will foster local development within the community.

The researchers will ask participants about their preference for confidentiality when publishing the findings of the project. Participant's identity will be safeguarded to the extent of their selected option below:

◯I do not want my identity revealed (my name will not be used and contextual information modified to further protect my identity).

◯I do not want my name revealed (my name will not be used, but, my title/status may be revealed).

◯I want my identity revealed (my name, title/status, organization, etc. will be stated)

Note that if no option is selected, a participant's identity will remain safeguarded and fully protected through the use of a pseudonym.

This research project might cause some risks to participants who decide to reveal their identities. Indeed, central and national officials might experience some inconveniences or discomforts since this investigation will involve issues directly related to their work as public employees.

The contents will be used only to search the influence of socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization and the results of this research will be used for future presentations and publications. The data collected both hard copy and electronic data such as tape recordings of interviews, transcripts, questionnaires, photographs, videos and field notes will be kept in a secure manner. They will be stored at the researcher home or at a hotel in the field. During the collection and analysis of data, a technical safeguard will be used to securely store all electronic data and project documents such as passwords. All research data will be retained for a minimum of five years for future investigations.

Participation is voluntary so participants can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If they choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed.

Participants are asked to keep a hard copy of this form for their record. If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

Do you agree to participate in this research project?

If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
Tel.: (613) 562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

Researcher's signature:……………………………. *(Signature)*   Date: *(Date)*

Consent Form (Municipal Oficials and Professionals)

Research project: "The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for a participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America"

Researchers: Claudia Kuzma (PhD candidate) and Paul Haslam (supervisor).

School of International Development and Global Studies

120 University Avenue (8039), University of Ottawa

 Ontario K1N 6N5

 Canadá

The aim of this research project is to study the incidence of territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) on the participatory decentralization experience of the state and its impact on human development in developing countries from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. To achieve this aim, this project will analyze the decentralization experiences at municipal level within the national context of an increasing decentralization process since the decade of the 90's in two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Chile. This project is being conducted as part of Ms. Kuzma's doctoral thesis and it is funded by the National Agency of Research and Innovation (Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, *ANII*) of Uruguay.

The project will require interviews (around 1 hour and ½), focus group (around 3 hours) and observation. During the interviews the participants will be asked about their experience on participatory decentralization in the municipality. Interviews will be audio-recorded in order to ensure that all information will be well registered. In the focus groups they will be asked to discuss about the main learning, difficulties and challenges to achieve a participatory decentralization. Focus group will be photographed and video-recorded in order to complement the information collected through field notes. Observation will be applied in order to analyze delegation of functions, political power and resources from the central to local bureaucracy as well as the inclusion of the territorial perspective through civil society engagement. For this purpose municipal activities which involve both local government and local civil society may be attended and observed as well as the delivery of municipal services. All research activities will be carried out at municipal offices and they will be scheduled during working hours.

This study will benefit the participants since it will allow to reflect and discuss about the main learning, challenges, difficulties and resistances to achieve a true participatory decentralization not only in terms of the efficiency and quality of the municipal services but also in terms of the potential synergy and co-governance between local government and civil society. This virtuous relationship and mutual engagement will foster local development within the community.

The researchers will ask participants about their preference for confidentiality when publishing the findings of the project. Participant's identity will be safeguarded to the extent of their selected option below:

◯ I do not want my identity revealed (my name will not be used and contextual information modified to further protect my identity).

◯ I do not want my name revealed (my name will not be used, but, my title/status may be revealed).

◯ I want my identity revealed (my name, title/status, organization, etc. will be stated)

If no option is selected, a participant's identity will remain safeguarded and fully protected through the use of a pseudonym.

Please note that researchers cannot guarantee that other members of the focus group entirely preserve the confidentiality of the information you will share during this activity. Furthermore, this research project might cause some risks to participants who decide to reveal their identities. Indeed, municipal officials and professionals might experience some inconveniences or discomforts since this investigation will involve issues directly related to their work as public employees within municipalities.

The contents will be used only to search the influence of socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization and the results of this research will be used for future presentations and publications. The data collected both hard copy and electronic data such as tape recordings of interviews, transcripts, questionnaires, photographs, videos and field notes will be kept in a secure manner. They will be stored at the researcher home or at a hotel in the field. During the collection and analysis of data, a technical safeguard will be used to securely store all electronic data and project documents such as passwords. All research data will be retained for a minimum of five years for future investigations.

Participation is voluntary so participants can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If they choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed except for focus group technique since its data is highly dependent on the overall group discussion.

Participants are asked to keep a hard copy of this form for their record. If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

Do you agree to participate in this research project?

If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5

<div align="center">

Tel.: (613) 562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

</div>

Researcher's signature:……………………………. *(Signature)* Date: *(Date)*

<u>Consent Form</u> (Representatives and social leaders from civil society)

Research project: "The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for a participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America"

<u>Researchers</u>: Claudia Kuzma (PhD candidate) and Paul Haslam (supervisor).

School of International Development and Global Studies

120 University Avenue (8039), University of Ottawa

Ontario K1N 6N5

Canadá

The aim of this research project is to study the incidence of territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) on the participatory decentralization experience of the state and its impact on human development in developing countries from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. To achieve this aim, this project will analyze the decentralization experiences at the municipal level within the national context of an increasing decentralization process since the decade of the 90's in two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Chile. This project is being conducted as part of Ms. Kuzma's doctoral thesis and it is funded by the National Agency of Research and Innovation (Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, *ANII*) of Uruguay.

The project will require interviews (around 1 hour and ½), focus group (around 3 hours), social and resources mapping (around 2 hours) and observation. During the interviews the participants will be asked about their experience on participatory decentralization in the municipality. Interviews will be audio-recorded in order to ensure that all information will be well registered. In the focus groups they will be asked to discuss about the main learning, difficulties and challenges to achieve a participatory decentralization. In the social and resources mapping they will be asked to identify the community resources to deal with needs and problems. Focus group and social and resources mapping will be photographed and video-recorded in order to complement the information collected through field notes. Observation will be applied to municipal activities which involve both local government and local civil society. In addition, observation will be undertaken of any activity promoted by representatives related to local government and development as well as of any other social event such as informal gatherings after official meetings or on weekends, religious and state holidays and family celebrations.

All research activities will be carried out at municipal offices or social organizations linked to the municipality and they will be scheduled during or after the activities promoted by local government. This study will benefit the participants since it will allow to reflect and discuss about the main learning, challenges, difficulties and resistances to achieve a true participatory decentralization not only in terms of the efficiency and quality of the municipal services but also in terms of the potential synergy and co-governance between local government and civil society. This virtuous relationship and mutual engagement will foster local development within the community.

The researchers will ask participants about their preference for confidentiality when publishing the findings of the project. Participant's identity will be safeguarded to the extent of their selected option below:

◯ I do not want my identity revealed (my name will not be used and contextual information modified to further protect my identity).

◯ I do not want my name revealed (my name will not be used, but, my title/status may be revealed).

◯ I want my identity revealed (my name, title/status, organization, etc. will be stated)

If no option is selected, a participant's identity will remain safeguarded and fully protected through the use of a pseudonym. Please note that researchers cannot guarantee that other members of the focus group entirely preserve the confidentiality of the information you will share during this activity. Furthermore, this research project might cause some risks to participants who decide to reveal their identities. Indeed, representatives or leaders from civil society may also experience some discomforts to give their opinions and express their thoughts about municipal government and participatory mechanisms, spaces and experiences at their municipalities.

The contents will be used only to search the influence of socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization and the results of this research will be used for future presentations and publications. The data collected both hard copy and electronic data such as tape recordings of interviews, transcripts, questionnaires, photographs, videos and field notes will be kept in a secure manner. They will be stored at the researcher home or at a hotel in the field. During the collection and analysis of data, a technical safeguard will be used to securely store all electronic data and project documents such as passwords. All research data will be retained for a minimum of five years for future investigations.

Participation is voluntary so participants can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If they choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed except for focus group technique since its data is highly dependent on the overall group discussion.

Participants are asked to keep a hard copy of this form for their record. If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. Do you agree to participate in this research project? If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5

Tel.: (613) 562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

Researcher's signature:……………………………. *(Signature)* Date: *(Date)*

<u>Consent Form</u> (Participating citizens)

Research project: "The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for a participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America"

<u>Researchers</u>: Claudia Kuzma (PhD candidate) and Paul Haslam (supervisor).

School of International Development and Global Studies

120 University Avenue (8039), University of Ottawa

Ontario K1N 6N5

Canadá

The aim of this research project is to study the incidence of territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) on the participatory decentralization experience of the state and its impact on human development in developing countries from a comparative perspective. To achieve this aim, this project will analyze the municipal decentralization in two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Chile. This project is being conducted as part of Ms. Kuzma's doctoral thesis and it is funded by the National Agency of Research and Innovation (Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, *ANII*) of Uruguay.

The project will require interviews (around 1 hour and ½), social and resources mapping (around 2 hours) and observation. During the interviews the participants will be asked about their experience on participatory decentralization not only within the spaces promoted by municipality but also in other spaces led by civil society such as NGOs, unions, associations, social networks and social movements. Interviews will be audio-recorded in order to ensure that all information will be well registered. In the social and resources mapping they will be asked to identify the community resources to deal with their needs and problems. Social and resources mapping will be photographed and video-recorded to complement the information collected through field notes. Observation will be undertaken of any participatory experience, process or space related to local development promoted by municipal government or by civil society as well as informal gatherings or on weekends, religious and state holidays, and family celebrations. All research activities will be carried out at municipal offices or social organizations and they will be scheduled during or after the activities promoted by municipalities or civil society.

This study will benefit the participants since it will allow reflect and discuss about the main learning and difficulties to achieve a true participatory decentralization not only in terms of the efficiency and quality of the municipal services but also in terms of the potential cooperation between local government and civil society. This relationship and mutual engagement will foster local development within the community.

Participant's identity will be protected by researchers through pseudonyms. This research project might cause some risks to participants. Indeed, they might feel some kind of discomfort to talk about their participatory experiences within spaces promoted by local government or about their difficulties to deal with their problems and needs within their communities.

The data collected will be kept in a secure manner. The results of this research will be used for future presentations and publications. All research data will be retained for a minimum of five years for future investigations.

Participation is voluntary so participants can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If they choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed.

Participants are asked to keep a hard copy of this form for their record. If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

Do you agree to participate in this research project?

If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
Tel.: (613) 562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

Researcher's signature:……………………………. 		*(Signature)* 	Date: *(Date)*

Consent Form (Scholars and Experts)

<u>Research project</u>: "The socio-cultural dimension of territory as the foundation for a participatory decentralization and human development in Latin America"

<u>Researchers</u>: Claudia Kuzma (PhD candidate) and Paul Haslam (supervisor).

School of International Development and Global Studies

120 University Avenue (8039), University of Ottawa

Ontario K1N 6N5

Canadá

The aim of this research project is to study the incidence of territory (particularly its socio-cultural dimension) on the participatory decentralization experience of the state and its impact on human development in developing countries from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. To achieve this aim, this project will analyze the decentralization experiences at the municipal level within the national context of an increasing decentralization process since the decade of the 90's in two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Chile. This project is being conducted as part of Ms. Kuzma's doctoral thesis and it is funded by the National Agency of Research and Innovation (Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, *ANII*) of Uruguay.

The project will require interviews of about one hour and half. During these interviews the participants (scholars and experts) will be asked about the participatory decentralization process in their country, the main obstacles, difficulties, learning and achievements as well as the possible causes of them. Interviews will be audio-recorded in order to ensure that all information will be well registered.

The researchers will ask participants about their preference for confidentiality when publishing the findings of the project. Participant's identity will be safeguarded to the extent of their selected option below:

◯ I do not want my identity revealed (my name will not be used and contextual information modified to further protect my identity).

◯ I do not want my name revealed (my name will not be used, but, my title/status may be revealed).

◯ I want my identity revealed (my name, title/status, organization, etc. will be stated)

Note that if no option is selected, a participant's identity will remain safeguarded and fully protected through the use of a pseudonym.

This research project might cause some risks to participants who decide to give their opinions and reveal their identities within their academic or work environment.

The contents will be used only to search the influence of socio-cultural dimension of territory on participatory decentralization and the results of this research will be used for future presentations and publications. The data collected both hard copy and electronic data such as

tape recordings of interviews, transcripts, questionnaires, photographs, videos and field notes will be kept in a secure manner. They will be stored at the researcher home or at a hotel in the field. During the collection and analysis of data, a technical safeguard will be used to securely store all electronic data and project documents such as passwords. All research data will be retained for a minimum of five years for future investigations.

Participation is voluntary so participants can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If they choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed.

Participants are asked to keep a hard copy of this form for their record. If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

Do you agree to participate in this research project?

If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
Tel.: (613) 562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

Researcher's signature:……………………………. *(Signature)* Date: *(Date)*

Appendix C

Questionnaires

A) Central and national government officials

A) Funcionarios públicos a nivel central y nacional

1. Personal information: name, organism, position, period of time in this position, previous experiences at central/national government.

1. Información personal: nombre, organismo, cargo, período de tiempo en su cargo, experiencias previas de trabajo a nivel central/nacional de gobierno.

2. How do you define decentralization? Which are its main characteristics?

2. ¿Cómo definiría la descentralización? ¿Cuáles son sus principales características?

3. Which are the main national goals and principles of decentralization in this country?

3. ¿Cuáles son los principales objetivos y principios de la descentralización a nivel nacional en este país?

4. How do you evaluate the national and municipal decentralization process in terms of its strengths and weaknesses?

4. ¿Cómo evalúa el proceso de descentralización a nivel nacional y municipal en términos de sus fortalezas y debilidades?

5. Which are the main obstacles and difficulties for decentralizing national and municipal government and what are their main causes?

5. ¿Cuáles son los principales obstáculos y dificultades de la descentralización a nivel nacional y municipal y cuáles son sus principales causas?

6. Which are the main learning and achievements of decentralization process in the last decades and what are their causes?

6. ¿Cuáles son los principales aprendizajes y logros obtenidos de la descentralización en la última década y cuáles sus principales causas?

7. In your opinion, what are the opportunities for decentralization process in the current moment?

7. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son las oportunidades para el proceso de descentralización en este momento?

8. What is the expected role of civil society within the decentralization project?

8. ¿Cuál es el rol esperado de la sociedad civil dentro del proyecto de descentralización?

9. How do you evaluate the citizen participation experiences related to decentralization policy in terms of learning, achievements as well as of main difficulties and challenges?

9. ¿Cómo evalúa las experiencias de participación ciudadana vinculadas a la política de descentralización en términos de aprendizajes, logros, dificultades y desafíos?

10. In your opinion, which are the causes of these achievements/difficulties?

10. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son las causas de estos logros y dificultades?

11. Which are the resources, capabilities and skills of the local government required to achieve participatory decentralization from the local level?

11. ¿Cuáles son los recursos, capacidades y habilidades del gobierno municipal para alcanzar la descentralización participativa a nivel local?

12. Which are the resources, capabilities and skills of the civil society required to achieve the participatory decentralization?

12. ¿Cuáles son los recursos, capacidades y habilidades de la sociedad civil necesarios para lograr una descentralización participativa?

B) <u>Municipal officials</u> (including mayors, managers and professionals)

B) <u>Funcionarios municipales</u> (incluye alcaldes, directores y profesionales)

1. Personal information: name, organism, position, period of time in this position, previous experiences at municipal government.
1. Información personal: nombre, organismo, cargo, período de tiempo en su cargo, experiencias previas a nivel del gobierno municipal.
2. How do you define decentralization? Which are its main characteristics?

2. ¿Cómo definiría a la descentralización? ¿Cuáles son sus principales características?

3. Which are the main goals and principles of the municipal decentralization?

3. ¿Cuáles son los principales objetivos y principios de la descentralización municipal?

4. Which are the main changes or reforms of municipal decentralization over time? How do you feel about these changes?

4. ¿Cuáles son los principales cambios o reformas de la descentralización municipal a lo largo del tiempo? ¿Cómo se siente respecto a estos cambios?

5. Which are the main spaces and mechanisms for political participation, for accountability and decision-making processes promoted by the local government?

5. ¿Cuáles son los principales espacios y mecanismos de participación política, de rendición de cuentas y para los procesos de toma de decisión ciudadana promovidos por el gobierno municipal?

6. Do you know any co-governance (networks between local government and civil society) experience in your municipality? Did you participate on it? Which were the main lessons achieved from it?

6. ¿Conoce Ud alguna experiencia de co-gobernanza (redes entre el gobierno local y la sociedad civil) en su municipalidad? ¿Ud. participó de ella? ¿Cuáles fueron los principales aprendizajes?

7. How local government defines development problems of this community?

7. ¿Cómo define el gobierno local los problemas vinculados al desarrollo en su comunidad?

8. Which are your main reasons and motivations for working at this community?

8. Cuáles son las principales razones y motivaciones para trabajar en su comunidad?

9. What is the expected role of civil society within the decentralization project?

9. ¿Cuál es el rol esperado de la sociedad civil dentro del proyecto de descentralización?

10. How do you evaluate the citizen participation experiences related to decentralization policy in terms of learning, achievements as well as of main difficulties and challenges?

10. ¿Cómo evalúa las experiencias de participación ciudadana vinculadas a la política de descentralización en términos de aprendizajes, logros, dificultades y desafíos?

11. In your opinion, which are the causes of these achievements/difficulties?

11. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son las causas de estos logros y dificultades?

12. Do you believe that all members of this community feel included in this municipality?

12. ¿Cree Ud. que todos los miembros de esta comunidad se sienten incluidos en esta municipalidad?

13. How Afro-Uruguayans or Mapuche community organization/movement/network is linked/engaged with local government?

13. ¿Cómo las organizaciones/movimientos/redes de Afro-Uruguayos o comunidades Mapuche están vinculadas/comprometidas con el gobierno local?

14. Which are the resources, capabilities and skills of the local government required to achieving participatory decentralization from the local level?

14. ¿Cuáles son los recursos, capacidades y habilidades del gobierno municipal necesarios para lograr una descentralización participativa a nivel local?

15. Which are the resources, capabilities and skills of the civil society required to achieve the participatory decentralization?

15. ¿Cuáles son los recursos, capacidades y habilidades de la sociedad civil necesarios para lograr una descentralización participativa?

C) Civil society leaders/representatives

C) Líderes y representantes de la sociedad civil

1. Personal information: name, organization, role or position, period of time in this role or position, previous experiences of participation (NGO, union, social network, churches, neighbourhood association, committee, movement).

1. Información personal: nombre, organización, rol o cargo, período de tiempo en su rol o cargo, experiencias previas de participación (ONG, sindicato, redes sociales, iglesias, asociaciones vecinales, comité, movimiento).

2. How do you define decentralization? Which are its main characteristics?

2. ¿Cómo definiría a la descentralización? ¿Cuáles son sus principales características?

3. Which are the main goals and principles of the municipal decentralization?

3. ¿Cuáles son los principales objetivos y principios de la descentralización municipal?

4. Which are the main changes or reforms of municipal decentralization over time and how do you feel about these changes?

4. ¿Cuáles son los principales cambios o reformas de la descentralización municipal a lo largo del tiempo? ¿Cómo se siente respecto a estos cambios?

5. Which are the main obstacles and difficulties for decentralizing municipal government and what are their main causes?

5. ¿Cuáles son los principales obstáculos y dificultades para la descentralización municipal y cuáles serían sus principales causas?

6. How do you define the main development problems of your community?

6. ¿Cómo define Ud. los principales problemas vinculados al desarrollo en su comunidad?

7. What are the main reasons and motivations for working at this community?

7. ¿Cuáles son las principales razones y motivaciones para trabajar en su comunidad?

8. How do you - as a representative/leader of your community- participate in the municipal government (e.g. planning, budget, advice)?

8. ¿Cómo Ud - en su calidad de representante o líder de su comunidad- participa dentro del gobierno municipal (por ej: planificación, presupuesto, consejo)?

9. Which are the main spaces and mechanisms for political participation, for accountability and decision-making processes promoted by the local government?

9. ¿Cuáles son los principales espacios y mecanismos de participación política, de rendición de cuentas y para los procesos de toma de decisión promovidos por el gobierno municipal?

10. Do you know any co-governance (networks between local government and civil society) experience in your municipality? Did you participate on it and which were the main lessons achieved from it?

10. ¿Conoce Ud alguna experiencia de co-gobernanza (redes entre el gobierno local y la sociedad civil) en su municipalidad? ¿Participó Ud. de ella? ¿Cuáles fueron los principales aprendizajes?

11. How do you represent your organization in terms of receiving demands, claims and proposals from their members as well as from the civil society (neighborhood, town or village) to incidence on the municipal policies and plans?

11. ¿Cómo Ud representa a su organización en términos de recepción de demandas, reclamos y propuestas de sus miembros así como de la sociedad civil (barrio, pueblo o villa) en general para incidir en las políticas y planes municipales?

12. Which are the main development problems of your local community?

12. ¿Cuáles son los principales problemas vinculados al desarrollo en su comunidad?

13. Do you believe that all members of this community feel included in this municipality?

13. ¿Cree Ud. que todos los miembros de esta comunidad se sienten incluidos en esta municipalidad?

14. Do you know any Afro-Uruguayan/Mapuche community organization, movement or network within your municipality?

14.¿Conoce Ud alguna organización, movimiento o red de Afro-Uruguayos/Comunidad Mapuche dentro de su municipio?

15. How this organization/movement/network is linked/engaged with the local government?

15. ¿Cómo esta organización/movimiento/red está vinculado/comprometido con el gobierno local?

16. Which are the resources, capabilities and skills of the local government required to achieve the participatory decentralization from the local level?

16. ¿Cuáles son los recursos, capacidades y habilidades del gobierno municipal necesarios para alcanzar una descentralización participativa a nivel local?

17. Which are the resources, capabilities and skills of the civil society required to achieve the participatory decentralization?

17. ¿Cuáles son los recursos, capacidades y habilidades de la sociedad civil necesarios para lograr una descentralización participativa?

D) Participating citizens

D) Ciudadanos participantes

1. Personal information: name, organization, previous experiences of participation (NGO, union, social network, churches, neighbourhood association, committee, movement).

1. Información personal: nombre, organización, experiencias previas de participación (ONG, sindicato, redes sociales, iglesias, asociaciones vecinales, comité, movimiento).

2. How do you evaluate the municipal decentralization process in terms of its strenghts and weaknesses?

2. ¿Cómo evalúa el proceso de descentralización municipal en términos de sus fortalezas y debilidades?

3. Which are the main spaces and mechanisms for political participation, for accountability and for decision-making processes promoted by the local government?

3. ¿Cuáles son los principales espacios y mecanismos de participación política, de rendición de cuentas y para procesos de toma de decisión promovidos por el gobierno municipal?

4. In your opinion, what is the expected role of citizens within the decentralization project?

4. En su opinión, ¿cuál es el rol esperado de los ciudadanos dentro del proyecto de descentralización?

5. In your opinion, which are the most valuable experiences of participation as citizen promoted by municipal government or by civil society? What is the difference between them?

5. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son las experiencias de participación más valiosas como ciudadano/a promovidas por el gobierno municipal o por la sociedad civil? ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre dichas experiencias?

6. Which are the most important learning and achievements during these experiences? Why?

6. ¿Cuáles son los aprendizajes y logros más importantes? ¿Por qué?

7. What are the main reasons and motivations for working at this community?

7. ¿Cuáles son las principales razones y motivaciones para trabajar en su comunidad?

8. Which are the main obstacles and difficulties to participate and which are their causes?

8. ¿Cuáles son los principales obstáculos y dificultades para participar y cuáles son sus causas?

9. If you belong to any NGO, union, neighborhood association or committee, network or movement, how do you propose your ideas and share your experiences within your organization in order to influence on municipal government (planning, budget, advice)?

9. Si Ud. pertenece a alguna ONG, sindicato, asociación o comité de vecinos, red o movimiento, ¿cómo propone sus ideas y comparte sus experiencias dentro de su organización para incidir en su gobierno municipal (planificación, presupuesto, asesoramiento)?

10. How do you perceive the work of your (neighbor) councils, local representatives/leader in terms of transparency, representativeness and engagement with citizens?

10. ¿Cómo percibe Ud. el trabajo de sus concejales (barriales), representante local/líder en términos de transparencia, representatividad y compromiso con los ciudadanos?

11. Do you believe that all members of this community feel included in this municipality?

11. ¿Cree Ud. que todos los miembros de esta comunidad se sienten incluidos en esta municipalidad?

12. Which are the main development problems of your local community?

12. ¿Cuáles son los principales problemas vinculados al desarrollo en su comunidad?

13. Do you know any co-governance (networks between local government and civil society) experience in your municipality? Did you participate on it and which were the main lessons achieved from it?

13. ¿Conoce Ud alguna experiencia de co-gobernanza (redes entre el gobierno local y la sociedad civil) en su municipalidad? ¿Participó Ud. de ella? ¿Cuáles fueron los principales aprendizajes?

<u>Focus group guide</u>

<u>Objective</u>: To analyze and compare the perceptions and discourses between municipal officials and leaders/representatives from the civil society about participatory decentralization processes within the selected municipalities in terms of their main learning, achievements, opportunities, difficulties, obstacles and resistances.

<u>Participants:</u> At least five key informants from civil society such as social leaders/representatives and five municipal officials (e.g. mayor, municipal councillors and professionals) from each municipality.

<u>Stages</u>

1. <u>General presentation and explanation</u> about the objectives of this activity in the context of the research project, and the main ethical issues previously explained during the interviews.

2. <u>Instructions for the activity</u>

Participants will discuss about the following questions:

a) Which are the main obstacles and difficulties to implement participatory decentralization in your municipality? Why?
b) What are the main achievements and learnings regarding to participatory decentralization at your municipality?

Answers were written and recorded during this activity.

3. <u>Closing of activity:</u> Final reflections and comments by participants and by the researcher.

Social and resources mapping guide

Objective: To observe the appropriation of spaces and mechanisms for citizen participation not only promoted by the state but also by civil society such as NGOs, social networks, trade unions, churches, associations and social clubs. In addition, this technique aim to analyze the main weaknesses (difficulties) and strengths namely community resources such as social organizations, networks, movements; skills and capabilities for decision-making processes in order to influence municipal government and to improve local development. Participants are invited to identify the main development problems, their possible causes and potential solutions taking into account their own community resources.

Participants: Key informants from civil society such as social leaders/representatives and participating citizens involved in spaces and channels promoted by municipal government or by civil society.

Stages

1. General presentation and explanation about the objectives of this activity in the context of my research project. This technique will be applied to participants during the interviews.

2. Instructions for the activity

2.1 Concepts of this activity will be explained to the participants. For instance: community resources refer to social organizations, networks, movements that are involved in the local government management and promote civic engagement. Futhermore, skills and capabilities for decision-making processes refer to learning processes about citizen participation through spaces and channels promoted by municipality (cabildos, meetings, neighbourhood elections, budgeting, planning) as well as by civil society (neighbourhood assemblies, commissions) to improve local development.

2.2 Development problems and social needs refer to the inefficient or insufficient public policies regarding to health, education, housing, nutrition, infrastructure, transports, discrimination against ethnic minorities like Afro-descendants or Mapuche communities, unemployment and poverty that negatively affect human development within local communities.

2.3 Participants will identify their community resources in order to deal with their development problems and social needs and their skills and capabilities for decision-making processes. Then, they will be asked to draw a map (or to use a printed map of their municipality) in order to place these community resources and capabilities for decision-making processes in order to find the best solutions and improve local development.

3. Closing of activity: Final reflections and comments by participants and by the researcher.

Appendix D

Maps-Uruguay

Figure D1. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Percentage of population with at least one Unsatisfied Basic Needs by departments.* Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. [Unpublished map], University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on 2011 Census. Calvo, J. (2013) Atlas socio-demográfico y de la desigualdad del Uruguay. Montevideo: UNFPA, INE, MIDES, OPP, IECON-UdelaR, Programa de Población-UdelaR. QGIS.

Figure D2. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Percentage of population with at least one UBN in Montevideo by neighbourhoods*. Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. [Unpublished map], University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on 2011 Census. Calvo, J. (2013) Atlas socio-demográfico y de la desigualdad del Uruguay. Montevideo: UNFPA, INE, MIDES, OPP, IECON-UdelaR, Programa de Población-UdelaR. QGIS.

Figure D3. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Percentage of Afro-descendants in Uruguay by departments*. Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. [Unpublished map], University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on 2011 Census. Calvo, J. (2013) Atlas socio-demográfico y de la desigualdad del Uruguay. Montevideo: UNFPA, INE, MIDES, OPP, IECON-UdelaR, Programa de Población-UdelaR. QGIS.

Figure D4. *The 112 Municipalities created in 2015 in Uruguay, based on the 2011 Census*. Municipality A (N° 1), Municipality of Santa Rosa (N°36) and Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (N°46). Nion A. & Feo, Y (2017) Reporte N° 6. *Clasificación socio-territorial de los municipios*. Observatorio Territorio Uruguay. OPP. Retrieved from: https://otu.opp.gub.uy/sites/default/files/docsBiblioteca/Reporte%206%20-%20Observatorio%20Territorio%20Uruguay.pdf

Uruguay: *Maps of the selected case studies*

Figure D5. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Map of Municipality A in Montevideo Department (Uruguay).* [Unpublished map] Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on MVOT geoservice and QGIS.

Figure D6. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Map of Municipality of Isidoro Noblía in Cerro Largo Department (Uruguay).* [Unpublished map] Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on MVOT geoservice and QGIS.

Figure D7. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Map of Municipality of Santa Rosa in Canelones Department (Uruguay)*. [Unpublished map] Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on MVOT geoservice and QGIS.

Uruguay: *Social and resources mapping activity*

Figure D8. Social and resources mapping activity in Municipality of Isidoro Noblía (Cerro Largo Department).

Figure D9. Social and resources mapping activity in Municipality A (Montevideo Department).

Figure D10. Social and resources mapping activity in Municipality of Santa Rosa (Canelones Department).

Chile: *Maps of the selected case studies*

Figure D11. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Map of Municipality of Perquenco, located in the La Araucania Region (Chile)* [Unpublished map] Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (Chile) and QGIS.

Figure D12. Adapted from Pose, S. (2021). *Map of Municipality of Empedrado, located in the Maule Region (Chile).* [Unpublished map] Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (Chile) and QGIS.

Figure D13. Pose, Sabrina. *Municipality of Recoleta located in the Metropolitan Region (Chile)*. [Unpublished map] Reproduced with permission of Sabrina Pose. University of the Republic of Uruguay. Map drawn based on Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (Chile) and QGIS.

Chile: *Social and resources mapping activity*

Figure D14. Social and resources mapping activity in the Municipality of Perquenco (La Araucanía region).

Figure D15. Social and resources mapping activity in the Municipality of Recoleta (Metropolitan region).

Figure D16. Social and resources mapping in the Municipality of Empedrado (Maule region).

Tables

Table D1

Research techniques applied in Municipalities

	Semi-structured interviews	Focus group	Social and resources mapping	Observation	Research activities
Municipality of Isidoro Noblía	32	1	1	Delivery of municipal services, Municipal sessions. Traditional festivals. (3)	37
Municipality of Santa Rosa	21	1	2	Delivery of municipal services, Municipal sessions. Traditional festivals (3)	27
Municipality A	27	1	2	Delivery of municipal services, participatory planning, PB & CV's elections. M.Session Meetings in community centers (5)	35
Municipality of Perquenco	26	2	2	Delivery of muninicpal services. Informal gatherings (San Sebastian feast). Mapuche ceremonies (4)	34
Municipality of Empedrado	23	1	1	Delivery of municipal services. Municipal session. Meetings in community centers (Elders' Club), community activities (4)	29
Municipality of Recoleta	30	1	1	Delivery of municipal services. Municipal session. Community centers. Health center. Junta de Vecinos Bella Vista. (5)	37
Totals	**159**	7	9	24	**199**

Table D2

Research techniques applied to national/central officials and scholars

	National/central officials and Scholars	Semi-structured interviews
Uruguay	Ministry of Social Development, Budget and Planning Office	10
	Intendencias (Cerro Largo, Canelones, Montevideo)	11
	Scholars and Experts	11
Chile	(SUBDERE, AChM)	5
	Provinces (Cautín)	1
	Scholars and Experts	6
	Total	**44**

Table D3

Incidence of poverty in persons by geographical area and ethnicity

	Total country	Total Montevideo	Total countryside	Locations + 5000 inhabitants	Locations – 5000 inhabitants
Total	7,9	11,1	5,8	5,9	7,2
Afro	16,9	24,7	11,4	11,8	12,6
White	6,8	9,3	5,1	5,3	6,4
Others	8,4	12,6	5,1	4,7	-----

Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay), 2017.

Table D4

Percentage of population with at least one UBN by departments.

Departments	Percentage of population with at least one UBN
Artigas	54,4
Salto	49,4
Rivera	45,4
Tacuarembó	45,2
Cerro Largo	**44,8**
Durazno	42,0
Paysandú	41,4
Treinta y Tres	38,9
Río Negro	38,9
Soriano	35,7
San José	35,0
Rocha	34,5
Maldonado	33,6
Lavalleja	33,6
Canelones	**32,2**
Florida	30,3
Flores	28,6
Colonia	28,6
Montevideo	**26,8**

Calvo, J. (2013). Atlas socio-demográfico y de la desigualdad del Uruguay, Montevideo: UdelaR.

Table D5

Percentage of indigenous people by indigenous groups in Chile

Indigenous Groups in Chile	Percentage of indigenous people
Mapuche	**79.8%**
Aymara	7.2%
Diaguita	4.1%
Quechua	1.6%

Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistic of Chile), 2018

Table D5

Percentage of indigenous people by indigenous groups in Chile

Indigenous Groups in Chile	Percentage of indigenous people

Glossary

Cabildos: Open town-hall meetings. Spaces or mechanisms for accountability promoted by municipal government in order to provide information to neighbours about the Municipal Development Plan and Municipal Budget. During the first Cabildo, the local authorities have to inform the public about their municipal plan, which will be monitored by citizens in the next Cabildo session. Cabildos' existence and functioning are established by the legal frameworks in Uruguay and in Chile. Cabildos should be organized by local government at least once a year.

Candombe: A style of rhythm and dance brought by enslaved Africans to Uruguay. Candombe became a cultural expression of resistance by Africans and Afro-descendants against the cultural homogenization implemented by the national state and the Catholic Church in this country. Candombe not only joined them together but also reminded them of their African past and held them close to their origins, to their history. Playing the drum (which derives from the African word 'tango') was something more than noise or music, it meant getting close to their people. In addition, using the drums to call one another (giving origin to *las llamadas* or "the calls" rhythmic sequences played on the drums), it was useful to gather together in groups and remember religious and warfare worships, something that still remains when they heat their drumheads around the fire.

Carabineros: Security forces that were known as cavalry corps, established in 1927 in Chile. Carabineros comes from the word *carabina,* the gun used by the national police at that time.

Carnivals: Uruguayan Carnival festivities are the longest of their kind in the world. They start at the beginning of January and run all the way to the middle of March.

Caudillo (Chieftain): Political leader of a small town or neighbourhood characterized by charismatic and paternalist leadership.

Comparsas: Carnival groups very popular in Uruguay.

Comuna (Commune): Limited territory that coincides with municipalities in Chile, with one exception. Includes people and goods.

Congreso de Intendentes: Mayors' Congress (Departmental Government Board).

Cuentas públicas: Public accountability.

Ediles: Aedils, Departmental Boards members (Legislative Power at departmental government) elected together with the *Intendentes* in Uruguay.

Faruchos: Popular boats known made of *ruils,* trees native to Empedrado.

Gobiernos Departamentales: Departmental Governments or the intermediate level of government in Uruguay namely Intendencias which have executive (Intendente) and legislative bodies (Juntas Departamentales).

Horizontal governance: Collaborative actions toward collective goals within a local community which implies horizontal relationship and networking between municipal

government and civil society based on co-responsibilities to manage development problems.

Huaso: Peasant from the center and south of Chile. Similar to gauchos of the River Plate zone.

Huinca: White people, Spanish conquerors in Mapudungún language.

Huilas: Non indigenous people. Mapuche language.

Iemanjá: Nigerian religious ceremony (Umbanda) brought by enslaved Africans to Uruguay.

Juntas Departamentales: Departmental Boards, Legislative Power at departmental government in Uruguay.

Juntas de Vecinos (Neighbourhood Boards): Neighbourhood commissions created by the national government in Chile, in the decade of 1960. They are one of the most common spaces for citizen participation at the local level in this country.

La Chimba: "On the other side" in Quecha language. Municipality of Recoleta.

Las Llamadas: The Calls are the largest popular celebrations in Uruguay. Every year in February, Montevideo is decorated for Candombe and Comparsas to take place in the neighbourhoods of Sur and Palermo (Afro-descendants neighbourhoods).

Lonko: Mapuche community leader who is considered the oldest and wisest man. Lonko inherited their leadership within Mapuche communities from their parents, and they from their grandparents, according to Mapuche worldwide.

Mapudungún: Mapuche language.

Machi: Doctor in Mapuche communities.

Medio Luto: Rural village located in the Municipality of Isidoro Noblía where Afro-descendants settled almost one hundred years ago.

Mizangas: Afro-descendant feminist collective founded in 2006 that advocates for human rights agenda in Uruguay that includes gender equality, sexual diversity, social and political participation of Afro-descendant women; it also fights against structural racism and discrimination from an inter-sectional approach. Mizangas is made up of many social networks. Mizangas is a word of African origin that means the beads in a necklace of protection. They have contributed to the National Agenda for Afro-descendant Women in the framework of the National Network of Afro-descendant Women (Red NAMUA) that supports political advocacy at departmental and national levels. In addition, Mizangas has promoted the approval of the Law N° 19.075 and the Law N° 19.122. In 2019, Mizangas organized the visit of Dr. Angela Davis in Uruguay through the Project Horizontes de Libertad, financed by the European Union.

Mundo Afro: Afro-descendant organization established in 1988 that emerged from ACSUN. Since its foundation, this organization has been advocating for the recognition and inclusion within the Uruguayan society of the Afro-Uruguayans. This organization achieved the inclusion of ethnicity data within national census in this country.

Murgas: One of the most popular Uruguayan forms of cultural expression. Despite being a cultural manifestation originally from Cadiz, Spain since 1908, the Uruguayan murga has gone through numerous transformations since the end of the nineteenth century. Costume design and makeup in murga draw some of their influence from similar European artistic expressions. Uruguayan murga is made up of 17 people: a scene and chorus director, 13 singers in the chorus divided by their vocal range, and three members making up the percussion section which is split into cymbals, bass drum and snare drum. Whether in Montevideo or anywhere outside the capital, murgas bring a refreshing humorous, satirical and critical view on current events, expressed through this traditional theatrical format with song, costume and vibrant makeup.

Neighbours: Residents of a neighbourhood or a small town, located in a one of the selected municipalities. They are considered potential participating citizens in this research project.

Portuñol: Mixture between Spanish and Portuguese.

Quilombo or Quilombolas: Bantu origin word. Quilombo was a sheltered space where slaves ran away from plantations in many Latin American countries.

Raid: Traditional horse marches organized by social and cultural clubs since the decade of 1940, in the rural area of Uruguay.

Ruil: Notofagus alessandri, species of tree, native from Empedrado.

Saladeros: Meat salting establishments.

Santoral: The group of towns named after saints such as San Ramón, San Antonio, San Baustista, San Jacinto and Santa Lucía; located in Canelones Department.

Umbanda: Sincretism between Catholicism, Afro beliefs and Kardecist doctrine.

Unidades Vecinales: Neighbourhood Units. Administrative division in the Municipality of Recoleta.

We Tripantu: Mapuche New Year celebration in Winter solstice between 21st and 24th June.

List of Acronyms

AChM: Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades [Chilean Association of Municipalities]

ACSUN: Asociación Cultural y Social Uruguay Negro

AMCAM: Asociación de Municipalidades con Alcalde Mapuche

AMRA: Asociación de Municipalidades Región de la Araucanía [Association of Municipalities of La Araucania]

ANII: Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación [National Agency of Research and Innovation]

CAIF: Centro de Atención a la Infancia y a la Familia [Child and Family Care Center]

CASEN: Encuesta de Caracterización Socio-Económica Nacional [National Socio-economic characterization survey]

CCZ: Centro Comunal Zonal [Zonal Community Center]

CESFAM: Centro de Salud Familiar [Family Health Center]

CONADI: Coorporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena [National Coorporation of Indigenous Development]

CONAF: Coorporación Nacional Forestal [National Forestry Corporation]

COSOC: Consejos de la Sociedad Civil [Communal Council of Civil Society]

CVs: Consejos Vecinales [Neighbourhood Councillors]

DIDECO: Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario [Community Development Direction]

ETAF: Equipos Territoriales de Atención Familiar [Territorial Family Care Teams]

FA: Frente Amplio [Broad Front]

FIGEM: Fondo de Incentivo al Mejoramiento de la Gestión Municipal-Chile [Incentive Fund for the Improvement of Municipal Management]

FIGM: Fondo de Incentivo a la Gestión Municipal-Uruguay [Uruguay Municipal Developent Incentivization Fund]

FONDEVE: Fondo de Desarrollo Vecinal [Neighbourhood Development Fund]

FNDR: Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional [National Regional Development Fund]

FRIL: Fondo Regional de Inversión Local [Regional Local Investment Fund]

IDE: Infraestructura de Datos Geoespaciales [Territorial System of Information]

INDAP: Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario [Agricultural Development Institute]

INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National Institute of Statistics]

LOCM: Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades [Constitutional Organic Law of Municipalities]

MDR: Mesas de Desarrollo Rural [Rural Development Boards]

MEVIR: Movimiento de Erradicación de la Vivienda Insalubre Rural [Rural Unhealthy Housing Eradication Movement]

MIDES: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social [Ministry of Social Development]

MPP: Movimiento de Participación Popular [Popular Participation Movement]

NBI: Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas [Unsatisfied Basic Needs]

OPP: Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto [Budget and Planning Office, Uruguay]

OTU: Observatorio Territorio Uruguay [Observatory Territory Uruguay]

PB: Participatory Budget

PLADECO: Plan de Desarrollo Comunitario [Community Development Plan]

PLAEDEZ: Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo Zonal [Strategic Plan for Zone Development]

POA: Plan Operativo Anual [Annual Operative Plan]

PRODESAL: Programa de Desarrollo Local [Local Development Program]

PRSD: Partido Radical Social Demócrata [Radical Social Democrat Party]

RIMISP: Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural [Latin American Center for Rural Development]

RN: Renovación Nacional [National Renovation]

SDG: Sustainable Development Goals

SEREMI: Secretarías Regionales Ministeriales [Regional Ministerial Secretariats]

SECPLAN: Secretaría Comunal de Planificación [Secretary of Communal Planning]

SINIM: Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal [National System of Municipal Information]

SOCAT: Servicio de Orientación, Consulta y Articulación Territorial [Orientation, Consultation and Territorial Articulation Service]

SUBDERE: Sub-Secretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo [Sub-secretary for Regional and Administrative Development]

UDI: Unión Demócrata Independiente [Independent Democratic Union]

UI: Uruguay Integra Program, Budget and Planning Office of Uruguay.

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme